might be discussed at a quadripartite meeting in October.

Arguments in favour of the United States Plan

47. (a) It provides a method which perhaps would be more quickly negotiated to bring the Americans into the Antarctic permanently as a counter-balance to the Russians.

(b) Provided an effort is made to go on from the first stage to extend the condominium to include all the Antarctic powers as at 45 (c) above, it provides a practical first step toward internationalising the whole continent.

(c) By excluding the Russians it would leave them without any legitimate pretext for remaining in Antarctica and might contribute toward securing their departure. All the arguments against inviting the Russians to join the scheme at paragraph 33 above may also be adduced in favour of the American plan.

(d) All the arguments against presentation of the plan to the United Nations also apply. In so far as it envisaged a solution to the problem of sovereignty along the lines indicated in paragraph 45 above, it has the advantage of theoretically settling once and for all any possibility of further disputes over sovereignty.

There are also certain advantages already enumerated as in favour of the United Kingdom plan at paragraph 43 above, which would be common to any scheme for internationalisation.

Arguments against the United States plan

48. (a) All the arguments in favour of Russian inclusion apply.

(b) All the arguments in favour of presentation to the United Nations apply.

/(c)

(e) From the U.K. angle a further objection is that the plan would be portrayed by critics of the Government as a further example of dismembering the Empire.

(f) The Argentines and Chileans, whether they agreed to join the scheme or not, would regard U.K. readiness to do so as a sign that she was weakening in her intention to maintain her claim and might correspondingly stiffen their attitude.

(g) Similarly, the Argentines might be encouraged in their pretensions to the Falkland Islands.

The United States Plan

45. According to present information American policy for the Antarctic is to:-

(a) claim the unclaimed zone.

(b) Invite the Australian and New Zealand Governments to merge the three zones into a single condominium involving a joint administration along the lines of a board of directors.

(c) At a later date invite the other Antarctic powers to join the condominium.

(d) Exclude Soviet Russia from the condominium.

(e) Make no attempt to secure the approval of the United Nations. The State Department think in terms rather of blocking any adverse vote there rather than of securing support. Whatever happened in the United Nations a stalemate could always be ensured which would leave the status quo, which would by then, of course, be whatever had resulted from the merger of the various zones.

46. We have no further details about the American plan. It seems probable that the Americans do not regard the above plan as necessarily a final one; they have asked to have more details of the U.K. proposals and have suggested that the whole question

/might

(d) It would ensure increased scientific and other co-operation in the Antarctic, which would particularly benefit the countries whose activities are at present limited by financial and other resources. It would be particularly welcomed by small nations and member-nations with small claims as giving them greater scope for participation in activities throughout the continent including the sharing in benefits from exploitation of any valuable mineral deposits.

(e) It would satisfy that body of world opinion which favours the internationalisation of Antarctica, and corresponding prestige would accrue to the founder-members for having put it forward.

(f) For this reason, the Governments of the Antarctic powers would be better able to present the proposal in the face of hostile public opinion than in the case of a scheme which was of a less sweeping character and which did not purport to banish the cold war from the whole continent. This would be of particular importance in Argentina and Chile.

Arguments against the United Kingdom Plan

44. (a) All the arguments against the inclusion of Soviet Russia described in paragraph 33 are also arguments against the United Kingdom scheme.

(b) All the arguments against seeking the prior approval of the United Nations.

(c) The element of doubt about the possibility of an effective demilitarisation plan inherent in paragraph 43 (a). But see paragraph 34 (b) above.

(d) Although the United Kingdom plan theoretically shelves the dispute over sovereignty in the United Kingdom zone it does not solve it once and for all or provide a complete guarantee against a revival of the dispute, should one of the parties succeed in backing out of the authority.

/(e)

be invited to take the leading part in exerting pressure on the Chileans and Argentines, who might regard such pressure coming from the United Kingdom as indicating weakness in their attitude over the territorial dispute. No publicity should be given to the proposal and therefore no approaches even of a diplomatic character should be made to any country other than the United States until after the Argentine elections in February 1958. In order, however, to forestall the danger of unacceptable proposals being brought forward in the United Nations during the General Assembly of 1958, action should be begun during the summer of 1958, always supposing that the new Argentine Government was not publicly and irrevocably committed against any change in the status quo.

Arguments in favour of United Kingdom Plan

43. (a) By the inclusion of Soviet Russia it would have all the advantages indicated in paragraph 34 above, including particularly the fact that, given reasonable co-operation from the Russians, it should then be possible to secure the effective demilitarisation of the whole continent.

(b) The position of the United States in the Antarctic would be regularised, with the certainty that she would neither leave the Australians face to face alone with the Russians nor embarrass others of the Antarctic powers by making claims which clashed with theirs.

(c) It would provide against the possible withdrawal from the Antarctic of the United Kingdom in that it would solve the present dispute over sovereignty in the United Kingdom zone, thereby rendering unnecessary the excessive costs of present activities directed mainly towards maintaining a legal claim in the face of Argentine and Chilean pretensions.

/(d)

THE RIVAL MERITS OF EXISTING PROPOSALS

The United Kingdom Plan

42. This presupposes the formation of an international authority composed of the Antarctic powers, the United States and Russia, and possibly other countries with an interest in the area such as South Africa, with a solution of the problem of sovereignty along the lines indicated at paragraph 17 (b) above; the administrative arrangements would follow the lines set out in paragraphs 19 to 21, and the charter of the authority would state that one of its purposes was to provide for the complete and effective demilitarisation of the whole continent. The charter would also state as a purpose of the authority the promotion of international scientific collaboration in exploring and developing the continent for the benefit of the whole world. The United Nations General Assembly would in due course be invited to approve the proposal. Proposals for establishing the authority would be presented simultaneously to the Chilean, Argentine, French, Norwegian and Soviet Governments after substantial agreement had been reached between the Commonwealth Governments concerned and the United States. In order, however, to take account of the special susceptibilities at least of the French, and maybe, as agreed in discussion with the Americans, of some or all of the others as well, in respect of being faced with a cut and dried plan fixed in advance it might be necessary to precede a formal invitation to join the scheme by confidential soundings conducted by either the United States or the U.K. Government. The United States Government would

/be

the United Nations would be very much more difficult because -

(a) the Russians would almost certainly encourage the anti-colonial powers to condemn the proposal as an example of "19th Century Imperialism", adding to these charges their own voices and those of their satellites; and this would make it far more difficult to prevent the inscription of the Antarctic on the General Assembly agenda;

(b) the Indians and "neutralists" would be concerned at the consequences of causing the Antarctic to become another subject of discord in great power relations;

(c) it would in fact be impossible to guarantee the demilitarisation of the area unless the Russians were members of the authority, and our best argument in the United Nations would thus be lost.

41. The United Kingdom view is that the balance of advantage lies with referring the plan to the United Nations after full agreement on the authority has been reached. As explained above, approval of the plan by the United Nations will depend to a very large degree on whether or not the Russians are members of the authority. If they were, and of course on the assumption of American support, there should be some prospect of securing approval for an acceptable arrangement. It would be important to ensure that the plan were properly presented to the United Nations, and in doing this some emphasis would have to be placed upon the world-wide benefits which should ensure from the establishment of the authority in the increased possibilities of international co-operation, particularly in regard to demilitarisation and in the scientific fields.

/THE

to the United Nations, to replace the authority by a United Nations administering body with broad geographical representation responsible to the General Assembly and paid for from the United Nations budget. (Other countries pressing to be included in the authority might of course be put off by making it clear in the draft constitution of the authority that all its members would share equally in the costs involved, and that the costs of the authority should not become a charge on the United Nations budget). Alternatively an attempt might be made to secure for the General Assembly the right to examine and make recommendations upon the actions of the authority.

38. It is clear that any scheme likely to pass the Assembly might give the United Nations such powers of interference as to render the plan unacceptable to the Antarctic Powers. But no attempt to by-pass the United Nations could prevent the proposals that the United Nations should debate this question, and it is by no means certain that sufficient votes could be secured to prevent the inscription of an item on the subject on the United Nations Assembly Agenda. Much would depend on the United States position, and on the basis of their attitude over the Oman question they would be unlikely to oppose inscription.

39. We have considered the possibility that the parties to the agreement for the authority might merely register the Agreement with the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter, and leave it at that. But as explained above this would not prevent attempts to debate the agreement in the Assembly.

40. The foregoing arguments apply whether or not it is decided to include the Soviet Union in the proposed authority. But if the Soviet Union were excluded the position vis-a-vis

/the

(a) many members of the United Nations take a keen interest in the question (for example the abortive proposal of the Indians in 1956 that the Antarctic should be considered by the General Assembly) and it is bound to be raised there sooner or later, whether an international authority of the kind under review is established or not;

(b) presentation of the project as one for which the parties concerned wished to secure U.N. approval would facilitate the task of the Argentine and Chilean Governments in presenting the scheme to public opinion in their countries. The same would apply to a greater or lesser degree in the case of all the Antarctic powers;

(c) if the scheme were not presented to the United Nations the powers now claiming sovereignty in the area would certainly be accused of establishing "collective imperialism" behind the Organisation's back.

36. The arguments against any reference to the United Nations are:

(a) a majority of the members of the United Nations have no valid reasons for concerning themselves with the Antarctic. The onus should be on nations outside the proposed authority to demonstrate the need for it to be discussed in the United Nations, rather than on member nations of the authority to raise it voluntarily;

(b) if the matter were brought before the United Nations by a non-member of the authority there would in theory be nothing to stop the members of the authority refusing to accept the jurisdiction of the United Nations or any resolution passed by the Organisation.

37. As regards the relationship between the authority and the United Nations an attempt might be made, were the plan referred

/to

(e) Although the Russians may maintain that they have adequate justification in international law for establishing themselves in Antarctica, they are no doubt alive to the fact that their present position in the Australian sector is ambiguous and might lead to serious friction with some of the other Antarctic powers. They might therefore be glad of an opportunity of regularising their own position through membership of an international authority,

(f) The Russians are on record as advocating the exploitation of the Antarctic for peaceful purposes. It seems likely that they would behave reasonably well in an international authority of this sort, of which they were founder members; and that they would accept the demilitarisation of Antarctica. Moreover they are more vulnerable in the Antarctic in the event of non-co-operation by other powers than is the case in the northern hemisphere.

(g) If the Russians decide that Antarctica is of particular use to them for strategic, economic or meteorological reasons, they are capable of deploying a far greater effort and in a shorter time than any of the other interested powers, except the United States, thus presenting the powers with a fait accompli.

(h) The Russians are doing useful scientific work in connection with the I.G.Y. and it is arguable that they could make further valuable contributions in this field.

Should the scheme be presented to the United Nations?

35. If agreement is reached among the parties to the proposed authority it is for consideration whether the United Nations should then be informed of what is proposed. Much would depend on the attitude of the Afro-Asians and the Indian position would be of special importance. The arguments in favour are as follows:

/(a)

prevent the creation of an international authority which would be acceptable by organising a majority against the project in the United Nations; (ii) to strengthen their own position in Antarctica in order to counter the position there of the Americans.

(b) If the Russians remain in the Antarctic after the I.G.Y. no means exist for ejecting them against their will and cohabitation by agreement with them is preferable to what might otherwise be prolonged friction. The continent could only be effectively demilitarised if they agreed to co-operate to that end with the other nations concerned. Yet demilitarisation provides the only guarantee against the establishment of Russian bases on a large scale in Antarctica which would represent a potential threat not only to Australia and New Zealand and South Africa but to the interests of the free world.

(c) If the Russians left the Antarctic after the I.G.Y. and were not invited to join the authority they would in practice be free to return at any time they wished without any obligation to accept supervision for the purpose of demilitarisation.

(d) The Russians may argue before world opinion that their exclusion was unjustifiable on the following grounds:-

(i) In their view Admiral Bellingshausen discovered Antarctica in 1819.

(ii) Their efforts in Antarctica during the I.G.Y. are greater than those of any other power except the United States.

(iii) They announced in 1950 that they wanted to be included in any scheme for Antarctica such as the condominium proposed by the Americans in 1948; at the same time they stated that they did not recognise the claims of other powers to sovereignty in Antarctica.

/(e)

discussions decline save on unacceptable terms. This might give to the Soviet (e.g. in Asian eyes) the appearance of Western acknowledgment of its interest in the Antarctic or put the West in the wrong in appearing to place unreasonable conditions on Soviet participation. We might, by our own proposal, elevate the Soviet from the position of trespasser to the status of a legitimate claimant.

(b) The Soviet would not readily surrender their freedom of action by joining an international scheme which would place them in a permanent voting inferiority.

(c) It might be impossible to reach agreement with the Soviet and all others (including the United States) on the principles governing commercial exploitation of minerals.

(d) If the Russians joined the scheme and it subsequently broke down, they might claim to have a permanent stake in the Antarctic, whatever formal arrangements might have been agreed beforehand to provide against such a contingency.

(e) There is no certain evidence that the Russians intend to stay on in the Antarctic after the end of the I.G.Y. An invitation to join made before that date might therefore incline them to stay with all the subsequent complications when they might otherwise not have done so; or to increase their bargaining strength by making a claim to territory.

(f) An international authority for Antarctica (or anywhere else for that matter) is likely to function more smoothly if the Russians are not members of it.

(g) The United States, Argentina and Chile might be reluctant to participate in any arrangements for Antarctica which included the Russians.

34. Arguments in favour

(a) If the Russians are excluded they will try (i) to

/prevent

of Soviet Russia's inclusion is dealt with below. The question arises whether membership should be opened to other powers having no territorial interest or direct historical connection with the Antarctic.

31. South Africa, because of her proximity to and strategic interest in the Antarctic, has indicated that she will wish to participate in any international agreement concerning the Antarctic. If excluded South Africa would be the only country bordering on the Antarctic which would have no part in future arrangements for the area. The disadvantages of excluding South Africa with her legitimate interests in the area should therefore be kept in mind.

32. In the event of South Africa's inclusion it is possible that other countries with a lesser degree of interest may express the wish to join, e.g. India, Uruguay, Ecuador, Belgium and Japan, all of whom have at one time or another shown special interest in the Antarctic in varying degrees. (Japan, however, renounced any political interest in the Antarctic in the San Francisco Treaty). In favour of a broadening of the authority to include other members may be said that so long as it did not contain nations under Soviet influence there would be a larger majority of votes to subdue undesirable proposals by the Russians. On the other hand, the authority would then become unwieldy, the complications inherent in any joint administration venture would be increased, the nations who have particularly strong feelings about their claims would resent being placed on an equal footing with nations having no previous connection with the Antarctic, and finally the Russians would probably seize the opportunity to propose, as members, satellite states.

Should Soviet Russia be invited to join the scheme?

33. Arguments against

(a) If invited to join, the Russians might after lengthy

/discussions

inspection team. If, however, an international body including Russia were set up to administer the area, with provision for prior notification of any activities and with full inspection facilities, such a régime would be a better guarantee against the build-up of a military potential than individual (unrecognised) sovereignty which possesses no power to inspect. If armed intervention is discounted, if only on practical grounds, there remains only moral force supported perhaps by an international convention to provide for the effective demilitarisation of the area. The main provision of any such convention would be a fool-proof inspection system.

27. Effective demilitarisation cannot be achieved by mere statement of intention embodied in a convention unless accompanied by arrangements of prior notification of activities and subsequent inspection. Inspection would be a matter for detailed examination. It might perhaps take the form of one or more of the following different methods:-

(a) Aerial inspection (hampered in Antarctica by weather conditions).

(b) Observers attached to the different expeditions.

(c) Visits by a team of observers representing the authority to the various bases and expeditions.

(d) Inspection by examination of ships' manifests, etc.

28. The convention under which the authority was established would need to state specifically what installations and activities were permitted in order not to contravene the proposed demilitarisation of the area.

29. There would be no objection to any country employing members of their armed forces on peaceful and scientific expeditions.

Composition of the international authority

30. The authority would be composed at least of the seven Antarctic claimant powers and the United States. The question

/of

arrangement preventing them from applying their own law so long as no disputes with other nations arose. A possible way of getting round this difficulty would be a compromise, admittedly unsatisfactory from the purely formal standpoint, in which at least during an initial period each nation remained free to administer its expeditions and bases under its own law so long as more than a certain proportion of the participants were nationals of the state in question. If the proportion of other nationals were higher or in the event of offences involving members of other expeditions or bases, recourse would be had to regulations to be drawn up by the authority. Until these regulations had been compiled it would be agreed that offences would be tried under the national law and in the national courts of the offender. In all cases and even after the compilation of the authority's regulations and the establishment of its courts, terms of imprisonment would be served in the national prisons of the offender.

Protection of existing rights

22. In order to avoid prejudicing their existing rights by the mere fact of entering into international negotiations, the parties concerned might formally reserve the present position as a condition of taking part in such negotiations. If so this point would no doubt be taken into account in drafting invitations to take part in discussions to other powers who have at present no claim in the area. At a later stage there would be the question, already mentioned in paragraph 18, of safeguarding existing rights by incorporating in any international agreement which might be concluded, a provision to ensure that the legal status quo at the beginning was preserved and remained unaffected by the subsequent activities of any member-nation.

/Lines of International

Lines of International co-operation relevant to the Antarctic

(a) International scientific co-operation

23. The scale of activity during the International Geophysical Year provides a practical example of the advantages of international co-operation in the scientific field. The extension of such co-operation under the aegis of the proposed authority is likely to prove not only of direct benefit to the participating powers but in view of the special opportunities in the Antarctic to be of much wider international interest. This is a point which would be of special importance in the public presentation of the proposal at a later stage and in enlisting wider international support at the appropriate time. It should be stated in the charter of the proposed international authority that one of its objects was to further co-operation in the field of scientific research to promote the peaceful exploration of the Antarctic and to assist the development of its natural resources not exclusively in the interests of any one country. It might be added that the authority should devote itself to promoting joint operations to these ends between the participating nations.

(b) Exploitation of Mineral and Other Resources

24. No mineral deposits of great value have so far been discovered in Antarctica. But owing to the unprecedented scale of activities there in connection with the I.G.Y. it is possible that important discoveries will be made during the next eighteen months. In order that this should not give rise to new disputes or the exacerbation of old ones, an effective licensing system agreed to by all concerned would be useful. This might take the form of a requirement by the proposed international authority that licences be required, both from members and non-members, for exploitation of any minerals or other resources found, with the payment of royalties. The level of these would be determined in the first place by the desirability of covering the expenses of

/the

the authority in this way if possible. Royalties would be payable at a higher rate by non-members. In the event of a very rich find it is possible that the authority would in this way receive a considerable surplus over its expenses. This would be divided among members either equally or at a variable rate, perhaps in proportion to the level at which they had contracted to contribute towards the authority's expenses in the initial agreement. Such an arrangement might provide an additional incentive to favour the scheme for nations which claim large zones but are reluctant or unable to incur the expense of developing them.

Relationship of the proposed International Authority with United Nations bodies

25. The proposed authority should be able to co-operate with various United Nations bodies. In particular such Specialised Agencies as the World Meteorological Organisation and the ICAO should benefit from the increased opportunities for research and international co-operation offered by the proposed authority. In the same way, it is for consideration whether, if a permanent United Nations Force is eventually established, it could be used in the system of inspection which is discussed in paragraph 27 below. These aspects of the work of the Authority would be of particular value if the plan were to be presented to the United Nations (see paragraphs 35-41 below dealing with the question of presenting the plan to the United Nations).

Demilitarisation

26. At present, if Russia were to put down an airfield or to create reserves of, e.g., oil and petrol of military potential, the power (if any) of inspection would lie only with the Australians in whose zone Russia's main base is located. As Russia does not recognise any claims in Antarctica it is problematical whether they would permit the entry of a national

/inspection

would be necessary to set up an authority consisting of representatives of the constituent states with a convention defining its powers and functions. It might be laid down, for example, that the authority would take decisions by vote, possibly a two-thirds majority, save on certain questions (e.g. relating to arrangements for undermining effective demilitarisation) for which unanimity might be required.

20. The authority would have to set up a headquarters, and such arrangements for liaison as might prove necessary in each constituent country, as well as in the various areas of activity in Antarctica. The authority and all members of the authority would have unrestricted rights of access to the whole of the area and to any installations created thereon. All members of the authority and their nationals (including commercial undertakings) would have right of entry throughout the area. Rights of exploration and exploitation would be subject to prior approval by the international authority and periodic inspection of activities by the authority. All non-members of the authority and their nationals would have the same rights subject to the same conditions but would require licences from the authority.

Law

21. Provision for police powers and for the institution of criminal law would be necessary from the beginning, and the most satisfactory solution would be for the international authority to adopt a criminal code applicable to the whole of Antarctica. The simplest way of doing this would be for the authority to adopt the law and make use of the courts of one constituent country. But as Antarctic activities will continue mainly to be on the basis of national bases and expeditions it is perhaps unrealistic to suppose that participating nations would welcome any

/arrangement

dissolved there would be a return to the status quo and states which had claimed sectors of the Antarctic would resume their residual claims while member-nations who had made no such claims at the outset and did not recognise the claims of others (e.g. the United States or Soviet Russia) would be free to re-assert complete liberty of action in the whole area or to make claims based on rights previously acquired. Careful provision would have to be made in the convention to provide for the freezing of the legal status quo at the beginning, in such a way that it would in no way be affected by the subsequent activities of any member-nation. Similarly any licences issued to non-members would be accompanied by a clear statement to the effect that the status quo would not be affected by any action on their part.

(c) A condominium

National sovereignty would be pooled, i.e. vested collectively in the states parties to it. States not already having claims to sectors of the Antarctic at the outset of the campaign would be invited by the other powers to join in the arrangement and thenceforward would have equal rights over the whole area to the other members. Under such an arrangement it would be theoretically possible to provide by special agreement for a return to the status quo in which some members had claims over certain areas and others had none. But in practice once a nation had enjoyed sovereignty in a condominium, it would be unlikely to give up its claim altogether. In the absence of any permanent populations or national administrations in Antarctica the usual bases for a condominium are absent; nevertheless there is nothing inherent in the concept of a condominium which would presuppose the establishment of any one type of administrative machinery in the area.

Administration

19. Whatever solution were reached as regards sovereignty, it

/would

its relations with other states or international organisations would be very difficult to determine. In the initial stages at least it would, although sovereign, be entirely dependent on the constituent countries on all fundamentals such as the legal and administrative systems to be applied, and it would take many years fully to establish its own system of law and administration. Even having regard to the likelihood of increased activity in Antarctica in years to come, the administrative and legal problems which will arise should not call for such cumbersome machinery. The greatest obstacle, however, would be the reluctance as a matter of national prestige and pride of many of the constituent countries to surrender their sovereignty over their possessions. They may be prepared eventually to give up the substance of sovereignty but they are likely to object to any proposal to give up sovereignty in name even if this is really only a shadow.

(b) An International Authority without sovereignty in name

Public opinions which would not accept renunciation of sovereignty in name may nevertheless be prepared to accept the handing over to an international authority of the attributes of this sovereignty which are necessary to its efficient functioning. For example, Panama signed away all the rights and attributes of sovereignty over the canal zone to the United States but was careful to retain that sovereignty in name. It would be necessary to agree a convention under which far-reaching powers were vested in the authority and in which participating powers contracted not to withdraw (thereby leading to an attempt to reassert sovereign rights) without the consent of the majority of the other participants, if not of all of them.

18. So long as the authority existed, therefore no disputes over sovereignty could arise. But if it were at any time

/dissolved

no apparent likelihood at present of Russian intrusion into the area. As regards a possible American claim, New Zealand might stand to lose a fair proportion of her zone since the main American claim would presumably be in New Zealand territory. In addition:-

(a) Even on the assumption that no claim is made by the Americans, increasing embarrassment would be caused to the New Zealand Government if the United States or other expeditions were for an indefinite period to be able, as at present, to enjoy virtually unrestricted entry to their zone.

(b) The excellent existing relations between New Zealand and the United States over the Antarctic and the present dependence of the Americans on facilities in New Zealand territory for pursuing large-scale activities would ensure that New Zealand interests were adequately protected in negotiations for an international régime. There is no guarantee that these favourable conditions will continue indefinitely.

C. AN INTERNATIONAL RÉGIME

Sovereignty

17. The following solutions to the problem of where sovereignty would lie have been considered:-

(a) A sovereign international authority

This would have the advantages that in theory disputes as to sovereignty, jurisdiction or control could not arise. It would, however, be very difficult to work in practice. There is no precedent for such an arrangement. A sovereign authority which would not be a state, nor yet an international organisation set up for a definite purpose and with a clearly-defined set of powers, would be an entirely new phenomenon. Its position in international law would be most uncertain and

/its

(a) Satisfactory relations which could hardly be improved under any other arrangement exist for scientific work between the United States and Australian authorities.

(b) The Russians may leave the Antarctic altogether after the I.G.Y., rendering any change in the present arrangement superfluous.

(c) If the Russians leave and the United States is not pressed further to make a claim, the United States may not do so, provided they are given freedom of action and facilities where required.

13. Against the status quo:-

The arguments at 4(a), 4(d) and 4(e) above apply with particular strength. Furthermore, there is a possibility that, since the United States do not recognise the claim of any nation, they may claim part of the Australian zone. There are indications that if projects for internationalisation come to nothing and if the Americans continue activities on their present scale, they will wish to hold sovereignty over some Antarctic territory and will press on with a formal claim.

The New Zealand Zone

14. Sovereignty was established by an Order-in-Council of 1923. Relatively little exploration and scientific work has been carried out independently of the Americans. The Americans have established three bases in the zone and the New Zealanders have one base as well as a joint New Zealand-United States base. There is no Russian activity in the zone.

Arguments which apply particularly to the New Zealand Zone

15. In favour of the status quo:-

All the arguments at paragraph 12 above apply, except possibly that in sub-paragraph (c).

16. Against the status quo:-

The arguments at paragraph 13 above apply, although there is

/no

Norwegian and French Zones

8. The Norwegian zone is comparatively unexplored. It is constitutionally a part of the Norwegian State and an Act of the Storting would be necessary to alter its status. The Japanese and Belgians will be operating independently in the Norwegian zone during the I.G.Y. The Norwegians have one base in the zone in connection with the I.G.Y. The French zone is small and has been fairly well explored. There is no evidence of valuable mineral deposits. They have two bases, both of which were established before the I.G.Y.

Arguments which apply particularly in the Norwegian and French Zones

9. In favour of the status quo the Norwegians have a relatively unchallenged claim to sovereignty and so far no Russian or American bases have been established in their zone. The French are in a similar position.

Against the status quo

10. Both zones might be entered by the Russians without supervision. In the event of a valuable discovery in their areas by another power Norway and France probably would not benefit economically. Admittedly the French zone probably has no valuable minerals but this is an argument in favour of some arrangement which would give her more scope in the rest of the continent.

The Australian Zone

11. Sovereignty was established by an Order-in-Council of 7th February, 1933, brought into effect by Proclamation on the 24th August, 1936. A good deal of exploration and scientific work has been carried out independently of the Americans. The Americans have established one base in the zone and the Russians three, with probably three more this year, all in connection with the I.G.Y. In response to a request from Soviet Russia, the Australians have offered facilities for air transit; this offer, however, has not so far been used.

Arguments which apply particularly to the Australian Zone

12. In favour of the status quo:-

/(a)

7. Against the status quo:-

(a) In order to maintain their claim, the United Kingdom must maintain activities in the relevant areas equal to or greater than those of the Argentines and Chileans. As the Argentine activities are considerable, this involves a high level of expenditure which is inconsistent with the current requirements to economize on overseas expenditure. In the opinion of the United Kingdom the expenditure needed to maintain and strengthen her legal claims could be more profitably devoted to e.g. scientific work and exploration of the area. In these circumstances the only possible solutions are to withdraw from the Antarctic altogether or to participate in an international régime in which none of the three competing countries would be required to engage in further costly competitive activities.

(b) This argument applies in greater or lesser degree both to Argentina and Chile as regards their corresponding claims in the United Kingdom zone.

(c) The need for the United Kingdom (and probably Argentina and Chile too) to devote most of their work in the Antarctic to competitive activities intended to bolster up their claims means that less effective scientific work can be carried on.

(d) The disappearance of the existing dispute and the establishment of an international régime would facilitate the carrying out of scientific work by the possibility of pooling with other powers, particularly Chile and Argentina, over e.g. shipping for the relief and provisioning of bases.

/Norwegian and French Zones

The United Kingdom Zone

5. The United Kingdom claim which was formally stated in 1907 and 1917 is overlapped by those of Argentina and Chile, made initially in respectively 1928 and 1940. The United Kingdom has offered to solve the resulting dispute with these two countries by recourse to the International Court or arbitration, but the offer has been rejected. Incidents have occurred which, at the time, threatened to affect good relations between the three countries, and it is desirable on these grounds alone that a peaceful agreement of the dispute should be found if possible. Among the groups of islands lying to the north of Graham Land in the United Kingdom zone, the South Sandwich Islands and South Georgia, both north of latitude 60°, are regarded by the United Kingdom as falling outside the area to be regarded for the purposes of this paper as falling within the Antarctic. Both groups of islands are, however, included in the claim made by the Argentine Government. A small part of the Chilean claim lies outside either the United Kingdom or the Argentine claims, to the west.

Arguments which apply particularly to the United Kingdom zone.

6. In favour of the status quo:-

(a) Provided there is no serious change in the balance of United Kingdom, Argentine and Chilean current activities, the United Kingdom claim would still probably be victorious in the event of a decision by the International Court or arbitration.

(b) Any element of recognition of the Argentine position in the Antarctic might be regarded in the Argentine as a weakening in the United Kingdom attitude and lead to greater pressure being exercised against her over the Falkland Islands.

/7.

General arguments against the status quo

4. (a) The arrival in the Antarctic of the Americans and Russians, with uncertainty about their future intentions, renders relatively precarious the position of all claimants to Antarctic zones and is an argument in favour of a régime in which the position of all concerned would be regularised.

(b) In the absence of any effective demilitarisation of the continent, the presence of the Russians introduces strategic uncertainties and renders necessary more or less costly defence precautions.

(c) In the uncertainty consequent upon the presence of the Russians and the Americans, it is likely that either the Russians or some other nation may put forward proposals in the United Nations for internationalising the whole area under the United Nations, which would be unacceptable to all the present claimants, and difficult to resist.

(d) There is no real check on the activities of the Russians and so long as they remain, effective demilitarisation could be brought about only through some international arrangement.

(e) Even if the Russians leave the Antarctic after the I.G.Y., there is no guarantee that they will not return, possibly with the intention of establishing military bases if the international situation should deteriorate. In that event there would not be any means of keeping a check on their activities.

(f) The present current of opinion in many countries, fomented partly by public interest in the I.G.Y., is favourable to international co-operation in the Antarctic. The Cold War has not yet been extended to the Antarctic. This favourable climate of opinion and absence of conflict may not last for long after the end of the I.G.Y. and therefore the present moment offers an opportunity which may not recur for considering a change in the status quo.

/The United

they do not recognise any of these claims. The United States have established bases in the United Kingdom, Australian and New Zealand zones as well as in the unclaimed zone. Although all these bases are established in connection with the I.G.Y., the Americans have also carried out considerable exploration work and air surveying. In the absence of activities by any other powers in the unclaimed zone, American activity there may be said to have provided them with prima facie grounds for making a claim; but it is unlikely that the Americans would be satisfied with this unattractive area alone. The Russians are establishing a number of bases (probably six) all in the Australian zone, in connection with the I.G.Y. It is not known whether they intend to remain in the Antarctic after the I.G.Y.

General arguments in favour of the status quo

3. (a) Important sectors of public opinion in the countries with claims would not wish to see any effective diminution of their national sovereignty.

(b) The presence of the Americans provides some insurance against possible hostile Russian activities.

(c) Although no significant mineral deposits have so far been found, some may be revealed in the course of the current survey programme and under the status quo these could perhaps at least in theory be exploited without any requirement to share the fruits of the discovery with other nations if it were wished to do so.

(d) Any attempt to change the status quo may precipitate friction with the Russians or a Russian claim, or complications in the United Nations which would result in a situation worse than the present one.

/General arguments against the status quo

ANTARCTICA

A. PREAMBLE

Meetings were held on September 12 and 13 in London between representatives of Her Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada (as observers) to discuss a proposal suggested informally by the United Kingdom for the establishment of an international régime in the Antarctic. This proposal was discussed from every angle and it was decided that, in preparation for the discussions which the United States Government had proposed should be held in Washington with interested parties in October, a paper should be prepared setting out the principal results of the discussions. It was agreed that a description should be given of the existing position in the Antarctic, and that this should be followed by an account of the arguments for and against a continuation of the status quo, an analysis of the principal problems which would arise in establishing an international régime with particular reference to where sovereignty would lie, how effective demilitarisation could be brought about, the extent of the membership and in particular the status of Russia, the special problem of economic exploitation, and the way in which the United Nations would be brought into the picture. Finally, the rival merits of the plans so far favoured by the United Kingdom, the United States and the suggestion for a limited demilitarisation programme which the Australians would like to explore would be compared.

B THE STATUS QUO

2. The entire continent, with the exception of the so-called unclaimed zone (map attached) is divided into sectors to which claims have been laid at various times by seven nations (the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, Norway and France). The United States and Soviet Russia have made clear that

/they do

ANTARCTICA

CONTENTS OF PAPER

ANTARCTICA

A working paper prepared on the basis of discussions between representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, in the presence of Canadian observers in London on the 12th and 13th September, 1957.

WES 147/58/1

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE,
DOWNING STREET, LONDON, S.W.1.

IFA de Villiers Esq.
S. Africa House

With the Compliments of the
Under-Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations

Secret & Guard

27 SEP 1957

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SECRET AND GUARD

Union from the meteorological point of view and we may in time have to establish permanent weather stations there. From the point of view of air communications Antarctica may provide an essential staging post for the Union and other countries in the southern hemisphere. In the event of any disruption of Suez, the passage between the Cape and the Antarctic coast will be a ~~vital~~ lifeline between East and West; South Africa is therefore bound to be essentially concerned about who holds and has access to the Antarctic coast on the opposite side.

It is clear therefore that, in addition to its desire to play a full and useful part in the administration and development of Antarctica, the Union cannot ignore the vital importance of Antarctica from the point of view of international security and, indeed, its own national security.

As regards the specific United Kingdom proposal which is now being considered, the Union Government agreed some years ago that an international authority may be a necessary solution.

Various proposals are still in process of formation and adaptation and it is not yet possible to say, therefore, whether and to what extent any particular one will be supported by the Union Government. But it would seem that an international regime composed not only of the present claimants to zones, but also of other countries which have a valid interest in the future of Antarctica, offers the best possibility of incorporating or accommodating the interests of the Union Government.

I would again ask that, in further considering proposals for Antarctica, you should not lose sight of the fact that South Africa is one of the major countries adjacent to the Antarctic circle. I have been asked to express the hope, therefore, that the position and essential interests of South Africa will be taken into full account in the formulation of the proposals which may emerge from these and subsequent discussions.

South African Statement

I have been asked by the Union Government to state that South Africa has very real interests in the Antarctic and that it attaches great importance to them. The Union Government would therefore be gravely perturbed if South Africa were excluded from any international controlling authority which might be contemplated.

South Africa has never advanced any physical claim to Antarctic territory. In default of effective occupation considerable parts of Antarctica must, in our view, still be regarded as terra nullius. That is not to say that we dispute any particular claim, but it does mean that not all territorial claims now made can necessarily be regarded as conferring a greater interest in Antarctica than that of the Union. Indeed, the manner in which control of the Antarctic Continent is exercised must inevitably be of as much concern to the Union as to any other country.

When, therefore, the United States initiated discussions in 1948 on, firstly, an international trusteeship and, subsequently, on a "special regime" for Antarctica, the Union Government formally put forward the reasons which are thought to justify the Union's association with any organisation or machinery which might be devised for the control and administration of Antarctica.

These reasons have already been stated and I shall therefore refer to them now in bare outline only. The proximity of the Antarctic Continent to South Africa is apparent from the map; in the field of long range and long term strategy the nature of the control, and the composition of the controlling authority, must always be a matter of primary concern to us. When the time comes for economic exploitation and development of the Antarctic Continent, the Union will be one of the countries most closely involved. This is illustrated by the whaling industry which is as yet the only 'Antarctic' industry; the Union has not only participated extensively in whaling in Antarctic waters in recent years, but serves as an intermediate base for the whaling and factory ships of other nations as well. Antarctica is extremely important to the

/Union ....

3. The position as at the end of these meetings was briefly set out in our telegram No 131. Since then the draft basic paper has been prepared and been approved by a further 'old' Commonwealth working party on Wednesday, 25th September. The full background, and a survey of the stage of agreement reached up to the present, are contained in the following documents which are attached:

a) Minutes of Meetings held in London on 12th and 13th September, 1957.

The documents referred to in these minutes are:

(i) the original United Kingdom paper (forwarded under cover of my minute of 16th August);

(ii) a supplementary paper to (i) - (enclosed);

(iii) a paper on Sovereignty, Administration and Neutralisation - (enclosed);

(iv) Australian comments - (enclosed)

b) Statement made by Mr. de Villiers.

c) Background paper for discussions in Washington.

Copy to Washington.

W. D. van SCHALKWYK

Minister.

IdV/AG

19/88/2

AIRMAIL

27th September, 1957.

SECRET AND GUARD

THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Antarctica

As indicated in my telegrams nos. 125 and 131, the series of preliminary discussions by officials of the 'Old' Commonwealth Missions in London was succeeded on September 12th and 13th by three sessions of formal discussions at which an attempt was made to produce an agreed paper on the basis of which the next stage of consultation could be initiated with the Americans in New York or Washington. Since I was myself engaged in the defence discussions which Mr. Erasmus has been conducting with the United Kingdom authorities, the Union Government was again represented by Mr. I.F.A. de Villiers assisted by Mr. A. Drake. The New Zealand delegation also remained unchanged, but the United Kingdom delegation included (as chairman) the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Sir Henry Lintott, and numerous advisers, and the Australian delegation included Mr. A. H. Tange, Australian Secretary for External Affairs, and Sir Edwin McCarthy, the Deputy High Commissioner in London.

2. In the absence of instructions further to your telegram No 125, the Union delegation gave much anxious thought to the line it should adopt. It became increasingly clear as the discussions proceeded (and as suggested in my despatch of 3rd September) that these consultations would contribute to the formation of a basic plan which was designed to lead, after several later stages of consultation with the non-Commonwealth countries concerned, to a new international regime for Antarctica. It therefore appeared to us to be essential that the Union's case should be firmly and clearly stated now, for in the absence of recognition of the Union's interests at this stage it might become progressively more difficult to ensure that the Union will eventually participate. Mr. de Villiers accordingly made a statement on the lines of the annexure referred to below and asked that an acknowledgment of the Union's interests in an international regime for Antarctica be included in the paper which would be prepared as a basis for the next stage of discussion with the United States State Department.

/3. The ....

in international regime. Copies airmailed today.

5) Please inform us of any instructions sent to Washington.

of the Union's interests at this stage it might become progressively more difficult to ensure that the Union will eventually participate. Mr. de Villiers accordingly made a statement on the lines of the annexure referred to below and asked that an acknowledgment of the Union's interests in an international regime for Antarctica be included in the paper which would be prepared as a basis for the next stage of discussion with the United States State Department.

/3. The ....

SECRET (EAS) EXT. AFFRS.

SECRET

IFAdeV.

27th September, 1957.

SECEXTERN PRETORIA

No.

Addressed External Affairs No. 141 repeated Washington No. 12.

~~Further~~ My No. 131. ANTARCTICA.

1) State Department propose convening talks in Washington with Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom from October 5th.
2) Americans first intend to propose merger of possible American claim with Australian and New Zealand zones as initial step. Australia and New Zealand reluctant to press for Union's presence at this stage of talks.
3) Discussions will subsequently be extended by United Kingdom to include background paper prepared here. If question of Union's participation at this stage of talks requested by us in Washington we understand Australia, New Zealand and United Kingdom will then affirm our interest.
4) Background paper just completed embodies firm acknowledgment of Union's interest in eventual participation

/....

and clearly stated now, i.e. in the [illegible] of the Union's interests at this stage it might become progressively more difficult to ensure that the Union will eventually participate. Mr. de Villiers accordingly made a statement on the lines of the annexure referred to below and asked that an acknowledgment of the Union's interests in an international regime for Antarctica be included in the paper which would be prepared as a basis for the next stage of discussion with the United States State Department.

/3. The ....

TELEGRAM.

FROM: SECEXTERN, PRETORIA.

D: 30.9.57.

TO: HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNION OF S.A.

R: 30.9.57.

Addressed to Washington No. 134. (SECRET EAS)

Repeated London No. 172.

Your 151 and Oppositely's 12 to you.

Agree that no approach to State Department is necessary in regard to discussions envisaged in paras 1 and 2 of London's 12.

You should, however, in meantime again remind State Department of Union's particular interest in future of Antarctica and indicate that in the event of wider talks, e.g. those envisaged in London's para 3 Union Government would press strongly for right of participation.

19. Aangesien besprekings tans aan die gang is oor die aangeleentheid het die Hoë Kommissaris in Londen gevra vir 'n aanduiding van die Unie se sienswyse oor die Britse en Amerikaanse planne. U sou vermoedelik in die lig van die oorwegings in paragrawe 8 en 9 hierbo wou oorweeg of dit op hierdie stadium in die Unie se belang is om die Britse plan te ondersteun. U sou miskien ook wou oorweeg of die Unie se Hoë Kommissaris in Londen die Verenigde Koninkryk moet meedeel dat ons steun vir hulle Suidpoolplan gebaseer is op Britse erkenning van ons reg tot lidmaatskap van enige moontlike beheerliggaam vir die gebied.

7. Ondersteuning van die Britse plan mag sekere finansiële en mannekrag-implikasies meebring. Dit is egter twyfelagtig of koste in verband hiermee groter sal wees as in die geval waar ons gebied in die Suidpool mag verkry en moet onderhou om ons eis in stand te hou. Dit is in ieder geval twyfelagtig of ons gebied daar kan bekom en die enigste moontlikheid is om met Noorweë te onderhandel in verband met die sektor onder sy soewereiniteit besuide die Unie.

8. Alhoewel dit geensins seker is of die Britse plan aanvaar sal word nie, sou ondersteuning daarvan deur ons een vernaame voordeel vir die Unie bied. Dit sou meebring dat die Verenigde Koninkryk en ander Gemenebeslande vir die eerste keer erken en hulle sienswyse op rekord plaas dat Suid-Afrika verteenwoordig sal word op enige toekomstige internasionale beheerliggaam vir die Suidpool. Al word die plan as sodanig nie aanvaar nie, sal hierdie erkenning vir Suid-Afrika 'n groot stap vorentoe beteken.

9. Die alternatiewe tot die Britse plan is

(a) die handhawing van die <u>status quo</u>, wat egter nie van die Russe ontslae sal raak indien hulle in die Suidpool aanbly nie en ook nie hulle moontlike bedrywighede daar sal neutraliseer nie en

(b) 'n Amerikaanse plan wat neerkom op 'n samesmelting van „Suidpoolbesittings" deur belanghebbende lande. Vermoedelik sal die betrokke lande 'n internasionale beheerliggaam vorm.

Ingeval hierdie Amerikaanse plan aanvaar word, sal dit die Unie vermoedelik uitsluit, aangesien ons geen gebied in die Suidpool het nie. 'n Ander nadeel daarvan is dat dit twyfelagtig is of so'n plan daarin sal slaag om die Russe na die I.G.J. uit die Gebied te kry.

/...

5. As gevolg hiervan het u op 7 September instruksies gegee dat die Hoë Kommissaris in Londen die Britse owerhede daarop moet wys dat die Unie die grootste belangrikheid heg aan ons belange in die Suidpoolstreke en uiters verontrus voel dat oorweging geskenk word aan 'n beheerliggaam vir die Gebied waarby die Unie nie ingesluit is nie. Die Hoë Kommissaris is versoek om terselfdertyd die Unie se eise in die Suidpool sterk te benadruk op grond van die volgende:-

(i) Die geografiese ligging van die Unie (wat saam met Australië, Nieu-Seeland, Argentinië en Chili een van die vyf belangrikste lande naaste aan die Suidpool is) maak ons aanspraak op 'n territoriale toekenning sterk;

(ii) Die Unie se belange ten opsigte van die Walvisnywerheid in die Gebied is welbekend;

(iii) Suid-Afrika hoop om voordeel te trek uit die opristing van weerstasies in die Suidpoolgebied;

(iv) Ons belang by lugverbindings met die Suidpool;

(v) Wanneer die Gebied ekonomies ontgin en ontwikkel word, sal die Unie weens die ligging van die Kontinent een van die aangewese natuurlike basisse vir sodanige onderneming wees en

(vi) op die gebied van strategie oor lang afstande is die beheer van die Suidpool van primêre belang vir ons.

6. Na hierdie démarche deur ons Hoë Kommissaris skyn die Verenigde Koninkryk nou bereid te wees om oorweging te skenk aan Suid-Afrikaanse lidmaatskap van die voorgestelde Suidpoolowerheid mits die Unie die Britse plan ondersteun.

/...

te hê oor 'n internasionale liggaam met die nodige bevoegdheid om Russiese aktiviteite daar te neutraliseer. Die Australiese owerhede wil egter 'n versekering hê dat dit ooreenkomstig die volkereg moontlik is om territoriale soewereiniteit op te dra aan 'n owerheid soos deur die Britse plan bepoog word.

Op 17 September het die Hoë Kommissaris, Londen, die volgende verdere reaksie van Nieu-Seeland en Australië telegrafies aan die Departement oorgedra:-

„Discussions by old Commonwealth delegations now concluded. No firm commitments as yet but appreciable shift in New Zealand and Australian attitude in favour of United Kingdom proposal for international regime. Working party now drafting document which will incorporate views expressed and serve as basic Commonwealth approach at next stage of discussions in Washington".

(c) Dis onwaarskynlik dat Kanada seggenskap sal wil hê in verband met die beheer van die Suidpoolgebied, aangesien Kanadese belange hoofsaaklik in die Noordpoolgebied is.

4. Aangesien die Verenigde Koninkryk aanvanklik gevoel het dat as Suid-Afrika lid word van die beoogde owerheid dit 'n openingskans sou gee aan ander lande (veral Rusland) wat voorsnog nie gepoog het om belange in die Gebied te verkry nie, het die oorspronklike Britse plan nie voorsiening gemaak vir Suid-Afrikaanse verteenwoordiging nie.

/...

Die gesamentlike beheer van die Gebied deur die agt lande moet verseker dat die presiese voorwaardes van elke „lisensie" uitgevoer word. Die bevoegdheid van die agt lande lê, volgens die Britse siensweyse, daarin dat hulle nie alleen die belangrikste aanspraak op gebied in die Suidpool het nie, maar ook as 'n groep sterk genoeg is om hulle magte doeltreffend en in 'n gees van internasionale regverdigheid uit te voer.

3. Die reaksie van die „ou" Gemenebeslande op die Britse plan is soos volg:-

(a) Nieu-Seeland het 'n gunstige reëling met die Verenigde State in die Nieu-Seelandse sektor van die Suidpoolgebied en kan voorlopig nie voordele in die Britse plan sien wat swaarder weeg as hierdie reëling nie. Die Nieu-Seelanders voel egter dat die moontlike gevaar van onbeheerde Russiese bedrywighede in die Gebied dit noodsaaklik sal maak om die Suidpoolgebied behoorlik te neutraliseer. In so'n geval sou hulle bereid wees om die Verenigde Koninkryk se plan te steun.

(b) Australië heg ook besondere belangrikheid aan die neutralisasie-aspek van die plan, maar is nie bereid om oorweging te skenk aan die afstand van sy soewereiniteit oor Australiese gebied in die Suidpool (wat een van die vereistes van die Britse plan is) tensy behoorlike neutralisasie moontlik is nie. Die Australiërs voel egter dat, as dit onmoontlik is om van die Russe ontslae te raak in die Suidpoolstreke aan die einde van die Internasionale Geofisiese Jaar, dit nodig mag word om 'n ooreenkoms

/...

Die Unie se beleid ten opsigte van die Verenigde Koninkryk se plan insake 'n internasionale owerheid vir die Suidpoolgebied.

Sien asseblief u kommentaar op die aangehegte memorandum oor die Unie se beleid ten opsigte van die Suidpoolgebied. Daardie memorandum bevat onder andere 'n oorsig van die verwikkelings wat tot die voorlegging van 'n nuwe Britse plan vir die beheer van die Gebied gelei het.

Die Britse plan vir 'n internasionale owerheid vir die Suidpoolgebied het as sy belangrikste beweegredes (1) die feit dat die Russe tans ooreenkomstig die program vir die Internasionale Geofisiese Jaar (I.G.J.) in die Gebied gevestig is en (2) die onsekerheid wat bestaan of hulle na die einde van die I.G.J. daar sal padgee.

2. In sy oorspronklike vorm beoog die Britse plan die oprigting van 'n internasionale owerheid bestaande uit die Verenigde Koninkryk, Australië, Nieu-Seeland, die Verenigde State, Argentinië, Chili, Noorweë en Frankryk. (As rede vir Suid-Afrika se uitsluiting is aangevoer dat ons deelname die Russe 'n geleentheid sou bied om ook op verteenwoordiging aan te dring. Aangesien later besef is dat dit onmoontlik mag wees om die Russe na die be-eindiging van die I.G.J. uit die Gebied te kry, het die Britte tot die tentatiewe besluit gekom dat een of ander vorm van internasionale ooreenkoms verkry moet word waaraan die Russe gewillig sou wees om deel te neem. Die grondoorsaak vir die Unie se uitsluiting het dus weggeval. Sien ook paragraph 4 in hierdie verband.) Die „ledelande" sal bydra tot 'n sentrale begroting en die Suidpoolgebied in sy geheel bestuur. Verder word dit in die vooruitsig gestel dat huidige gebiedseise ten opsigte van segmente van die Gebied laat vaar sal word en dat elke land in die owerheid, sowel as dié daarbuite, toegang tot enige deel van die Gebied sal hê, onderworpe aan „lisensies" uitgereik deur die sentrale owerheid. „Lisensies" sal vir ekonomiese, weerkundige en ander doeleindes uitgereik word, dog militêre basisse deur indiwiduele lande sal verbied word.

/...

'n Afskrif van hierdie diensbrief en van die bylae word aan die Hoë Kommissaris in Londen gestuur.

G. P. JOOSTE

SEKRETARIS VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE.

Die Hoë Kommissaris,
LONDEN.

Ter inligting met verwysing na u diensbrief nr. 19/88/2 van 27 September 1957, en bylaes, oor die Suidpoolgebied.

B. G. Jonine
SEKRETARIS VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE.