

SECRET AND GUARD

Zealand. It would provide for continued co-operation with the Americans in the New Zealand sector on a more satisfactory basis than at present; the Americans would presumably bear the main part of the future cost of the activities which would otherwise have been necessary to sustain the New Zealand claim; and it would establish New Zealand rights which the Americans were not prepared to recognise in terms of the existing national claim. Moreover, New Zealand would be in a more favourable position as regards the economic exploitation of the area than would members of the international authority proposed by the United Kingdom; and in addition, the American plan would not be vulnerable to interference by the United Nations Assembly.

- (e) Among the disadvantages of the American plan should be listed the danger that the preliminary American claim to the present unclaimed sector would simply provoke a Russian counter-claim and thus add to the tension existing in the area. Moreover, the plan neither provided effectively for bringing any pressure to bear on the Russians to withdraw, nor held out any hope of reaching a working agreement with them if they decided to stay.
- (f) As drafted, the memorandum (paragraph 6(c)) seemed to suggest that it would be necessary and desirable to secure United Nations approval and support for any Western scheme. The position was rather that it would be important to avoid giving the Russians any opportunity to mobilise world-opinion against such a

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SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

It was agreed that the paragraphs of the memorandum dealing with the pros and cons of the American plan (paras. 5 and 6) should be amended to incorporate these, and the following main points which emerged in discussion:-

- (a) The American plan would at its first stage remove the potential dispute which now existed between, on the one hand Australia and New Zealand, and on the other, the United States, which did not recognise their claims. Such a dispute, if it became open, would be seriously embarrassing to all concerned.
- (b) It could be argued (para 5(a)) that the Americans, who were indeed already installed in the New Zealand sector, would be brought into the area just as quickly under any other plan than that which they had themselves put forward. It was pointed out however that the United Kingdom plan, which was a single-stage operation involving the agreement of all the existing Antarctic powers together with the Americans and the Russians, was likely to take considerably longer to negotiate than the first stage of the American plan, which affected only Australia and New Zealand, and which would have the effect of bringing the Americans, on a regular basis, into the area.
- (c) It was doubtful whether in fact the American plan was likely to succeed in squeezing out the Russians. It seemed more likely that the latter would whip-up anti-American feeling in the United Nations against a 'share-out' of the area, and with this support would then refuse to budge.
- (d) The American plan possessed certain advantages over the United Kingdom scheme, particularly for New

SECRET AND GUARD

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SECRET AND GUARD

of the area by governments other than America, which were not already claimants to sovereignty. Nor was there much likelihood of the Americans being willing to contemplate the accession of further countries to their condominium in case this served as a precedent for a Russian application. For this reason the United Kingdom scheme appeared better to suit the interests of the South African Government. It was agreed that the disadvantage of excluding countries such as South Africa, which had a legitimate interest in the area, should be brought to the attention of the Americans during the forthcoming discussions in Washington. Y

MR. TANGE suggested that it would be desirable to clarify the timing which seemed to be intended for the American plan. Information available to the United Kingdom had indicated (para. 3(c) of the memorandum) that the Americans hoped to proceed to the second stage of their plan, at which all remaining national sectors in the Antarctic would join the Australian-New Zealand-American condominium before the end of 1958. Information more recently available to his Government however showed that the Americans now intended to keep their plan a secret until after the end of the International Geophysical Year, in December, 1958.

MR. CORNER added that there seemed also to be some confusion as to the order in which the Americans hoped to incorporate the remaining sectors, and that in which they proposed to consult the countries concerned. It was generally agreed that despite the lack of certainty as to their intentions in this respect, the general structure of the Americans' plan was clear: its main feature was the progressive establishment of a condominium under the joint administration of a "board of directors" from which the Russians would be excluded. The Americans felt that a plan on these lines offered the maximum opportunity of eventually squeezing the Russians out of the area altogether.

SECRET AND GUARD

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SECRET AND GUARD

advance claims to sovereignty in the area which up to now they had not accepted. Against this, it was pointed out that the 'freezing' would also, in effect, protect the Russians' right not to recognise existing claims, just as it would protect those claims themselves, i.e. the status quo ante would be revived in its entirety. It might indeed be more to the advantage, e.g. of the Americans not to make any claim beforehand (which would have to be confined to the present unclaimed sector) so as to leave themselves free subsequently to make a more extensive one. Moreover, the United Kingdom scheme might well prove acceptable to the Russians in view of their somewhat equivocal legal position in the area and their difficulty in substantiating any claim to sovereignty. It was likely that for somewhat different reasons Chile and the Argentine might welcome such a plan, at least if sponsored by the United States, while France and Norway were unlikely to raise much objection in view of the present vulnerability of their sectors to intrusion by the Russians.

THE CHAIRMAN suggested that the meeting might next consider the alternatives to the United Kingdom scheme, as set out in the summary memorandum on this subject. He accepted a suggestion by Mr. Tange that the possibility of an international demilitarisation convention without other alteration to the existing status quo, which was referred to in the Australian memorandum, should be considered among the possible alternatives. The first alternative course set out in the United Kingdom memorandum was the United States plan. The American Plan (paras 3 - 6)

MR. de VILLIERS said that from the South African point of view, the American plan had the very serious disadvantage that it made no provision for participation in the administration

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SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

did not apply to the United Kingdom proposal which amounted to the indefinite suspension, but not the pooling, of claims to sovereignty. One objective of the United Kingdom scheme was to remove these potential sources of controversy and thus by easing the tension which would result from rival claims by the major powers, perhaps contribute to a voluntary withdrawal of the Russians from the area. For this purpose all claims - including those of Argentina and Chile - would be put into storage and the rights of each country fully protected in the event of a breakdown of the authority. It was clear that there could, in spite of this, in some circumstances be an increased danger of a subsequent Russian claim to sovereignty, but the same danger existed if either no action were taken, or a proposal put forward which did not provide for Russian participation.

SIR EDWIN McCARTHY agreed that there would also be danger in trying to maintain the present status quo. His Government appreciated this and were giving very full and serious consideration to the proposals put forward by the United Kingdom. It was however concerned that any new initiative should not prove in the long run merely to have damaged Australia's present position without securing any countervailing advantages. On the question of a condominium, the most important factor would of course be who the other members would be.

MR. TANGE questioned whether a provision, such as appeared to be necessary under the United Kingdom scheme, for protecting pre-existing claims by specifically providing for the 'freezing' of such claims during the continuance of an international authority, would in fact be politically acceptable to countries like the United States and Russia, unless they first put in comparable claims of their own. Such a 'freeze' would otherwise amount to asking Russia and the United States to recognise in

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SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

a State to hand over all the attributes of sovereignty MR. FREELAND said that, while the Panama case provided a precedent for the transfer of the attributes of sovereignty from one State to another, he knew of no precedent for such a transfer by a State to an international authority of the kind contemplated in the paper: in principle, however, he saw no objection.

MR. CORNER and MR. TANGE questioned how far such a collapse of the international authority would in practice restore the original claims unimpaired in international law, if for a long period the main activities in the area had been carried out by States other than those which originally had claims to sovereignty in the area. Even a specific provision that activities under the international authority could not be made the basis for subsequent claims to sovereignty might not be wholly reliable in view of the continual evolution of international law, and the political circumstances in which such an issue might fall to be decided. MR. de VILLIERS pointed out that in any event, such a reversion would only be to a situation in which, as now, some claims were more firmly established than others and none, for example, were legally recognised either by the United States or Russia.

SIR EDWIN McCARTY said that the main difficulty which the Australian Government felt in a proposal involving the pooling of sovereignty was that, if for example, it led to notional claims to sovereignty being put forward by the United States and by Russia, to qualify them for membership of the authority, any subsequent breakdown either of the authority, or even of the negotiations for its establishment, would have to that extent prejudiced and diminished the status of the present Australian claim. MR. HANKEY suggested that this consideration, which was appropriate to any proposal for the establishment of a condominium,

SECRET GUARD

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SECRET AND GUARD

of the possible alternatives to the United Kingdom proposal, taking in where appropriate the points put forward in the Australian paper.

In response to a suggestion that a legal definition of the term "condominium" would be of assistance, MR. FREELAND explained that the essence of this conception was the sharing of sovereignty by two or more states over a particular territory. The actual administrative arrangements adopted were a matter for the states concerned: they could and did differ widely in different cases and it would therefore be misleading to draw general conclusions from any particular precedent. There was no reason in principle why a condominium should not be established by the state or states with a claim to sovereignty over a particular area inviting another, with no prior claim, to share sovereignty. Looking ahead to the position which would exist at the termination of an international régime, the main practical difference between a condominium arrangement and that suggested by the United Kingdom (whereby only certain attributes of sovereignty would be transferred to a joint authority) was that in the case of a condominium, the pre-existing claims to sovereignty over separate sectors would have been ended by the establishment of the condominium over the whole territory, and in the event of a breakdown of the arrangements there would be no automatic reversion to the status quo ante (though this could if desired be provided for in the instrument establishing the condominium): in the case of an international authority on the lines suggested by the United Kingdom, the institution of the authority would not prejudice existing sovereign rights and claims which would be in abeyance during its operation and would revive if it collapsed, thus restoring the pre-existing legal situation. In reply to a question whether it was possible for

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SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

MINUTES OF FIRST SESSION

Having welcomed the representatives of Commonwealth Governments, THE CHAIRMAN referred to the preliminary informal discussions on the question of the future control of Antarctica which had been held during the past few weeks. The object of the present meeting was to consider more fully the main issues which had emerged from the preliminary discussions, with a view to arriving if possible at some consensus of Commonwealth opinion on the merits and demerits of the various proposals which had been considered, before the discussions on this question with the United States which were expected to take place in Washington the following month. The papers which had been circulated for consideration at the meeting were, firstly, the substantive United Kingdom proposals embodied in the original memorandum; secondly, a paper elaborating and somewhat modifying those parts of the United Kingdom proposal concerned with sovereignty, administration and neutralisation; thirdly, a memorandum summarising the pros and cons of the main alternative proposals which had been mentioned during the preliminary discussions; and finally, a paper prepared by the Australian delegation setting out comments on the United Kingdom proposals and indicating the issues with which the Australian Government were mainly concerned. It was to be understood that none of the views expressed in any of these papers should be regarded as committing any of the Governments concerned: although the United Kingdom proposals had been approved as a basis for discussion by the Ministers most directly concerned, they had not been submitted to the Cabinet. He suggested that the most convenient approach to the problem would be by means of the paper summarising the pros and cons

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SECRET AND GUARD

COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE
Downing Street, S.W.1

19th Sept 57

Mr I.P.A. de Villiers
South Africa House

With the Compliments of the
Under Secretary of State
for Commonwealth Relations

Commonwealth
1 September,
57

Dear Sir

Australia

Sir

Mr.

(S)

I

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Mr

Mr C.R.O.2

Commonwealth Relations Office

Mr. Bass
Mr. Swinnerton (b)
Mr. Shaw
Mr. St.C. Duncan

Office

New Zealand House

Mr. F.H. Corner
Mr. H.H. Francis

WES 147/58/1

Mr. H.A.A. Hankey
Mr. Clift

Mr. J.R. Freeland (a)
(Legal Adviser's Dept.)
Mr. H.D. Morgan (c)

South Africa House

Mr. I.P.A. de Villiers
Mr. A. Drake

Colonial Office

Mr. P. Rogers (a)
Mr. F. Kennedy (b)
Mr. M.A. Willis

Canada House (Observers)

Mr. Arnold Smith
Mr. G.G. Riddell
Mr. Courtney Kingstone (a)

Ministry of Defence

Mr. J.F. Hosie

Cabinet Office

Mr. L. Airey (Secretary)

(a) For Meeting on Friday, 13th September only.

(b) For Meeting on Thursday, 12th September only.

(c) For Meeting on Friday, 13th September (afternoon only)

SECRET AND GUARD

TELEGRAM

SECRET

FROM: HIGH COMMISSIONER: LONDON.
TO: SECEXTERN PRETORIA.
SALEG WASHINGTON.
D: 17.9.57.

No. 131. (SECRET EAS). Antarctica.
Your No. 149.
Addressed to Pretoria No. 131 repeated to Washington No. 10.

1. Discussions by Old Commonwealth delegations now concluded. No firm commitments as yet but appreciable shift in New Zealand and Australian attitude in favour of United Kingdom proposal for international regime. Working party now drafting document which will incorporate views expressed and serve as basic Commonwealth approach at next stage of discussions in Washington.
2. Because of tactical importance of this document Union delegation made firm statement on lines your telegram No. 147. This was well received by Tange (Australian Secretary for External Affairs) and Lintott of British delegation. It was agreed that disadvantages of excluding South Africa should be stated in document and brought to attention of Americans at next stage of discussions.
3. This next stage consists of meetings being secretly convened by State Department in Washington in early October, and to which they have invited United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand only. If we wish to participate we should ourselves approach State Department now. Latter may demur in which case we should suggest that they consult other three parties concerned. These have no objection to our approaching State Department in confidence and if asked would confirm our interest in the matter.
4. Full report and documentation will follow and be copied to Washington. In meantime we recommend urgent instructions to Washington on lines of paragraph (3) in order that tactical position gained here may be consolidated.

SECRET AND GUARD

lest one or more political parties there should seize upon the subject as a theme for electoral propoganda and possibly be returned pledged to preserving the status quo against any change.

46. Thereafter the scheme might be launched ^{in mid-} during the summer of 1958 in ^{in hope of being able to} order ~~to~~ provide against the danger of losing the initiative should unacceptable proposals be put up by other powers ^{at 3rd session of} in the United Nations in the autumn (cf. the abortive Indian resolution of 1956). Alternatively it might be better to wait until 1959 when it will be known whether the Russians intend to leave after the I.G.Y. or not.

47. Legal Rights: Protection against erosion of ~~long~~ existing ~~rights~~ claims by making formal reservation on map when entering negotiations.

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SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

(c) The American method of proceeding by stages is less calculated to secure approval by Argentina and Chile who would be more impressed by a single plan to banish the cold war from the whole continent (see paragraph 39(e) above).

(d) The plan apparently makes no provision for the admission of other powers, particularly South Africa; so long as the Russians were excluded it would be difficult to amend it in order to do so.

e) (e) There is a danger that having reached ^{the point} stage 1 of their scheme (i.e. ^{41cb} ~~merger of American, Australian and New Zealand zones only~~) the Americans, having satisfactorily regularised their own position, will indefinitely postpone the complications of going on to stage 2. In that event ~~Australia and/or New Zealand~~ ^{the situation to the Commonwealth} might be embarrassed by repercussions of any obligation to assist the United States in their efforts to squeeze the Russians out. If excessive pressure were used there might be fighting; if insufficient pressure were used and the Russians stayed all ~~three~~ ^{covered} powers would lose face.

(f) Should the American plan stop at stage 1 no solution would be provided for the United Kingdom dispute with Argentina and Chile. Furthermore the resultant publicity might well provoke undesirable repercussions in Russia's Antarctic policy.

44. It is difficult, however to pronounce authoritatively on the American plan without further details. It might be suggested to the Americans, however, that at least stage 1 of their plan should be regarded as a last resort to be adopted only if efforts to bring about a more comprehensive one should fail.

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SECRET AND GUARD

might be discussed at a quadripartite meeting in October.

In Favour of the United States Plan

42. (a) It provides a method which perhaps would be more quickly negotiated to bring the Americans into the Antarctic permanently as a counter-balance to the Russians.
- (b) Provided an effort is made to go on from the first stage to extend the condominium to include all the Antarctic powers as at 41 (c) above, it provides a practical first step toward internationalising the whole continent.
- (c) By excluding the Russians it would leave them without any legitimate pretext for remaining in Antarctica and might contribute toward securing their departure. All the arguments against inviting the Russians to join the scheme at paragraph 32 above may also be adduced in favour of the American plan.
- (d) All the arguments against ^{presentation} ~~prior~~ submission of the plan to the United Nations in paragraph 34 above also apply. In so far as it envisaged a solution to the problem of sovereignty along the lines indicated in paragraph 41 above, it has the advantage of ^{hastily} settling once and for all any possibility of further disputes over sovereignty.

There are also certain advantages already enumerated as in favour of the United Kingdom plan at paragraph 39 above, which would be common to any scheme for internationalisation.

Arguments against the United States plan

43. (a) All the arguments in favour of Russian inclusion apply.
- (b) All the arguments in favour of ^{presentation} ~~prior~~ submission to the United Nations apply.

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SECRET AND GUARD

and corresponding prestige would accrue to the founder-members for having put it forward.

(e) For this reason, the Governments of the Antarctic powers would be better able to present the proposal in the face of hostile public opinion than in the case of a scheme which was of a less sweeping character and which did not purport to banish the cold war from the whole continent. This would be of particular importance in Argentina and Chile.

(f) It would ensure increased scientific and other co-operation in the Antarctic, which would particularly benefit the countries whose activities are at present limited by financial and other resources. It would be welcomed by the nations with only small sector claims ^{or with no claim but direct interests} as giving them greater scope for participation in activities throughout the continent including the sharing in benefits from exploitation of any valuable mineral deposits.

Arguments against the United Kingdom Plan

40. (a) All the arguments against the inclusion of Soviet Russia described in paragraph ³² 26 are also arguments against the United Kingdom scheme.

(b) All the arguments against seeking the prior approval of the United Nations in paragraph ³⁴ 28.

(c) ^{The element of doubt about an effective demilitarisation plan inherent in 29 (a) above.} It is doubtful whether any plan for demilitarisation would in fact be sufficiently effective to justify a departure from the status quo.

(d) Although the United Kingdom plan theoretically shelves the dispute over sovereignty in the United Kingdom zone it does not solve it once and for all or provide a complete guarantee against a revival of the dispute, should one of the parties succeed in backing out of the authority.

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SECRET AND GUARD

Nations such powers of interference as to render the plan unacceptable to the Antarctic powers.

37. From the United Nations angle everything must therefore depend on the attitude of the Russians (which would probably be determined by whether they were members of the authority or not) and the Afro-Asians. With Soviet support there should be some prospect of securing approval for an acceptable arrangement.

THE RIVAL MERITS OF EXISTING PROPOSALS

The United Kingdom Plan

38. This presupposes the formation of an international authority composed of the Antarctic powers, the United States, and Russia, with a solution of the problem of sovereignty along the lines indicated at paragraph 17 (b) above; the administrative arrangements would follow the lines set out in paragraphs 19 to 22, and the charter of the authority would state that one of its purposes was to provide for the complete and effective demilitarisation of the whole continent. The charter would also state as a purpose of the authority the promotion of scientific collaboration in exploring the continent and exploiting its resources for the benefit of the whole world. Proposals for establishing the authority would be presented simultaneously to the Chilean, Argentine, French, Norwegian and Soviet Governments after final agreement had been reached between the Commonwealth Governments concerned and the United States. In order, however, to take account of the special susceptibilities at least of the French, and may be, as agreed in discussion with the Americans, of some or all of the others as well, in respect of being faced with a cut and dried plan fixed in advance, it might be necessary to precede a formal invitation to join the scheme by confidential soundings conducted by either the United States or U.K. Government. The United States Government would

SA?
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U.S. plan: according to this presentation SA affairs to be excluded here also.

only claim to be all with real interests?
and finally other countries such as S.A. having a substantial interest

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SECRET AND GUARD

considered by the General Assembly). ^{the Russians as well as} If the Americans and the Russians are members of the international authority it is ^{less} unlikely that extremist proposals for, e.g., expanding the authority so as to secure African and Asian representation could secure a majority. In these circumstances it might ^{possibly} not be unnecessary to submit the proposal to the United Nations at all, although probably at least the Russians would insist on this being done. Moreover, presentation of the project as one for which United Nations approval was to be sought would facilitate the task of the Argentine and Chilean Governments in presenting the scheme to public opinion in their countries. The same would apply to a greater or lesser degree in the case of all the Antarctic powers.

36. If Russia were to be excluded they would undoubtedly try to wreck the scheme by opposition in the United Nations. It would be branded as an example of "collective imperialism" and various unacceptable alternative schemes would be put forward, such as, for example, the replacement of the authority by a United Nations administering body with broad geographical representation, responsible to the General Assembly and paid for from the United Nations budget. Other countries pressing to be included in the authority might of course be put off by making it clear in the draft constitution of the authority that all its members would share equally in the costs involved, and that the costs of the authority should not become a charge on the United Nations budget. As regards the relationship between the authority and the United Nations, an attempt might be made to secure for the General Assembly the right to examine and make recommendations upon the actions of the authority. In general it can be said that this aspect of the question would present serious difficulties and that any scheme likely to pass the Assembly might give the United

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SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

(g) The Russians are on record as advocating the exploitation of the Antarctic for peaceful purposes. It seems likely that they would behave reasonably well in an international authority of this sort, of which they were founder members; and that they would accept the neutralisation of Antarctica. Moreover they are more vulnerable in the Antarctic in the event of non-co-operation by other powers than is the case in the northern hemisphere.

(h) If the Russians decide that Antarctica is of particular use to them for strategic, economic or meteorological reasons, they are capable of deploying a far greater effort and in a shorter time than any of the other interested powers, except the United States, thus presenting the powers with a fait accompli.

67 Russian 164 contribution proposal.
Should the scheme be submitted to the United Nations for approval?

34. The arguments against prior submission of the scheme to the United Nations are as follows. The majority of the members of the United Nations have no valid reasons for concerning themselves with the Antarctic. The onus is on nations outside the proposed authority to demonstrate the need for it to be discussed in the United Nations rather than on member-nations to raise it voluntarily. If the matter were brought before the United Nations by a non-member of the authority, the member-nations could decline to accept the jurisdiction of the United Nations and any resolutions passed by them which might be unacceptable; this would of course be impossible if the question were placed on the agenda by the member-countries.

35. On the other hand, ^{other} all members of the United Nations are likely to take a keen interest in the question (^{of} viz. the abortive proposal of the Indians of 1956 that the Antarctic should be

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SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

(d) If the Russians joined the scheme and it subsequently broke down, they might claim to have a permanent stake in the Antarctic, whatever formal arrangements might have been agreed beforehand to provide against such a contingency.

(e) There is no certain evidence that the Russians intend to stay on in the Antarctic after the end of the I.G.Y. An invitation to join made before that date might therefore incline them to stay with all the subsequent complications when they might otherwise not have done so; or to increase their bargaining strength by making a claim to territory.

(f) An international authority for Antarctica (or anywhere else for that matter) is likely to function more smoothly if the Russians are not members of it.

(g) At least Argentina and Chile might be reluctant to participate in any arrangements for Antarctica which included the Russians.

33. Arguments in favour

(a) If the Russians are excluded they will try (i) to prevent the creation of an ^{acceptable} international authority by organising a majority against the project in the United Nations;

(ii) to strengthen their own position in Antarctica in order to counter the position there of the Americans.

(b) It is ²⁴probable that the Russians intend to remain in Antarctica after the I.G.Y., although the only positive evidence to that effect is in statements by Soviet spokesmen (not at the highest level) that they intend to do so.

(c) If ~~they stay~~ no means exist for ejecting them against their will and cohabitation by agreement with them is preferable to what might otherwise be prolonged friction. The continent could only be effectively demilitarised if they agreed to co-operate to that end with the other nations concerned. Yet

/demilitarisation

SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

In favour of a broadening of the authority to include other members may be said that so long as it did not contain nations under Soviet influence there would be a larger majority of votes to subdue undesirable proposals by the Russians. On the other hand, the authority would then become unwieldy, the complications inherent in any joint administration venture would be increased, the nations who have particularly strong feelings about their claims would resent being placed on an equal footing with nations having no previous connection with the Antarctic, and finally the Russians would probably seize the opportunity to propose, as members, satellite states.

Should Soviet Russia be invited to join the scheme?

32. Arguments against

(a) If invited to join, the Russians might after lengthy discussions decline save on unacceptable terms. This might give to the Soviet (e.g. in Asian eyes) the appearance of Western acknowledgment of its interest in the Antarctic or put the West in the wrong in appearing to place unreasonable conditions on Soviet participation. We might, by our own proposal, elevate the Soviet from the position of trespasser to the status of a legitimate claimant.

(b) The Soviet would not readily surrender their freedom of action by joining an international scheme which would place them in a permanent voting inferiority.

(c) It might be impossible to reach agreement with the Soviet and all others (including the United States) on the principles governing commercial exploitation of minerals.

/(d)

SECRET AND GUARD

27. The convention under which the authority was established would need to state specifically what installations and activities were permitted in order not to contravene the proposed demilitarisation of the area.

28. While there would be no objection to any country employing members of their armed forces on peaceful and scientific expeditions, no country without the unanimous approval of the authority would be permitted to use any portion of the area for military exercises as such.

delete

29. It is problematical to what extent member-nations would be prepared to accept a sufficient degree of supervision of their activities. But it should be noted that the Russians have not yet accepted the Protocol to the International Whaling Convention which would arrange for the placing of observers on factory ships to ensure that the regulations of the Commission are carried out.

Composition of the international authority

30. The authority would be composed at least of the seven Antarctic claimant powers and the United States. The question of Soviet Russia's inclusion is dealt with below. The question arises whether membership should be opened to other powers having no territorial interest or direct historical connection with the Antarctic.

para 13 to set out the para more fully.

31. South Africa, because of her proximity to and strategic interest in the Antarctic, has indicated that she will wish to participate in any international agreement concerning the Antarctic. In the event of South Africa's inclusion, however,

Substantive

it is possible that other countries may express the wish to join, e.g., India, Uruguay, Ecuador, Belgium and Japan, all of whom have at one time or another shown special interest in the Antarctic in varying degrees. (Japan, however, renounced any political interest in the Antarctic in the San Francisco Treaty).

of statement of views as agreed in 1944 summary of views of members of Commission to attention of Americans New para

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it weakens SA's case to have it equated with countries with less substantial interests. Can this not be referred to in a separate para?

Demilitarisation

25. At present, if Russia were to put down an airfield or to create reserves of, e.g., oil and petrol of military potential, the power (if any) of inspection would lie only with the Australians in whose zone Russia's main base is located. As Russia does not recognise any claims in Antarctica it is problematical whether they would permit the entry of a national inspection team. If, however, an international body including Russia were set up to administer the area, with provision for prior notification of any activities and with full inspection facilities, such a régime would be a better guarantee against the build-up of a military potential than individual (unrecognised) sovereignty which possesses no power to inspect. If armed intervention is discounted, if only on practical grounds, there remains only moral force supported perhaps by an international convention to provide for the effective neutralisation of the area. The main provision of any such convention would be a foolproof inspection system.

26. Effective neutralisation cannot be achieved by mere statement of intention embodied in a convention unless accompanied by arrangements of prior notification of activities and subsequent inspection. Inspection could perhaps best be carried out by combining several different methods:-

- (a) aerial inspection (hampered in Antarctica by weather conditions).
- (b) Observers attached to the different expeditions.
- (c) Visits by a team of observers representing the authority to the various bases and expeditions.

(d) ~~Inspection by examination of ships' manifests, etc., would be ineffective since this season's experience shows that the Russians can launch activities in the Antarctic from ships plying there direct.~~

Check if staff to look at.

Understand N.P. with view of inspection would lead to the subject of expert examination.

would have power of inspection

Exploitation of Mineral Resources

23. No mineral deposits ^{of great value} of great value have so far been discovered in Antarctica. But owing to the unprecedented scale of activities there in connection with the I.G.Y. it is possible that important discoveries will be made during the next eighteen months. In order that this should not give rise to new disputes or the exacerbation of old ones, an effective licensing system agreed to by all concerned would be useful. This might take the form of a requirement by the proposed international authority that licences be required, both from members and non-members, for exploitation of any minerals found, with the payment of royalties. The level of these would be determined in the first place by the desirability of covering the expenses of the authority in this way if possible. Royalties would be payable at a higher rate by non-members. In the event of a very rich find it is possible that the authority would in this way receive a considerable surplus over its expenses. This would be divided among members either equally or at a variable rate, ^{perhaps} in proportion to the level at which they had contracted to contribute towards the authority's expenses in the initial agreement. Such an arrangement might provide an additional incentive to favour the scheme for nations which claim large zones but are reluctant or unable to incur the expense of developing them.

24. It should be stated in the charter of the authority that one of its objects was to promote the peaceful exploration of the Antarctic and the exploitation of its natural resources ~~in the~~ interests of the whole world; it might be added that the authority should devote itself to promoting joint operations to this end between the participating nations.

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/Demilitarisation

SECRET AND GUARD

admittedly unsatisfactory from the purely formal standpoint, in which at least during an initial period each nation remained free to administer its expeditions and bases under its own law so long as more than a certain proportion of the participants were nationals of the state in question. If the proportion of other nationals were higher or in the event of offences involving members of other expeditions or bases, recourse would be had to regulations to be drawn up by the authority. Until these regulations had been compiled it would be agreed that offences would be tried under the national law and in the national courts of the offender. In all cases and even after the compilation of the authority's regulations and the establishment of its courts, terms of imprisonment would be served in the national prisons of the offender. ~~As regards the police force it might in practice be possible to delay actually constituting one, but there should be no material delay in providing for its eventual institution.~~

/Exploitation

SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

of access to the whole of the area and to any installations created thereon. All members of the authority and their nationals (including commercial undertakings) would have unrestricted right of entry and exploration ^{throughout the area, rights to establish and exploitation} subject only to notification ^{first approved by} to the international authority, and periodic inspection of activities by the authority. All non-members of the authority and their nationals would have the same rights subject to the same conditions but would require licences from the authority.

21. Cost of administering the authority would be met either by the payment of contributions by member-states and/or by payment of royalties for licences to exploit mineral resources, ¹⁴ ~~payable both by member-states and, on a higher scale, by non-member-states.~~ ¹⁵ ~~The payment of an annual contribution by member-states could be at a flat rate or variable according to the rate at which each state consented to participate in the benefit from any royalties accruing to the authority from the exploitation of valuable mineral deposits.~~

Law

22. Provision for a police ^{force} and for the institution of criminal law would be necessary from the beginning, and the most satisfactory solution would be for the international authority to adopt a criminal code applicable to the whole of Antarctica. The simplest way of doing this would be for the authority to adopt the law and make use of the courts of one constituent country. But as Antarctic activities will continue mainly to be on the basis of national bases and expeditions it is perhaps unrealistic to suppose that participating nations would welcome any arrangement preventing them from applying their own law so long as no disputes with other nations arose. A possible way of getting round this difficulty would be a compromise,

/admittedly

SECRET AND GUARD

for the freezing of the legal status quo at the beginning, in such a way that it would in no way be affected by the subsequent activities of any member-nation.

INSERT. Similarly
(c) A condominium

National sovereignty would be pooled, i.e. vested collectively in the states parties to it. States not already having claims to sectors of the Antarctic at the outset of the campaign would be invited by the other powers to join in the arrangement and thenceforward would have equal rights over the whole area to the other members. Under such an arrangement it would be impossible to provide for a return to the status quo in which some members had claims over certain areas and others had none. *These really provide of sovereignty*
Once a nation had enjoyed sovereignty in a condominium it would be unable to give up its claim.
In the absence of any permanent populations or national administrations in Antarctica the usual bases for a condominium are absent; nevertheless there is nothing inherent in the concept of a condominium which would presuppose the establishment of any one type of administrative machinery in the area.

Administration

19. Whatever solution were reached as regards sovereignty, it would be necessary to set up an authority consisting of *representatives of* the constituent states with a convention defining its powers and functions. It might be laid down, for example, that the authority would take decisions by vote, possibly a two-thirds majority, save on certain questions (e.g. relating to arrangements for undermining effective demilitarisation) for which unanimity might be required.

20. The authority would have to set up a headquarters, and *such arrangements for liaison as might prove necessary* possibly small offices in each constituent country, as well as in the various areas of activity in Antarctica. The authority and all members of the authority would have unrestricted rights

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SECRET AND GUARD

administrative and legal problems which will arise should not call for such cumbersome machinery. The greatest obstacle, however, would be the reluctance as a matter of national prestige and pride of many of the constituent countries to surrender their sovereign rights to their possessions. They may be prepared eventually to give up the substance of sovereignty but they are likely to object to any proposal to give up sovereignty in name even if this is really only a shadow.

(b) An International Authority without sovereignty in name

Public opinions which would not accept renunciation of sovereignty in name may nevertheless be prepared to accept the handing over to an international authority of the attributes of this sovereignty which are necessary to its efficient functioning. For example, Panama signed away all the rights and attributes of sovereignty over the canal zone to the United States but was careful to retain that sovereignty in name. It would be necessary to agree a convention under which far-reaching powers were vested in the authority and in which participating powers contracted not to withdraw (thereby leading to an attempt to reassert sovereign rights) without the consent of the majority of the other participants, if not of all of them. 18. So long as the authority existed, therefore no disputes over sovereignty could arise. But if it were at any time dissolved there would be a return to the status quo and states

which had claimed sectors ^{of the Antarctic} of the Antarctic would resume their residual claims, ^{of which they had no such claims at the outset} while member-nations who had no such claims at the outset and did not recognise the claims of others (e.g. the United States or Soviet Russia) would be free to resume ^{their} complete liberty of action in the whole area. Careful provision would have to be made in the convention to provide

/for

INSERT P 10

Similarly any business done

SECRET AND GUARD

by a clear statement to the effect

that the status quo would not be affected by any action on their part.

would presumably be in New Zealand territory. In addition:-

- (a) Even on the assumption that no claim is made by the Americans, increasing embarrassment would be caused to the New Zealand Government if the United States or other expeditions were for an indefinite period to be able, as at present, to enjoy virtually unrestricted entry to their zone.
- (b) The excellent existing relations between New Zealand and the United States ^{and the present agreement of the United States to facilitate in the future} over the Antarctic would ensure that ^{the} New Zealand interests were adequately protected in negotiations for an international régime. There is no guarantee that ^{these} this favourable ^{conditions} atmosphere will continue indefinitely.

AN INTERNATIONAL RÉGIME

Sovereignty

17. The following solutions to the problem of where sovereignty would lie have been considered:-

(a) a sovereign international authority

This would have the advantages that in theory disputes as to sovereignty, jurisdiction or control could not arise. It would, however, be very difficult to work in practice. There is no precedent for such an arrangement. A sovereign authority which would not be a state, nor yet an international organisation set up for a definite purpose and with a clearly-defined set of powers, would be an entirely new phenomenon. Its position in international law would be most uncertain and its relations with other states or international organisations would be very difficult to determine. In the initial stages at least it would, although sovereign, be entirely dependent on the constituent countries on all fundamentals such as the legal and administrative systems to be applied, and it would take many years fully to establish its own system of law and administration. Even having regard to the likelihood of increased activity in Antarctica in years to come, the

SECRET AND GUARD

- (a) Satisfactory relations which could hardly be improved under any other arrangement exist for scientific work between the United States and Australian authorities.
- (b) The Russians may leave the Antarctic altogether after the I.G.Y., rendering any change in the present arrangement superfluous.

get down
13. Against the status quo:-

The arguments at 4(a), 4(d) and 4(e) above apply with particular strength. Furthermore, there is a possibility that, since the United States do not recognise the claim of any nation, they may claim part of the Australian zone. There are indications that if projects for internationalisation come to nothing and if the Americans continue activities on their present scale, they will wish to hold sovereignty over some Antarctic territory and will press on with a formal claim.

The New Zealand Zone

14. Sovereignty was established by an Order-in-Council of..... Relatively little exploration and scientific work has been carried out independently of the Americans. The Americans have established three bases in the zone and the New Zealanders have one base as well as a joint New Zealand-United States base. There is no Russian activity in the zone.

Arguments which apply particularly to the New Zealand Zone.

15. In favour of the status quo:-

All the arguments at paragraph 12 above apply. *except for my paragraph*

16. Against the status quo:-

The arguments at paragraph 13 above apply, although there is no apparent likelihood at present of Russian intrusion into the area. As regards a possible American claim, New Zealand might stand to lose a fair proportion of her zone since the main American claim

/would

SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

Norwegian and French Zones

8. The Norwegian zone is comparatively unexplored. It is constitutionally a part of the Norwegian State and an Act of the Storting would be necessary to alter its status. The Japanese and Belgians will be operating independently in the Norwegian zone during the I.G.Y. The Norwegians have one base in the zone in connection with the I.G.Y. The French zone is small and has been fairly well explored. There is no evidence of valuable mineral deposits. They have two bases, both of which were established before the I.G.Y.

Arguments which apply particularly
K

In favour of the status quo in the Norwegian and French Zones.

9. The Norwegians have relatively unchallenged claim to sovereignty and so far no Russian or American bases have been established in their zone. The French are in a similar position.

Against the status quo in the Norwegian and French Zones

unlike

10. Both zones might be entered by the Russians without supervision. ~~Parts might be claimed by the United States.~~ In the event of a valuable discovery in their areas by another power Norway and France probably would not benefit economically. Admittedly the French zone probably has no valuable minerals but this is an argument in favour of some arrangement which would give her more scope in the rest of the continent.

The Australian Zone

1/33.

11. Sovereignty was established by an Order-in-Council of..... A good deal of exploration and scientific work has been carried out independently of the Americans. The Americans have established one base in the zone and the Russians three, with probably three more this year, all in connection with the I.G.Y. In response to a request from Soviet Russia, the Australians have offered facilities for air transit; this offer, however, has not so far been used.

Arguments which apply particularly to the Australian Zone

12. In favour of the status quo--

/(a)

SECRET AND GUARD

7. Against the status quo:-

- to be
agreed
to U.K. //
- (a) In order to maintain their claim, the United Kingdom must maintain activities in the relevant areas equal to or greater than those of the Argentines and Chileans. As the Argentine activities are considerable, this involves a high level of expenditure which is inconsistent with the current requirements to economize on overseas expenditure. In the opinion of the United Kingdom it is doubtful whether the expenditure needed to maintain and strengthen her legal claims is justified by the advantages to be derived from doing so. In these circumstances the only possible solutions are to withdraw from the Antarctic altogether or to participate in an international régime in which none of the three competing countries would be required to engage in further costly competitive activities.
- (b) This argument applies in greater or lesser degree both to Argentina and Chile as regards their corresponding claims in the United Kingdom zone.
- (c) The need for the United Kingdom (and probably Argentina and Chile too) to devote most of their work in the Antarctic to competitive activities intended to bolster up their claims means that less effective scientific work can be carried on.
- (d) The disappearance of the existing dispute and the establishment of an international régime would facilitate the carrying out of scientific work by the possibility of pooling with other powers, particularly Chile and Argentina, over e.g. shipping for the relief and provisioning of bases.

/Norwegian and French Zones

SECRET AND GUARD

The United Kingdom Zone

5. The United Kingdom claim which was formally stated in 1907 and 1917 is overlapped by those of Argentina and Chile, made respectively in and 1940. The United Kingdom has offered to solve the resulting dispute with these two countries by recourse to the International Court or arbitration, but the offer has been rejected. Incidents have occurred which, at the time, threatened to affect good relations between the three countries, and it is desirable on these grounds alone that a peaceful agreement of the dispute should be found if possible. Among the groups of islands lying to the north of Graham Land in the United Kingdom zone, the South Sandwich Islands and South Georgia, both north of latitude 60°, are regarded by the United Kingdom as falling outside the area to be regarded for the purposes of this paper as falling within the Antarctic. Both groups of islands are, however, included in the claim made by the Argentine Government. A small part of the Chilean claim lies outside either the United Kingdom or the Argentine claims, to the west.

Arguments which apply particularly to the United Kingdom zone.

6. In favour of the status quo:-

- (a) Provided there is no serious change in the balance of United Kingdom, Argentine and Chilean current activities, the United Kingdom claim would still probably be victorious in the event of a decision by the International Court or arbitration.
- (b) Any element of recognition of the Argentine position in the Antarctic might be regarded in the Argentine as a weakening in the United Kingdom attitude and lead to greater pressure being exercised against her over the Falkland Islands.

/7.

Special Arguments against the status quo

- 4. (a) The arrival in the Antarctic of the Americans and Russians, with uncertainty about their future intentions, renders relatively precarious the position of all claimants to Antarctic zones and is an argument in favour of a régime in which the position of all concerned would be regularised.
- (b) In the absence of any effective demilitarisation of the continent, the presence of the Russians ^{in view of strategic considerations and} renders necessary more or less costly defence precautions.
- (c) In the uncertainty consequent upon the presence of the Russians and the Americans, it is likely that either the Russians or some other nation may put forward proposals in the United Nations for internationalising the whole area under the United Nations, which would be unacceptable to all the present claimants, and difficult to resist.
- (d) There is no real check on the activities of the Russians and so long as they remain, effective demilitarisation could be brought about only through some international arrangement.
- (e) Even if the Russians leave the Antarctic after the I.G.Y., there is no guarantee that they will not return, possibly with the intention of establishing military bases if the international situation should deteriorate. In that event there would not be any means of keeping a check on their activities.
- (f) The present current of opinion in many countries favourable to international co-operation in the Antarctic, ^{The latter has not yet been returned to the Antarctic. This} fomented partly by public interest in the I.G.Y. ^{is a} may not last for long after the end of the I.G.Y. and therefore the present moment ^{is a} ~~is a~~ ^{is a} ~~good one~~ ^{is a} ~~for~~ ^{is a} ~~considering~~ ^{is a} ~~a change~~ ^{is a} in the status quo. ^{Offers an opportunity which may not recur}

*This column of
unclassified facts
is a result of
and version of
conflict may*

/The United Kingdom Zone.

they do not recognise any of these claims. The United States have established bases in the United Kingdom, Australian and New Zealand zones as well as in the unclaimed zone. Although all these bases are established in connection with the I.G.Y., the Americans have also carried out considerable exploration work and air surveying. In the absence of activities by any other powers in the unclaimed zone, American activity there may be said to have provided them with prima facie grounds for making a claim. ^{but it is unlikely that the Americans would} The Russians are ^{be satisfied with this situation} ~~establishing~~ ^{also} a number of bases (probably six) all in the Australian ^{zone} zone, in connection with the I.G.Y. It is not known whether they intend to remain in the Antarctic after the I.G.Y. although Soviet spokesmen (not at the highest level) have said that Soviet activities in Antarctica will continue after the end of the I.G.Y. in 1958.

General Arguments in favour of the status quo

3. (a) Important sectors of public opinion in the countries with claims would not wish to see any effective diminution of their national sovereignty.
- (b) The presence of the Americans provides some insurance against possible hostile Russian activities.
- (c) Although no significant mineral deposits have so far been found, some may be revealed in the course of the current survey programme and under the status quo these could ^{perhaps at least} be ^{exploited} exploited ^{at least in theory} without any requirement to share the fruits of the discovery with other nations if it were wished to do so.
- (d) Any attempt to change the status quo may precipitate friction with the Russians ^{or Russia or} and complications in the United Nations which would result in a situation worse than the present one.

Arguments against the status quo

SECRET AND GUARD

ANTARCTICA

PREAMBLE

Meetings were held on September 12 and 13 in London between representatives of Her Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada to discuss a proposal suggested informally by the United Kingdom for the establishment of an international régime in the Antarctic. This proposal was discussed from every angle and it was decided that, in preparation for the discussions which the United States Government had proposed should be held in Washington with interested parties in October, a paper should be prepared setting out the principal results of the discussions. It was agreed that a description should be given of the existing position in the Antarctic, and that this should be followed by an account of the arguments for and against a continuation of the status quo, an analysis of the principal problems which would arise in establishing an international régime with particular reference to where sovereignty would lie, how effective demilitarisation could be brought about, the extent of the membership and in particular the status of Russia, the special problem of economic exploitation, and the way in which the United Nations would be brought into the picture. Finally, the rival merits of the plans so far favoured by the United Kingdom, the United States and the suggestion for a limited demilitarisation programme which the Australians would like to explore would be compared.

THE STATUS QUO

2. The entire continent, with the exception of the so-called unclaimed zone (map to be attached) is divided into sectors to which claims have been laid at various times by seven nations (the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, Norway and France). The United States and Soviet Russia have made clear that

/they do

SECRET AND GUARD



COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE
 DOWNING STREET
 LONDON, S.W.1

SECRET AND GUARD

24th September, 1957

Whitehall 2323/Ext. 113

Your Reference:

Please quote in reply:

WES.147/58/1

Dear Drake,

I am writing to confirm the arrangement for a meeting of the Commonwealth group on Antarctica in the Conference Room (ground floor), Downing Street at 11 a.m. tomorrow, Wednesday 25th September. At the same time I am enclosing a copy of the draft paper for discussion which has been prepared in accordance with the conclusions of the meetings on the 11th and 12th September.

Yours sincerely
 J.D.B. Shaw
 (J.D.B. SHAW)

A. DRAKE ESQ.,
 SOUTH AFRICA HOUSE.

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THE STATUS QUO

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SECRET AND GUARD

explained above this would not prevent attempts to debate the Agreement in the Assembly.

40. The foregoing arguments apply whether or not it is decided to include the Soviet Union in the proposed Authority. But if the Soviet Union were excluded the position vis-a-vis the United Nations would be very much more difficult because -

(a) the Russians would almost certainly encourage the anti-colonial powers to condemn the proposal as an example of "19th Century Imperialism", adding to these charges their own voices and those of their satellites; and this would make it far more difficult to prevent the inscription of the Antarctic on the General Assembly agenda;

(b) the Indians and "neutralists" would be concerned at the consequences of causing the Antarctic to become another subject of discord in great power relations;

(c) it would in fact be impossible to guarantee the demilitarisation of the area unless the Russians were members of the Authority, and our best argument in the United Nations would thus be lost.

41. The U.K. view is that the balance of advantage lies with referring the plan to the United Nations after full agreement on the Authority has been reached. As explained above, approval of the plan by the United Nations will depend to a very large degree on whether or not the Russians are members of the Authority. If they were, and of course on the assumption of American support, there should be some prospect of securing approval for an acceptable arrangement. It would be important to ensure that the plan were properly presented to the United Nations, and in doing this some emphasis would have to be placed upon the world-wide benefits which should ensue from the establishment of the Authority in the increased possibilities of international co-operation, particularly in regard to demilitarisation and in the scientific fields.

be nothing to stop the members of the Authority refusing to accept the jurisdiction of the United Nations or any resolution passed by the Organisation.

37. As regards the relationship between the Authority and the United Nations an attempt might be made, were the plan referred to the United Nations, to replace the Authority by a United Nations administering body with broad geographical representation responsible to the General Assembly and paid for from the United Nations budget. (Other countries pressing to be included in the Authority might of course be put off by making it clear in the draft constitution of the Authority that all its members would share equally in the costs involved, and that the costs of the Authority should not become a charge on the United Nations budget). Alternatively an attempt might be made to secure for the General Assembly the right to examine and make recommendations upon the actions of the Authority.

38. It is clear that any scheme likely to pass the Assembly might give the United Nations such powers of interference as to render the plan unacceptable to the Antarctic Powers. But no attempt to by-pass the United Nations could prevent the proposals that the United Nations should debate this question, and it is by no means certain that sufficient votes could be secured to prevent the inscription of an item on the subject on the United Nations Assembly Agenda. Much would depend on the United States position, and on the basis of their attitude over the Oman question they would be unlikely to oppose inscription.

39. We have considered the possibility that the parties to the agreement for the Authority might merely register the Agreement with the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter, and leave it at that. But as

/explained

Should the scheme be presented to the United Nations?

35. If agreement is reached among the parties to the proposed Authority it is for consideration whether the United Nations should then be informed of what is proposed. Much would depend on the attitude of the Afro-Asians and the Indian position would be of special importance. The arguments in favour are as follows:

- (a) many members of the United Nations take a keen interest in the question (for example the abortive proposal of the Indians in 1956 that the Antarctic should be considered by the General Assembly) and it is bound to be raised there sooner or later, whether an International Authority of the kind under review is established or not;
- (b) presentation of the project as one for which the parties concerned wished to secure U.N. approval would facilitate the task of the Argentine and Chilean Governments in presenting the scheme to public opinion in their countries. The same would apply to a greater or lesser degree in the case of all the Antarctic powers;
- (c) if the scheme were not presented to the United Nations the powers now claiming sovereignty in the area would certainly be accused of establishing "collective imperialism" behind the Organisation's back.

36. The arguments against any reference to the United Nations are:

- (a) a majority of the members of the United Nations have no valid reasons for concerning themselves with the Antarctic. The onus should be on nations outside the proposed Authority to demonstrate the need for it to be discussed in the United Nations, rather than on member nations of the Authority to raise it voluntarily;
- (b) if the matter were brought before the United Nations by a non-member of the Authority there would in theory

Relationship of the proposed Authority with United Nations bodies

25. The proposed Authority should be able to encourage co-operation with various United Nations bodies. In particular such Specialised Agencies as the World Meteorological Organisation and the ICAO should benefit from the increased opportunities for research and international co-operation offered by the proposed Authority. In the same way, it is for consideration whether, if a permanent United Nations Force is eventually established, it could be used in the system of inspection which is discussed in paragraph 26 below. These aspects of the work of the Authority would be of particular value if the plan were to be presented to the United Nations (see section dealing with the question of presenting the plan to the United Nations, below).

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(a) International scientific co-operation

23. It should be stated in the charter of the proposed international authority that one of its objects was to promote the peaceful exploration of the Antarctic and the development of its natural resources not in the interests of any one country, and to further co-operation in the field of scientific research. It might be added that the authority should devote itself to promoting joint operations to these ends between the participating nations. The scale of activity during the International Geophysical Year, provides a practical example of the advantages of international co-operation in the scientific field. The extension of such co-operation under the aegis of the proposed authority is likely to prove not only of direct benefit to the participating powers but to be of such wider international interest. This is a point which would be of special importance in the public presentation of the proposal at a later stage and in enlisting wider international support at the appropriate time.

in view of the special opportunities in the Antarctic



COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

DOWNING STREET

LONDON, S.W.1

SECRET AND GUARD

26th September, 1957

Whitehall 2323/Ext. 113

Your Reference:

Please quote in reply:

Dear de Villiers,

I enclose re-drafts of the three passages in the draft paper on Antarctica which it was agreed at yesterday's meeting should be circulated before the paper issues in its final form. To enable the paper to be cleared in time for distribution tomorrow, I shall be very grateful if you could let me have your views by telephone later today.

Yours sincerely,

J.D.B. Shaw
(J.D.B. SHAW)

I.F.A. de VILLIERS ESQ.,
SOUTH AFRICA HOUSE.

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SECRET AND GUARD

position in Antarctica and might, as much as any other plan, serve as an inducement for her to stay, when she might otherwise have left after the I.G.Y.

Timing

52. Assuming that it is agreed that there should be a change in the status quo no public indication of this should be given until after the Argentine elections in February 1958 lest one or more political parties there should seize upon the subject as a theme for electoral propaganda and possibly be returned pledged to preserving the status quo against any change.

53. Thereafter the scheme might be launched in mid-1958 in the hope of being able to provide against the danger of losing the initiative should unacceptable proposals be put up by other powers in the United Nations at the 13th Session (cf. the abortive Indian resolution of 1956). Alternatively it might be better to wait until 1959 when it will be known whether the Russians intend to leave after the I.G.Y. or not.

LONDON,
September, 1957.

SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

A limited plan for Demilitarisation only

50. This plan is a more modest proposal, providing for an agreement between all parties operating in the Antarctic for the demilitarisation of the area. In so far as demilitarisation cannot be effected without machinery for notification of activities and inspection any such demilitarisation convention would establish the necessary machinery.

51. In favour of this plan it may be said it would give the advantages of neutralisation without requiring the present claimants to share with the Russians and others the benefits of their position. At the same time it would be easier to negotiate than anything more far-reaching and might be a stepping-stone to a more all-embracing plan at a later stage.

The objections to it are:-

- (a) It would not solve the political disputes.
- (b) It would require a procedure for enforcement (e.g. for the settlement of disputes and the administration of inspections) which would be almost as intricate as that needed for an international authority.
- (c) Agreement to arrangements necessary for effective demilitarisation (especially inspection by representatives of an international authority) might be hard for the Russians to swallow in any international scheme, if only because it might be used as a precedent against them in other areas. If they would accept that they would probably therefore be prepared to participate in a broader arrangement which brought with it the advantages of greater facilities for scientific work.
- (d) The plan if presented before 1958 would also grant in some measure de facto recognition of Russia's

/position

SECRET AND GUARD

SECRET AND GUARD

- (c) The American method of proceeding by stages is less calculated to secure approval by Argentina and Chile who would be more impressed by a single plan to banish the cold war from the whole continent (see paragraph 43 (f) above).
- (d) The plan apparently makes no provision for the admission of other powers, particularly South Africa; so long as the Russians were excluded it would be difficult to amend it in order to do so.
- (e) The parties to the condominium might be embarrassed by repercussions of any obligation to assist the United States in their efforts to squeeze the Russians out. If excessive pressure were used there might be fighting; if insufficient pressure were used and the Russians stayed all the powers concerned would lose face.
- (f) There may be a danger that having reached the first stage (paragraph 45 (b)) of their scheme (i.e. merger of American, Australian and New Zealand zones only) the Americans, having satisfactorily regularised their own position, will indefinitely postpone the complications of going on to the second stage (paragraph 45 (c)). No solution would be provided for the United Kingdom dispute with Argentina and Chile. Furthermore the resultant publicity might well provoke undesirable repercussions in Russia's Antarctic policy.

49. It is difficult to pronounce authoritatively on the American plan without further details. It might be suggested to the Americans, however, that at least the first stage of their plan should be regarded as a last resort, to be adopted only if efforts to bring about a more comprehensive one should fail.

/50.

SECRET AND GUARD