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Washington telegram No.403 Saving to Foreign Office.

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favoured some sort of semi-official organisation, such as the proposed Institute, to which all countries could belong.

4. The Australian representative joined the New Zealand representative in deploring the rigid Chilean position on accession. He said that his Government took the view that if Russian signature of the Treaty depended on the inclusion of an accession clause, this price must be paid. They would be most reluctant to see the conference break down on this point. The Chilean representative said that a price must be paid for Russian participation but this price was far too high.

5. The Argentine representative then made a rather muddled statement. He said that the Twelve should agree on the three basic principles but that there should be no discussion now of details; this could be left to another Conference in the future. When questioned, he was unable to elaborate his ideas.

6. The consensus was that the idea of an International Institute of Antarctic Research should be looked at. It might be complementary to, or perhaps take the place of the suggested Protocol. The Special Committee for Antarctic Research (S.C.A.R.) might be invited to take part or even merge itself in the Institute; and if the idea commended itself to governments, rules and statutes would have to be worked out soon.

7. Zone of Application

The Chilean representative said that he understood our pre-occupation, expressed at the last meeting of the Twelve, lest a group of States appeared to be claiming exclusive jurisdiction over a part of the high seas. Perhaps our point could be met by the inclusion in the Treaty of a clause which would say that nothing in the Treaty was to be taken as abrogating or modifying any international treaty, or treaties, already in force. This would avoid the ambiguity of the 1958 Geneva Convention definition of "the high seas". We said that if application of the treaty was to be restricted in this way, there seemed to be no objection to the words "excluding the high seas" appearing in the definition of Antarctica. We were supported in this by the United States, but the Chileans were not to be moved.

8. Please see my immediately following telegram.

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

Lord Hood

No.403 Saving

July 25,1958

R. July 27,1958

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.403 Saving of  
July 25.

Repeated for information Saving to: U.K.Miss.New York.

ANTARCTIC TREATY

Representatives of Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States met privately yesterday afternoon.

2. Accession Clause.

The Chilean representative said again that the idea of third countries acceding to the Treaty was entirely unacceptable to his Government. In reply to questions about his suggestion of a Protocol (Muirhead's letter 1520/176/58 of July 18, to Hankey; paragraph 3), Ambassador Gajardo said that the Protocol would have treaty force and could have to be ratified by national parliaments. The adherence of all countries (for example Red China) to the Protocol would be permitted, provided there was a "genuine interest" in scientific research. Perhaps this "genuine interest" could be established and controlled by an International Institute of Antarctic Research. This proposed Institute might also concern itself with the administrative arrangements which we still had to work out.

3. The United States representative said that if the Protocol, which would have treaty force, were open to all, the United States might find itself in treaty relations with a country which it did not recognize. This would be unacceptable and would prevent ratification by Congress of any Antarctic Treaty. He therefore

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9. The Soviet representative said that his objections could not be overcome by changes in terminology. He objected to any discussion of points of substance. The New Zealand representative said that he thought that it was a great mistake to assume that swift progress could be made at the Conference if adequate preparation had not first been undertaken. The Norwegian representative said that he could not see why we should not circulate papers of general interest. His Government would find it difficult to go to the Conference if there had not first been an exchange of views about the contents of the Treaty. He pointed out that it was the normal practice to prepare the way for important conferences by exchanging views beforehand. The Argentine representative endorsed this last remark and quoted the preparations for the Conference on the Law of the Sea as a precedent. The United States representative said that he did not consider the present working group to be a substitute for the Conference. His Government were interested in hearing views about the points to be included in the Treaty, which would be concluded at the Conference.
10. The Chilean representative said that he did not believe the working group could break up without deciding the date and place of the Conference. It would be useful to discuss procedural points, as suggested by Ambassador Daniels. But he also thought it most important to exchange views about the principles to be included in the Treaty. The Soviet representative agreed that it would be useful to discuss procedural problems.
11. The Norwegian representative then asked the Soviet representative whether he objected to the rest of the Twelve exchanging views on the substance of the Treaty. The Soviet representative replied that he thought we should adopt his view that there should be no discussion of substance. The New Zealand representative repeated that he thought that we could have a further exchange of views on substance. He pointed out that there would be great public criticism if the Conference broke down owing to lack of adequate preparation. He suggested that we might perhaps continue our exchanges for a week or two and then adjourn. We stated that we supported fully the remarks of the New Zealand representative on the importance of preparing adequately for the Conference. We agreed that points of procedure were of some importance. But in our view, the first priority was to exchange ideas about the substance of the Treaty, in order that our governments should have some basis on which to prepare for the Conference. We pointed out that it was normal international practice not to go to a many-nation conference until there was some certainty that a measure of agreement was possible. For this, an exchange of ideas; without commitment, was necessary beforehand. As this had been perfectly normal before previous conferences, we invited the Soviet representative to explain his reasons for opposing this measure of commonsense in this particular instance.
12. The Chairman closed the meeting before the Soviet representative could be pressed to reply to our enquiry. It was agreed that we should continue our discussion on Tuesday August 5.
13. Comments and suggestions about future tactics have gone to you by letter. We should add that the United States representative is showing a slightly alarming tendency to be less than robust with the Russians. This may be because he is anxious that the Russians should not leave the working group; we think that, at the moment, this fear is exaggerated. And if the Russians are allowed to have their way, the results are not likely to be agreeable to us.

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Washington telegram No: 421 Saving to Foreign Office

Antarctica was too difficult a question for us to discuss.

6. The Soviet representative stated that he could give no estimate of how long the Conference was likely to last. He thought however that the Conference would be much swifter in dealing with questions of substance than the Twelve, as experts would be included in the various national delegations. The Chilean representative said that he had not intended to create fresh difficulties when he referred to the competence of the United Nations. In his view, it was not desirable to link the date of the Conference with any discussions that might be held in the United Nations as had been suggested by the Soviet representative. Moreover, he understood that the Indian Government had now decided to withdraw their item. The South African representative said that he agreed with the view that it would help us to fix a suitable date for the Conference if we could continue our exchanges of views about the principles on which the Treaty was to be based. He pointed out that if we were to wait until the Indian item had been finally disposed of, we might have to postpone a decision about the date of the Conference until the end of the year, so delaying the Conference until some time in 1959. This would clearly be unsatisfactory, since the Antarctic Treaty was intended to prolong the scientific cooperation that had been so successful during the I.G.Y. The Argentine representative agreed with these views, as did the French representative. The latter went on to say that he did not see how discussions in the United Nations could in any way affect the right of the Twelve, representing the Governments which had taken an active part in Antarctic scientific activities, to discuss the proposed Treaty. He said that we should continue working on the substance of the Treaty.

7. The Soviet representative, rather unexpectedly stated that he presumed that the Argentine and French representatives were referring obliquely to the question of participation in the Conference. In this connexion he felt compelled to say that his Government could not agree with the view that the Conference should be restricted to the present twelve powers. Scientific research in Antarctica, and the work of the Conference, would be enhanced if other Powers took part. Both the Argentine and French representatives denied that they had intended to say anything about participation in the Conference.

8. The Norwegian representative (speaking as Chairman) said that it now seemed to be the general view that September 8 was too early a date to set for the Conference. It also seemed to be generally thought that the Soviet suggestion that no decision should be taken until the United Nations had met, would involve too long a delay. So far as the place of the Conference was concerned, the majority seemed to support Washington. It also seemed to be hoped that we should, if possible, continue discussion of the principles to be included in the proposed Treaty. The United States representative then suggested that the Russian objections might be met if, instead of referring to "discussion of points of substance" we were to speak of voluntary expressions of opinion. He also proposed that we might discuss points of procedure at the Conference, such as the languages to be used, the organisation of Committees, etc.

/ 9. The Soviet

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3. The Chilean representative, after stating that September 8 would be an acceptable target date for his Government, said that he would like to take up the remarks made by the Soviet representative at the previous meeting about the relevance of discussions in the United Nations General Assembly to our work. In the view of his Government, many complications would arise if we tried to link a discussion in the United Nations to the preparation of the Antarctic Treaty. The Chilean Government took the view that Chilean territory in the Antarctic was an integral part of the mother country. Consequently, they would oppose discussion about Antarctica at the United Nations if this was likely to prejudice Chilean sovereignty. Although it was clear that the United Nations had a legitimate right to discuss any questions affecting world peace, Article II(7) of the United Nations Charter set out the principle that the United Nations could not intervene in matters of internal jurisdiction. The United States representative pointed out that it was precisely because questions involving territorial rights and claims might cause difficulty at the Conference that his delegation had circulated a working paper on the subject, in the hope that we might be able to reach agreement in advance of the Conference. He pointed out that he was still waiting for the comments of other representatives on his working paper. He expressed support for our views and stated that the problems we had mentioned must obviously be clarified before the date of the Conference was settled.

4. The Soviet representative reserved the right to reply to the remarks made by Ambassador Gajardo, on the subject of the competence of the United Nations and territorial claims in the Antarctic. He stated that, in his opinion, if we continued to discuss the substance of the proposed Treaty, we should only complicate the task of preparing for the Conference. He repeated that we should not discuss points of substance and that we should confine our work to a decision on the place, time and procedure of the Conference. He also repeated that his Government preferred that the Conference should be held in Geneva, but were prepared to meet in Washington if this were the general wish, and that a final decision about the time of the Conference should be postponed until we had news of the manner in which the United Nations intended to deal with the Indian item.

5. The Argentine representative stated that he supported the remarks of the representative of Chile about the competence of the United Nations. In his view there was no reason for the United Nations to discuss the subject of Antarctica. He supported the United States proposal that we should continue to exchange views about the principles to be incorporated in the Treaty. The New Zealand representative said that he opposed any suggestion that we should postpone taking a decision about the time of the Conference until the General Assembly had met. He explained that his Government were not in any way afraid of the possibility that the United Nations might discuss the subject of Antarctica. In their view, the United Nations had only a general interest in the area connected with the wider problem of the preservation of world peace. The twelve powers represented at the current meeting, however, were all taking an active part in scientific research in the Antarctic, and so had a direct interest. He pointed out that if there was no adequate preparation beforehand, the Conference might drag on indefinitely. He therefore favoured our making an effort to ensure that the views of all the interested Governments had been clarified before a decision was taken on the date of the Conference. He considered that the competence of the United Nations to discuss

/ Antarctica

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BY DAG

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

Lord Hood

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 421 Saving  
of July 31, 1958

FOREIGN OFFICE AND WHITEHALL  
DISTRIBUTION

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R: August 2, 1958.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 421 Saving of July 31,  
Repeated for information Saving to: UKMIS New York

My telegram No. 418 Saving / of July 29 /

ANTARCTIC TREATY

The ninth meeting of the representatives of the Twelve was held this morning. We made no progress.

2. The Norwegian representative (who was in the chair) opened the discussion by asking for further views about the time and place of the proposed Conference. The French representative said that his Government supported September 8 as the target date for the Conference, and that they would be prepared to agree to meet in Washington. We explained, by way of expansion of our remarks at the previous meeting, that in our view the extent of the agreement so far reached in our discussions did not seem to afford any guarantee against a failure to reach agreement on the text of the proposed Treaty if a Conference were held early in September. It was precisely because we were so interested in ensuring that the Conference should result in a Treaty satisfactory to all concerned that we believed it would be preferable to postpone a decision regarding the date of the Conference. We believed that general agreement should first be reached on the important question of whether or not other countries were to be associated with the Treaty, on the inclusion in it of a clause for freezing rights and claims, and on an acceptable article providing for administrative measures. We therefore considered that September 8 or even 15 would be too early a date. So far as the place was concerned, we were ready to agree to Paris or Washington, and we had no objection to Geneva. The Australian representative expressed his support for our views. He thought it was premature to try and set a date for the Conference, and that September would in any case be too soon, in view of the lack of progress on many important items.

/ 3. The Chilean

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7. The Chilean representative endorsed the principle set out in the New Zealand working paper; he thought that the notes would also be helpful. The Chilean government agreed that logistic support of Antarctic bases by military forces would not contravene the principle that Antarctica should be used for peaceful purposes only. The United States representative stressed the importance of ensuring that naval vessels could continue to be employed in the support of Antarctic bases after the Treaty was signed. We spoke on the same lines. We also endorsed the principle that Antarctica should be used for peaceful purposes only. We pointed out that it was essential to make arrangements for the application of the principle. We suggested that it was perhaps time for the meeting to give some thought to the manner in which this was to be done and to discuss the administrative arrangements that would be required as proposed in Note II of the New Zealand working paper.

8. The United States representative asked whether it was thought that the administrative arrangements necessary to apply this article should be included within the article, or if they should form part of a separate article which would cover administrative arrangements in general. The Japanese representative, expressed agreement with the thought that lay behind Note I of the New Zealand working paper. He suggested that the point could perhaps be incorporated in a Protocol attached to the Treaty. He thought that all the administrative arrangements necessary to put the Treaty into effect could be included in a single article. He added that he believed the additional wording suggested by the Soviet representative was strictly explanatory, and that it should also be included in a separate Protocol. The Soviet representative disagreed. He argued that the ideas he had put forward were essential to the principle of the peaceful use of Antarctica and that they should be included in the Treaty.

9. The French representative stated that he would like to see a clear statement included in the Treaty to the effect that military forces could be used for logistic support. He thought that it might be a good idea to try to define the limits of logistic support. The New Zealand representative suggested that if a Protocol were attached to the Treaty it could be given the same status as the Treaty itself. The United States representative said that he saw some merit in restricting the articles to a brief statement of principle.

10. This morning's meeting was noteworthy for the active part played by the Russians, who have apparently overcome their dislike of becoming involved in points of substance. The discussion showed however, that there is much work still to be done if a reasonable measure of agreement on the text of the Treaty is to be achieved in time for a conference to be held in early September as seems to be generally desired.

11. We meet again on Tuesday, July 29, when we shall probably continue to discuss the peaceful use of Antarctica. We may go on to tackle the second New Zealand working paper, on scientific research and cooperation, and the United States working paper on rights and claims.

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Washington telegram No. 399 Saving to Foreign Office

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4. The United States representative then asked for views about the manner in which the time and place of the Conference should be announced. The French representative urged that we should not announce any date until we were able to see how much progress on the Treaty was likely to be made in our preparatory talks. The New Zealand representative suggested that there were four possible ways in which the announcement might be made: by the United States Government (as the power which had taken the initiative in suggesting the Conference), jointly by all twelve governments, by the government of the country in which the Conference was being held, or by one government convening the Conference on behalf of the other interested powers. The Chilean and Soviet representatives spoke in favour of a joint announcement by the twelve governments. Discussion about the time and place of the Conference will be resumed at the next meeting, by which time most representatives hope to be in a position to state their governments' views.

5. Delimitation of Antarctica

The Argentine representative suggested that this article should in future be entitled "The Zone of Application of the Treaty". The Australian and Japanese representatives spoke in support of this idea. We stated that we were still studying the wording proposed by the Chilean representative at the previous meeting. We explained that we did not like the idea of including part of the "high seas" within the delimitation of Antarctica, and that we would not want to agree to anything that might possibly be taken to imply that part of the "high seas" could come within the exclusive jurisdiction of a group of states (your telegram No. 5086 [of July 23]).

6. Peaceful Use of Antarctica

The meeting then discussed the working paper circulated by the representative of New Zealand at the meeting before last. The Soviet representative (speaking in Russian) said that one of the most important purposes of the Treaty was to ensure peaceful conditions for scientific research by all countries in Antarctica. This implied that no military bases should be established there, no military manoeuvres should be held and no weapons tested. He suggested that the principle formulated by the New Zealand representative should be amended to include the ideas he had put forward. He subsequently read out the following wording: "Antarctica should be used by all countries for peaceful purposes only. This means, in particular, that no military bases should be established there, that no manoeuvres by land, sea or air forces should be held, and that no weapons should be tested there". He agreed, at the request of the Chilean representative, to circulate a working paper explaining his proposal more precisely.

/7. The

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By bag

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
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Lord Hood  
No. 399 Saving  
July 24, 1958.

R. July 27, 1958.

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 399 Saving of  
July 24

Repeated for information Saving to:- U.K. Mission New York

My telegram No. 392 Saving [of July 22]: ANTARCTIC TREATY.

The seventh meeting of the representatives of the Twelve was held today. The time and place of the Conference, the delimitation of Antarctica, and the article on the peaceful use of Antarctica were discussed.

2. Time and Place

The Chilean representative said that he had been instructed to suggest that September 8 should be adopted as the target date for the Conference instead of September 1, owing to the fact that the Chilean Presidential elections would be held on September 4. The Argentine, United States, Norwegian and Japanese, representatives all indicated that their Governments could agree to September 1, and that they thought September 8 would be equally convenient. We said that we presumed that if Her Majesty's Government were ready to agree to the Conference taking place in early September, we would be able to support either of the dates proposed. We added that we were still awaiting instructions, however, and that we could not anticipate whether early September would be acceptable to us. The South African and Soviet representatives took a similar line. The Australian representative stated that he doubted whether it would be possible to reach a decision about the date of the Conference, until more progress had been made on the substance of the Treaty.

3. The Chilean and Japanese representatives expressed a preference for Washington as the venue of the Conference. The United States representative stated that either Paris or Washington would be acceptable to his Government. He also reported that the United States Mission in New York had made enquiries about the possibility of using the United Nations facilities in Geneva for a Conference in the early part of September. They had been informed this would be out of the question, owing to the fact that the Conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy was to be held there at that time.

/4. The

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Washington telegram No. 394 Saving to Foreign Office

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4. The Norwegian representative said that he had no specific instructions but he knew that his Government had accepted the United States draft on freezing of rights and claims.

5. The United States representative said the main objectives of the Antarctic Treaty were non-militarisation of the area and the freezing of rights and claims in order to prevent the Soviet Union putting forward a claim. Such action by the Soviet Union would force the United States to make a claim too. It was also necessary to work out some sort of settlement of the conflicting claims of the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile. For all this a clause freezing rights and claims was indispensable. It was necessary to insulate scientific research from the effects of possible political conflict and to avoid in the future expensive competition in the way of scientific expeditions mounted for nationalist reasons. The United States draft protected all present claims and rights and each of the Twelve would be in a better position to resist intrusion if a clause freezing rights and claims were included in the Treaty.

6. The French representative said nothing but was obviously pleased by the amount of ammunition we had given him to use with his Government. He will now seek fresh instructions. It is possible, however, that his instructions will not change and he will be obliged to bring the French Government's view, as set out in my telegram No. 380 Saving, before the full meeting on Tuesday, July 29. You may wish to consider whether it might not be useful to have a word in Paris, as suggested in paragraph 6 of your telegram under reference.

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INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

By Bag

Lord Hood

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
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No. 394 Saving

July 23, 1958

R. July 25, 1958

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 394 Saving of  
July 23.

Repeated for information Saving to U.K. Mission New York

Your telegram No. 4957 [of July 22]: ANTARCTIC TREATY

We put your points to a meeting of representatives of the claimant countries and the United States today.

2. The Chilean representative agreed with our views except that, as usual, he showed himself extremely sensitive to any broadening of the Treaty or what he considered interference by the United Nations. He said that should other countries attending the preliminary discussions press for an accession clause or for some form of endorsement of an Antarctic Treaty by the United Nations, the Chilean Government might have to reconsider their acceptance of the United States invitation. Otherwise, he said that the freezing of rights and claims was essential if we were to carry out the basic principle of the peaceful use of Antarctica. He agreed that it would be possible that, once the Treaty was in force, third countries could under various pretexts establish bases and eventually claim rights. But there was nothing to prevent third countries from doing this now. And if the Treaty were to come into force, the Twelve would be collectively in a position to see that the Treaty was observed; their capacity for mobilising world opinion against any intervention would be strengthened. He suggested that if the French were really afraid of creating a precedent, this fear might be allayed by an insertion of wording to the effect that the freezing of rights and claims in the Treaty would be applicable only to Antarctica and could not be used as a precedent for other areas.

3. The Argentine representative agreed with the Chilean position and, in general, with us. He added, however, that if we were to seek endorsement by the United Nations, we would be putting in doubt the right of the Twelve to legislate for Antarctica.

/4. The

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Washington telegram No. 392 Saving to Foreign Office

to the region encompassed within the 60 degree line. He subsequently proposed the following wording (based on our draft):

"The provisions of this Treaty shall be applied to all the lands and waters situated in the whole area between Latitude 60 degrees South and the South Pole."

The Argentine and Japanese representatives expressed some agreement with the Chilean proposal, and the Norwegian representative also spoke in support of the idea of omitting any reference to the "high seas". In answer to an enquiry from the New Zealand representative, the Chilean representative stated that he did not believe that omission of the reference to the "high seas" would raise difficulties, nor would it result in a conflict between the Antarctic Treaty and the provisions of other international conventions. The United States representative stated that he was impressed by the importance of distinguishing between a precise scientific definition of Antarctica, and the zone within which the proposed Treaty would apply. It was agreed that we should pursue the problem at a later meeting.

5. This morning's discussion was the most detailed that we have had to date and it is perhaps encouraging that the Russians showed no reluctance to discussion of questions of substance. We hope this may last. But it clearly shows that we have so far only begun to scratch the surface of the problems involved in working out the substance of the proposed Treaty. In spite of this, almost all the representatives seemed to favour an early decision upon the time of the proposed Conference and we doubt whether it will be possible to avoid a decision in the near future. We meet again on Thursday, July 24.

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3. The French representative said that his government had no objection to the Conference being held in Paris, although they would like as much warning as possible. It soon became clear that there were three choices: Paris, Washington and Geneva.

The United States representative was asked to enquire very informally whether the United Nations could provide the necessary facilities for a Conference in Geneva in the early Autumn, should this be decided upon. It was also agreed that representatives would seek instructions about the three choices now before us.

The following opinions were expressed this morning.

The New Zealand representative indicated a preference for Paris rather than Geneva.

We said that we were ready to consider either Paris or Washington.

The South African representative said that his Government would prefer a city in which they had a reasonably large Mission (thus presumably ruling out Geneva).

The Norwegian representative said that his Government preferred Geneva, Paris and Washington in that order.

The Soviet representative expressed a preference for Geneva. He said that he would have to ask for instructions about the possibility of the Conference meeting in Paris. He thought that his Government would have no objection to Washington.

The Australian representative was in favour of Washington, Paris and Geneva in that order.

It was agreed that it would also be useful if Governments would give some thought to the probable size of their delegations, since this might affect the choice of place.

4. Delimitation of Antarctica:

The meeting then resumed discussion of the working paper which we had circulated at the previous meeting. The South African and French representatives both indicated that they supported our wording. The Soviet representative, speaking for the first time in Russian, (presumably in order to emphasise the importance of his remarks) repeated the view which he had expressed in the last meeting, namely that since one of the main purposes of the Treaty was to encourage scientific research in the Antarctic, we should make use of the definition agreed upon by the Special Committee for Antarctic Research. He proposed accordingly that we should adopt a definition under which Antarctica would be limited by "the Antarctic Convergence" which he described as "the zone of the convergence of the polar and sub-tropical waters." The United States representative expressed doubts whether the Antarctic convergence, since it was not a fixed line, would be suitable for the proposed Treaty which would require some precise definition. The French supported this view. The Chilean representative argued that we had insufficient knowledge about the nature of Antarctica to enable us to make a precise definition. Any definition that we might adopt would probably have to be altered later on in the light of further scientific discoveries. He also thought that the inclusion of any reference to "high seas" involved serious difficulties, since there was no universally accepted definition of the term. He therefore proposed that, instead of defining Antarctica, we should include an article to the effect that the provisions of the Treaty should be applied to the

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BY BAG

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Lord Hood

FOREIGN OFFICE AND  
WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

No. 392 Saving  
of July 22, 1958

R. July 24, 1958

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 392 Saving  
of July 22, 1958

Repeated for information Saving to:- UKMIS New York

My telegram No. 375 Saving /of July 15/:

ANTARCTIC TREATY.

The sixth meeting of the representatives of the Twelve was held this morning. The time and place of the Conference and the delimitation of Antarctica were discussed.

2. Time and Place.

The Chilean representative suggested that the Conference might be held at the end of August or in the first days of September, depending upon the progress made.

The United States representative said that he had no objection to the date proposed, provided sufficient progress had been made.

The South African representative thought that an early decision would have to be taken if the Conference were to be held at the beginning of September, in order to enable governments to make the necessary preparations.

The United States representative then proposed that we might tentatively recommend to governments that September 1 should be adopted as the target date for the Conference. He was supported by the Chilean and Japanese representatives. The Australian, South African and Norwegian representatives indicated that they thought their governments would be able to agree. We said that we should have to ask for instructions, and that we could not anticipate whether this date would be convenient. The New Zealand, Russian and Argentine representatives took the same line as ourselves.

/ 3. The French



A limited plan for Demilitarisation only

44. This plan is a more modest proposal, providing for an agreement between all parties operating in the Antarctic for the demilitarisation of the area. In so far as demilitarisation cannot be effected without machinery for notification of activities and inspection any such demilitarisation convention would establish the necessary machinery.

In favour of this plan it may be said that it would be easier to negotiate than anything more far-reaching and might be

b/a stepping-stone to a more all-embracing plan at a later stage.

c) a method of achieving neutralisation of the Russians without req. formal claimants to give up sov. ~~claims~~  
The objections to it are:- give up benefits of present form.

- (a) It would not solve the political disputes.
- (b) It would require machinery for <sup>advan. of inspection arrangements</sup> enforcement which would be almost as intricate as that needed for an international authority.
- (c) Agreement to arrangements necessary for effective demilitarisation (i.e. inspection by representatives of an international authority) would be the hardest <sup>in case this should create a precedent for other areas.</sup> gnat for the Russians to swallow in any international scheme. If they would accept that they would probably therefore be prepared to participate in a broader arrangement which brought with it the advantages of greater facilities for scientific work.
- (d) The plan would also grant in some measure de facto recognition of Russia's position in Antarctica and might, as much as any other plan, serve as an inducement for her to stay, when she might otherwise have left after the I.G.Y.

Timing

45. ~~No news of any change proposed in the status quo should be made public until after the Argentine elections in February 1958~~ <sup>should agreement be reached on the desirability of changing) no publicity should be given to this</sup>

/lest

(e) From the U.K. angle a further objection is that the plan would be portrayed by critics of the Government as a further example of 'dismembering the Empire.'

(f) The Argentines and Chileans, whether they agreed to join the scheme or not, would regard U.K. readiness to do so as a sign that she was weakening in her intention to maintain her claim and might correspondingly stiffen their attitude.

(g) Similarly, the Argentines might be encouraged in their pretensions to the Falkland Islands.

The United States Plan

41. According to present information American policy for the Antarctic is to:-

- (a) claim the unclaimed zone.
- (b) Invite the Australian and New Zealand Governments to merge the three zones into a single condominium involving a joint administration along the lines of a board of directors.
- (c) At a later date invite the other Antarctic powers to join the condominium.
- (d) Exclude Soviet Russia from the condominium.
- (e) Make no attempt to secure the approval ~~in advance~~ of the United Nations. The State Department think in terms rather of blocking any adverse vote there rather than of securing support. Whatever happened in the United Nations a stalemate could always be ensured which would leave the status quo, which would by then, of course, be whatever had resulted from the merger of the various zones.

We have no further details about the American plan. It seems probable that the Americans do not regard the above plan as necessarily a final one; they have asked to have more details of the U.K. proposals and have suggested that the whole question

/might

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be invited to take the leading part in exerting pressure on the Chileans and Argentines, who might regard such pressure coming from the United Kingdom as indicating weakness in their attitude over the territorial dispute. The United Nations General Assembly would <sup>in due course</sup> be invited to approve the proposal. No publicity should be given to the proposal and therefore no approaches even of a diplomatic character should be made to any country other than the United States until after the Argentine elections in February 1958. In order, however, to forestall the danger of unacceptable proposals being brought forward in the United Nations during the General Assembly of 1958, action should be begun during the summer of 1958, always supposing that the new Argentine Government was not publicly and irrevocably committed against any change in the status quo.

Arguments in favour of United Kingdom Plan

39. (a) By the inclusion of Soviet Russia it would have all the advantages <sup>indicated</sup> described in paragraph <sup>33</sup> 26 above, including particularly the fact that, <sup>given the co-op of the Russians</sup> it would then be possible to secure the effective demilitarisation of the whole continent.

(b) The position of the United States in the Antarctic would be regularised, with the certainty that she would neither leave the Australians face to face alone with the Russians nor embarrass others of the Antarctic powers by making claims which clashed with theirs.

(c) It would provide against the possible withdrawal from the Antarctic of the United Kingdom in that it would solve the present dispute over sovereignty in the United Kingdom zone, thereby rendering unnecessary the excessive costs of present activities directed mainly towards maintaining a legal claim in the face of Argentine and Chilean pretensions.

(d) It would satisfy <sup>most</sup> the ~~large~~ body of opinion ~~throughout~~ the world which favours the internationalisation of Antarctica,

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demilitarisation provides the only guarantee against the establishment of Russian bases on a large scale in Antarctica which would represent a potential threat not only to Australia and New Zealand and South Africa but to the interests of the free world. ✓ //

(d) If the Russians left the Antarctic after the I.G.Y. and were not invited to join the authority they would in practice be free to return at any time they wished without any obligation to accept supervision for the purpose of demilitarisation.

(e) The Russians may argue before world opinion that their exclusion was unjustifiable on the following grounds:-

- (i) In their view Admiral Bellingshausen discovered Antarctica in 1819.
- (ii) Their efforts in Antarctica during the I.G.Y. are greater than those of any other power except the United States.
- (iii) They announced in 1950 that they wanted to be included in any scheme for Antarctica such as the condominium proposed by the Americans in 1948; at the same time they stated that they did not recognise the claims of other powers to sovereignty in Antarctica.

(f) Although the Russians may maintain that they have adequate justification in international law for establishing themselves in Antarctica (~~as indeed it would be anywhere in the Antarctic save possibly in the unclaimed zone~~), they are no doubt alive to the fact that their present position in the Australian sector is ambiguous and might lead to serious friction with some of the other Antarctic powers. They might therefore be glad of an opportunity of regularising their own position through membership of an international authority.

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