

be resumed in the Falkland Islands Dependencies ; that the personnel, which included administrative officials, had already arrived ; that fully-equipped bases had been established ; and that the personnel were expected to remain in the Antarctic for a considerable period. No information has yet been received as to the reaction of the Argentine Government to this announcement.

AS 4828/176/2  
of 1944.

254. In July 1944 the Ministerio de Marina at Buenos Aires published a chart (No. 100) of Deception Island bearing the title : "*República Argentina, Océano glacial Antártico, Isla Decepción. . .*" This Chart is obviously based very largely on Admiralty Chart No. 3205, which, in turn, was based on a French Government Chart of 1912. The sub-title, however, implies that the Argentine chart is a direct result of the visits of the *Primero de Mayo* in 1942 and 1943. The publication of this official document may be regarded as a further provocative measure by the Argentine Government, and is one which should be taken into consideration when the formal protest mentioned above is made.

AS 5924/176/2  
of 1944.

File AS 258/G  
of 1944.

255. During the summer of 1944 a series of inter-departmental meetings were held to consider future policy and to make arrangements for extending the scope of the operations. The difficulty of obtaining a suitable ship seriously restricted the formulation of precise plans, but it was decided to attempt to establish a new base at Hope Bay, to continue the occupation of Deception Island and Port Lockroy throughout 1945, and to occupy a small new base on Signy Island for a short period during the summer of 1944-45. In order to facilitate exploration down the little-known east coast of Graham Land, which has never been closely examined by a British expedition, it was decided to provide dogs and sledging equipment for the use of the party at Hope Bay. It was not, however, until the end of September 1944 that the Newfoundland sealing steamer *Eagle* was made available and it became possible to proceed with these plans. H.M.S. *William Scoresby* and the *Fitzroy* were also made available to assist with the operations in the southern summer of 1944-45.

AS 5342/258/G  
of 1944.

File AS 453/G  
of 1945.

255A. On January 1st 1945 the Buenos Aires press announced that the transport *Chaco* would shortly be taking reliefs to the meteorological station on Laurie Island ; instructions were provided for philatelists interested in receiving correspondence cancelled with the South Orkney postmark. No evidence had been received by the end of January that the Argentine Government contemplated any further Antarctic activities during the summer of 1944-45. The *Fitzroy*, accompanied by H.M.S. *William Scoresby*, left Port Stanley for the south on January 23rd, and the *Eagle* left on the following day. The first two ships proceeded, on February 2nd, from Deception Island to Port Lockroy to embark personnel and stores for Hope Bay. On February 7th, Lt. Cdr. J. W. S. Marr asked to be relieved of the command of the expedition on grounds of ill-health. The wisdom of his decision was confirmed by the medical officer, who reported that Marr had collapsed and that it was considered imperative to take him to Port Stanley immediately. Accordingly H.M.S. *William Scoresby* was instructed to undertake this task. She reached the Falkland Islands on February 12th. After a period in hospital in Port Stanley, Lieut.-Commander Marr returned to the United Kingdom and Captain A. Taylor, Royal Canadian Engineers, was appointed to succeed him in command of the shore bases. The *Eagle* arrived at Hope Bay on February 12th, and a new base was established there. On the same day the *Fitzroy* reached Sandefjord Bay on Coronation Island in the South Orkneys. A hut was erected, but, owing to shortage of personnel, no occupation party was left on the island. The personnel of the shore stations has been strengthened by the addition of five extra men from the United Kingdom and three Falkland Islanders, bringing the total shore staff to twenty-one. For convenience of reference the four bases have been given code letters as follows : Port Lockroy (A), Deception

249. On February 17th the two ships left Port Lockroy and visited the Melchior Islands in the Palmer Archipelago. A record of the Argentine visit in February 1943 (paragraph 240) was found here on Lambda Island, and this was removed. The ships then sailed via Deception Island for the South Orkneys. Signy Island was visited on February 21st. The British marks left there by H.M.S. *Carnarvon Castle* in 1943 (paragraph 237) were found to be untouched, and no Argentine marks were seen there. The ships reached South Georgia on February 24th and returned to Port Stanley on February 29th.

250. It was learned later that the Argentine transport *Pampa* had visited Laurie Island on February 20th (i.e. one day before the *Fitzroy* and *William Scoresby* were at Signy Island). The *Pampa* apparently confined her activities to the relief of the meteorological staff, and since the ships did not meet, there was fortunately no necessity to implement the instructions outlined in paragraph 244.

251. In order to counter the Argentine move in establishing a permanent post office on Laurie Island in November 1941, a procedure clearly based on the belief that such action demonstrates permanent administration (paragraph 229), a special series of postage stamps was issued for the use of the British establishments. These were Falkland Island stamps, overprinted with the names South Georgia, South Shetland Islands, South Orkney Islands and Graham Land. The Bureau of the International Postal Union at Berne was informed of the issue of these stamps, and the Bureau notified postal administrations in a circular letter dated July 14th 1944. In accordance with the practice which has been followed since the German occupation of southern France, specimens were sent directly from the General Post Office in London to the postal administrations of non-enemy countries, including Argentina and Chile, the Foreign Office having agreed to the war-time practice in this case.\* As a further act of sovereignty, the Governor of the Falkland Islands swore in Lieut.-Commander J. W. S. Marr and Mr. W. R. Flett as Magistrates for Graham Land, the South Orkneys and the South Shetlands.

252. H.M.S. *William Scoresby* sailed again on March 14th to convey further stores to the two bases. On March 22nd a landing was made at Cape Renard on the mainland of Graham Land. The Union Jack was erected and documents recording the visit were deposited. It had been proposed, if circumstances permitted, that she should also pay a formal call on Laurie Island, as had been done by H.M.S. *Carnarvon Castle* in 1943 (paragraph 237), but this project had to be abandoned owing to thick weather and shortage of fuel. H.M.S. *William Scoresby* returned to Port Stanley and then left on April 12th for a third visit to the Dependencies, carrying further stores and mail. She reached Deception Island on April 16th and Port Lockroy on the following day, returning to Port Stanley on April 24th.

253. It had been agreed that, when the season was well advanced and the British bases were firmly established, Sir D. Kelly should notify the Argentine Government of all these developments and protest against the activities of the *Primero de Mayo* in 1943. However, in view of the confused political situation in Argentina in March 1944, it seemed important that any publicity should be postponed until a decision should be reached regarding recognition or non-recognition of General Farrell's Administration. On the other hand, the arrival in this country of letters bearing the special overprinted stamps aroused considerable interest among philatelists, and it was agreed on March 7th that a brief press announcement would have to be made. It was also decided that the proposed protest to the Argentine Government should be withheld until normal relations with that Government had been restored. Accordingly, on April 24th, a press announcement was released to the effect that arrangements had been made for scientific and survey work to

A 1280/258/G  
of 1944.

AS 1483/258/G  
of 1944.

G.P.O.  
43042/44.

AS 1484/258/G  
of 1944.

AS 3048/258/G  
of 1944.

AS 2239/258/G  
of 1944.

AS 3048/258/G  
of 1944.

AS 1483/258/G  
of 1944.

A 1484/258/G  
of 1944.

AS 2239/258/G  
of 1944.

\* The normal practice of notifying the International Bureau of the opening of new post offices has been suspended during the war.

A 9122/480/G  
of 1943.

244. During the summer of 1943 detailed plans for the proposed parties of occupation were drawn up and Lieut.-Commander J. W. S. Marr, R.N.V.R., was selected as leader. It was agreed that the main object was rather to establish parties on the islands concerned than to deny access to them to similar Argentine or Chilean parties. Any foreign marks found were to be erased and replaced by British marks. The members of the shore parties also had instructions, should they meet an Argentine or Chilean expedition anywhere in the islands, to assert British sovereignty by all means short of violent force. It did not seem likely that they would meet any such party, since there was some evidence to suggest that Argentine action in the season 1943-44 would be confined to the usual annual visit to relieve the personnel at Laurie Island, and that the Chilean Government had failed to obtain a suitable ship (paragraph 268). It was further decided that no communication should be made to the Governments of Argentina, Chile or the United States until the parties of occupation had reached the islands, and that the substance and timing of any communication which might then have to be made would depend upon developments.

A 10924/480/G  
of 1943.  
A 1281/258/G  
of 1944.

245. The special position at South Georgia necessitated separate instructions for the Officer Commanding the South Georgia Defence Force in the unlikely event of an Argentine party landing and attempting to perform acts of sovereignty there. At South Georgia it was considered that the local representatives of His Majesty's Government should use all the force at their disposal to uphold their authority over the island.

A 9620/480/G  
of 1943.

246. In view of the visit of the *Primero de Mayo* to Graham Land in March 1943 (paragraphs 240-241), the occupation of Graham Land by British personnel was considered to be of greater importance than the occupation of Signy Island. The final plan therefore envisaged the establishment of occupation parties at Deception Island and at Hope Bay (on the mainland of Graham Land). A visit was to be made to Signy Island, but arrangements to occupy that island had to be postponed until the season 1944-45.

A 1484/258/G  
of 1944.  
AS 2668/258/G  
of 1944.

247. The members of the shore parties, fourteen in number, left Great Britain on December 16th 1943, and arrived at Port Stanley on January 28th 1944.\* H.M.S. *Bransfield* (ex *Veslekari*) which was originally intended to convey them to their bases in the Dependencies, developed a serious defect, and as repairs would have taken too long, it was decided to send them to the Falkland Islands by troop ship. The Admiralty had made H.M.S. *William Scoresby* available for the operations in the Dependencies, and on January 29th the shore parties left Port Stanley on board H.M.S. *William Scoresby* and S.S. *Fitzroy*. A base was established at Deception Island on February 6th. It was confirmed that the British marks which had been left on this island by H.M.S. *Carnarvon Castle* in March 1943 had been removed and Argentine marks substituted (paragraph 240). These Argentine marks were in turn removed.

248. The plan to establish a base on the mainland of Graham Land unfortunately had to be abandoned owing to unfavourable ice conditions, which prevented the *Fitzroy* from approaching Hope Bay. H.M.S. *William Scoresby* was able to reach the shore, but her cargo capacity was too small to allow relaying the cargo from the *Fitzroy*. The mainland coast was then carefully searched from Antarctic Sound south-westwards to Andvord Bay, but no suitable site for a base could be found. On February 11th the two ships arrived at Port Lockroy, in the Palmer Archipelago, and it was decided to establish the main base there. Port Lockroy is one of the best harbours in the region. Although of considerable political value as a site for administrative acts, it is not well located either for scientific work or as a base for exploratory journeys. At Port Lockroy an Argentine flag was found, and also a bronze cylinder containing an Argentine document laying claim to territories lying between longs. 25° W. and 68° 34' W., south of lat. 60° S. (see paragraph 240). These marks were removed.

\* During the war these operations have been conducted under the secret code word "Tabarin."



war. Argentine and Chilean aspirations in the Antarctic are discussed in detail, and the rivalry and distrust between them in this connection are clearly brought out.\* The Argentines erased the British marks at Deception Island with the cognisance of the Chileans, but endeavoured to keep secret from the latter the fact that, on the eve of departure, they also restored the Argentine marks. In transmitting this report, the British Naval Attaché at Santiago stressed the importance of not disclosing that His Majesty's Government have obtained possession of this document.

241. Capitán Córdovez's report shows that unfavourable weather prevented the *Primero de Mayo* from carrying out any hydrographic work, but that navigational beacons were erected in the Melchior Islands, at Port Lockroy and in Neny Fjord. The scientific instruments and equipment which the Americans had been forced to abandon at Neny Fjord in 1941 (paragraph 278) were embarked in accordance with a request from the United States Embassy at Buenos Aires.† On return of the expedition to Buenos Aires, the Argentine Government suppressed all public announcements regarding the removal of the Argentine emblems from Deception Island and their replacement by British emblems. However, at least one newspaper published a brief statement that the *Primero de Mayo* had completed her expedition, that she had found an abandoned factory on Deception Island and that the Argentine flag had been erased.

*Crítica*, March  
19th 1944.

242. When in February 1944 H.M.S. *William Scoresby* visited Port Lockroy (paragraph 248), she found a cylinder containing an Argentine claim to sovereignty over the area between longs. 25° W. and 68° 34' W., south of lat. 60° S. This claim must have been deposited by the *Primero de Mayo* on March 1st or 2nd 1943 (see paragraph 240). Thus, although the Argentine Government have put forward no official claim to Graham Land by name, they have done so several times by implication. The voyage of the *Primero de Mayo* and the acts performed by her commander obviously indicate that the Argentine Government are preparing to carry out a policy of penetration and that they regard as Argentine the whole of this peninsula and the adjacent islands (see Appendix VIII, pp. 177-178).

AS 2239/258/G  
of 1944.

243. *British Occupation, 1944*. The first of the two proposals approved by the War Cabinet on January 28th 1943 (paragraph 236) had been carried out by the voyage of H.M.S. *Carnarvon Castle*. Before proceeding with the second proposal, namely the occupation of the threatened islands, His Majesty's Ambassador at Buenos Aires was again consulted with a view to estimating the probable reaction of the new revolutionary government which had since come into power in Buenos Aires. Sir D. Kelly expressed his opinion that the risks involved should be accepted, but that action should be early, effective and carried out with absolute secrecy. He further advised that Laurie Island should be avoided. After protracted discussions it was decided on May 27th to send parties of occupation to Deception Island and to Signy Island, but not to Laurie Island. It was realised that the omission of the latter might result in its loss to the British Empire, but His Majesty's Government were not at that time prepared to remove the Argentines by force, thus irretrievably compromising relations with Argentina, and it was obviously impractical to send a British party of occupation to live alongside the Argentines.

A 8132/480/G  
of 1943.

A 4935/25/2 of  
1943.

AS 2327/258/G  
of 1944.

\* It is perhaps relevant that in June 1944, the Argentine Government suggested to the Chilean Government that they should endeavour to reach a settlement of their long outstanding boundary dispute relating to Beagle Channel "as between two friendly countries" and without having recourse to the arbitration which they had agreed upon in 1938. The Argentine Government added that they wished only to insist on recognition of their sovereignty over Isla Nueva (New Island). In August 1944, the Chilean Government replied stating that they considered the arbitration should take place, since Chile could not, in any circumstances, agree to Argentina's proposal regarding Isla Nueva (AS 4749/3968/9 and AS 5325/3968/9 of 1944).

† These items did not reach the United States until December 1944, and then only after a long series of enquiries had been made by State Department officials at the Argentine Foreign Office. It is probable that nothing would have been returned had not a Curator of the Smithsonian Institution recognised some of the American equipment while visiting a Buenos Aires Museum.

A 757/480/G ;

A 1093/480/G  
of 1943.A 1598/25/2  
of 1943.  
A 1350/480/G  
of 1943.

party landed on Signy Island to erect flagstaffs carrying the Union Jack and to leave a record of the visit. The following day the ship called at the Argentine meteorological station on Laurie Island. The captain of the *Carnarvon Castle* had instructions not to make a demonstration of force if the Argentines showed any disposition to resist a landing, for His Majesty's Ambassador at Buenos Aires had expressed his opinion that any armed clash would do serious and lasting damage to Anglo-Argentine relations. The reception at Laurie Island, however, was most cordial, and no references were made to the subject of sovereignty. It was explained that the *Carnarvon Castle* was cruising in the Dependencies to find out whether the anchorages were being used by the enemy. The Argentine flag was flying over the station. His Majesty's Ambassador informed the Argentine Foreign Minister of the visit of the *Carnarvon Castle* to Deception Island and assured him that His Majesty's Government had no intention of allowing their title to go by default or to be challenged.

A 1917/25/2 of  
1943.A 1902/25/2 of  
1943.A 2856/25/2 of  
1943.  
AS 1529/453/2  
of 1945.A 1917/25/2 ;  
A 4225/25/2 of  
1943.

238. To this the Argentine Foreign Minister replied that the Argentine Government considered that its claims, *inherited from Spain*, were absolutely justified, and, in a memorandum of February 15th, the Argentine Government "re-affirmed" its sovereign rights over all Antarctic lands and dependencies south of lat. 60° S. and between longs. 25° W. and 68° 34' W., expressed regret at the removal of Argentine emblems on Deception Island, and opposed the "most formal resistance" to jurisdictional acts carried out by British officials. At the same time it was reported that the Argentine Government had again formulated reserves with the International Postal Union over the inclusion of the Falkland Islands and Dependencies in the ratification by the United Kingdom of an agreement relating to letters and packages.

239. His Majesty's Government replied to the Argentine memorandum of February 15th by a memorandum, dated April 7th, setting forth their title to the Falkland Islands Dependencies\* and reciting Argentine infringements of that title. When, on April 12th, Sir D. Kelly presented this document to the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs, he stated that when the *Primero de Mayo* visited Deception Island in 1942, her Captain should have seen that the destruction of certain installations by His Majesty's ships on a previous visit was a clear indication that His Majesty's Government claimed sovereignty. The visit referred to was that of H.M.S. *Queen of Bermuda* in March 1941 (paragraph 176). The Argentine Minister made no comment on this point.

A 8239/25/2  
of 1943.

240. Meanwhile the *Primero de Mayo* (Capitán de Fragata S. Harriague) had engaged in a second expedition, in which two Chilean naval officers and one civilian were invited to participate. Sailing on February 4th 1943, the ship visited the Melchior Islands in the Palmer Archipelago, Port Lockroy (another anchorage in the Palmer Archipelago), and Marguerite Bay (where the expedition visited the United States Antarctic Service "East Base" in Neny Fjord), and then returned to Deception Island. There the Commander was unpleasantly surprised to discover that the Argentine flag which the crew of the transport had painted on her last visit had been obliterated and replaced by the British flag. The British emblems, therefore, were in turn removed and the Argentine flag was repainted. The ship left Deception Island on March 11th; the Argentine Government have not yet seen fit to avow this act to His Majesty's Government. A full report of the activities of the *Primero de Mayo* was subsequently obtained confidentially from Capitán Córdovez, the senior Chilean officer who accompanied the expedition. This report provides evidence of unsuccessful attempts on the part of the Argentines to enrol Chile's co-operation in presenting a common front to Great Britain on the subject of Antarctic claims after the

\* A considerably stronger British case could have been made than is presented in this document, which should not form the basis of any future memorandum.

prepared in June, setting out a brief history of the case and protesting against the Argentine activities at the South Orkneys; the note also enquired whether there was any substance in the press reports regarding the action alleged to have been taken by an Argentine naval officer at Deception Island in January 1942 (paragraph 231).

233. On September 2nd His Majesty's Ambassador (Sir D. Kelly), who had only recently received his instructions, demurred to the immediate presentation of this note, and he was authorized to defer presenting it for not more than two months. The Foreign Office legal advisers strongly emphasised their opinion that, if the present situation was allowed to continue, the British title to the South Orkneys would become progressively weaker and the Argentine claim would be strengthened; in their view the suggested protest and the existing administrative measures were insufficient to safeguard the British title, and some form of permanent occupation had become essential to establish effective British possession; from a legal point of view it was questionable whether the steps which His Majesty's Government had so far taken had done more than create an inchoate title to the islands.

A 9280/12/2  
of 1942.

234. At an inter-departmental meeting held on September 24th 1942, it was decided that no useful purpose would be served by delaying the written protest. Accordingly, Sir D. Kelly was instructed on October 14th to present the note to the Argentine Government. However, before he had had an opportunity to do so the matter was again deferred while the question was raised whether the value of the South Orkneys (and the South Shetlands) was sufficient to justify continued resistance to Argentine claims and the more decisive action with which His Majesty's Government was now faced. The Admiralty laid stress on the strategic value of the islands (paragraph 53). The Colonial Office took the view that, though they had little immediate economic importance to the Colonial Empire, their potential importance was considerable, especially in view of the need for strict control of whaling after the war and of their potential value in respect of minerals, meteorological stations and polar air routes. The interest of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was confined to the possible effects of Argentine encroachments on Antarctic whaling operations. All of these Departments were agreed on the importance of strongly resisting any attempt on the part of foreign governments to contest the British title to areas in the Antarctic.

A 9545/12/2  
of 1942.

A 11130/12/2;  
A 11502/12/2  
of 1942.

235. Meanwhile, it was learned on January 1st 1943 that the *Primero de Mayo* would shortly sail again for the Antarctic and would formally take possession in the name of the Argentine Government of the South Orkney and South Shetland Islands.

Admiralty R.O.  
Case 6037,  
M 09551/42.

236. *British Countervailing Action, 1943-44.*—Following the announcement on January 9th 1943 that the Admiralty could make H.M.S. *Carnarvon Castle* available for an Antarctic voyage, several inter-departmental meetings were held in January and it was decided that a round of visits to the islands of the Dependencies should be made immediately in order to anticipate the *Primero de Mayo*. It was recognised that this action would in itself be insufficient to secure the British title, and that permanent occupation parties would have to be sent out in the Autumn of 1943 to all the threatened islands except, probably, Laurie Island (paragraph 520). These proposals were approved by the War Cabinet on January 28th, and the Dominion Governments were informed of the circumstances of the voyage.

A 480/480/G of  
1943.

A 1103/480/G  
of 1943.

A 1132/480/G  
of 1943.

237. H.M.S. *Carnarvon Castle* was dispatched from the Falkland Islands on January 25th 1943. On January 30th a party landed at Deception Island, obliterated all traces of the Argentine visit in 1942 (paragraph 231), hoisted the Union Jack, and left a record of the ship's visit. A writ stating that the lease had lapsed and that the buildings and plant had become Government property was pinned in a conspicuous place in one of the buildings. There were no indications of the station having been visited or used by the enemy. The ship then proceeded to the South Orkneys, and on February 8th a

Admiralty R.O.  
Case 6037,  
M 06404/43;  
A 1324/480/G  
of 1943.



A 9773/152/2  
of 1941.

A 667/12/3  
of 1942.

*Conventions et  
Divers. Bulletin*  
No. 54, Bernc,  
Dec. 12th 1941.

A 5498/12/2  
of 1942.

229. Thus encouraged by the hope of Chilean support and United States sympathy, the Argentine Government announced in August 1941 that Argentine naval wireless operators would in future man the meteorological station at Laurie Island. It was reported by the British Naval Attaché at Buenos Aires that the Argentines assumed that this action would strengthen their claim to the South Orkney Islands "as such an act would not normally be tolerated by another owner." In November 1941 the Argentine Director of Posts and Telegraphs announced the opening of a permanent post office in the South Orkney Islands. The creation of this post office was formally notified to post office administrations generally through the International Postal Union; a move obviously influenced by the hope that this action would be interpreted as a definite exercise of Argentine sovereignty. Letters from the new post office bore Argentine stamps post-marked "Islas Orcadas del Sud : Argentina."

A 178/12/2  
of 1942.

A 1406/12/2  
of 1942.

230. *Continued Argentine Intransigence, 1942-43.* It was thus clear that if no action was taken to refute the Argentine move in setting up a post office, His Majesty's Government would run a serious risk of allowing Argentina gradually to establish a claim by occupation which it would be difficult to contest, but that any representation to Argentina might provoke a controversy which His Majesty's Government were at that time particularly anxious to avoid. Inter-departmental discussions took place in January and February 1942. The Foreign Office pointed out that a call by one of His Majesty's ships at the islands, or the recital of the names of the various Dependencies of the Falkland Islands in a communication to the International Postal Union, would by themselves be quite insufficient to safeguard the British claim. The Admiralty expressed the firm opinion that, in naval interests, the British title to the South Orkneys should be retained. The Colonial Office, while disinclined to commit themselves to the view that it would be desirable to maintain this title in all circumstances, expressed the view that in present circumstances the surrender of the British claim should not be contemplated. The necessity for some countervailing action was fully appreciated, and it was suggested by the Admiralty and Colonial Office that occasional visits by an officer of the Falkland Islands administration should be undertaken pending the consideration of stronger action after the war. At that time the Admiralty was unable to spare a ship to make a special visit to the islands. In view, therefore, of the impossibility of enforcing these views on the Argentine Government owing both to wartime naval commitments and to the necessity for maintaining trade in essential Argentine commodities, it was decided to consult His Majesty's Ambassador at Buenos Aires (Sir E. Ovey) on the desirability of a representation to the Argentine Government.

A 2620/12/2  
of 1942.

Admiralty R.O.,  
Case 5051,  
Vol. 2,  
M 04010/42.

A 9929/12/2  
of 1942.

A 6617/12/2  
of 1942.  
*Argentine  
Ministry of  
Marine's Notice  
to Mariners,*  
No. 12,  
June 15th, 1942.

A 2416/12/2  
of 1942.

A 5855/12/2  
of 1942.

231. Meanwhile, at the end of January 1942, the Argentine transport *Primero de Mayo* (Capitán de Fragata A. J. Oddera) had visited Deception Island in the South Shetlands, and had taken possession for the Argentine Republic of the whole sector between longs. 25° W. and 68° 34' W. to the south of lat. 60° S. An act of possession was deposited\* (see p. 167) and the national colours were painted on the walls of the factory. The ship then sailed southwards and erected a flag and a light beacon on Lambda Island, one of the Melchior Islands in the Palmer Archipelago.

232. In March 1942 rumours of these activities reached His Majesty's Government through Argentine press reports, thus providing further evidence of the "acts of sovereignty" by which Argentina was endeavouring to build up a case to extend her claims in this region.† At the same time, in reply to the enquiry mentioned above (paragraph 230), Sir E. Ovey had advised that a protest should be made to the Argentine Government. A note was accordingly

\* This was found by H.M.S. *Carnarvon Castle* on January 30th 1943 (see paragraph 237).

† It is rather curious that the inter-departmental correspondence at this time completely overlooks the long history of British administration at Deception Island (paragraphs 173-174), and concludes that the British title to the South Shetlands "would be easily defeated if the Argentine Government embarked on something amounting to occupation and administration." (A 2416/12/2; A 2974/12/2 of 1942.)

proofs of Argentina's claims to certain lands and islands in the Antarctic, had stated, in a newspaper interview, that the Bergen Congress must settle the political questions of sovereignty before any other business could receive attention. According to Señor Galmarini, it was impossible to establish any permanent international scientific collaboration in the Arctic regions, as proposed by the Norwegian Government, until these political questions were put out of the way. This interview had not been repudiated but had, indeed, been made the basis of a newspaper campaign favouring the despatch of an Argentine expedition to the Antarctic in the following summer. On the same day an article appeared in *La Prensa* outlining the interests of the various Powers in the Antarctic and pointing out their unfavourable geographical position as compared with Argentina's. The only territory which had been permanently occupied, the article stated, was the South Orkneys, and that by Argentina for the last thirty-five years. The South Shetlands and Graham Island were geographically merely extensions of the South American continent, and Argentina had consequently more right there than anybody else. These claims to polar territory received prominence in the whole Argentine press.

A 6142/3582/2  
of 1939.

A 6363/3582/2  
of 1939.

226. Following the postponement of the Bergen Congress owing to the war, a permanent "National Antarctic Committee" was formed, by a Decree of April 30th 1940, "to centralise and be responsible for the consideration and handling of all questions connected with the defence and development of Argentine interests in the Antarctic" and to submit "a plan of action covering all the aspects of the question whether of internal or of international character."

Argentine  
Decree  
No. 61,852 M97;  
A 4388/4388/2  
of 1940.

227. On July 15th 1940 His Majesty's Ambassador at Buenos Aires presented to the Argentine Government a map of Antarctica published by His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia and forwarded by them for that purpose. The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in acknowledging receipt of this map on September 11th, "availed themselves of the opportunity to inform the British Embassy that the Argentine Government has not recognised the sovereignty of any other State to any portion of Antarctic lands or seas. The Argentine Government, which maintains that to it belongs in Antarctica the dominion over a zone to which occupation, geographical proximity and the sector formed by prolongation of the American Continent afford it just title, considers that it would be proper in so far as international circumstances permit to assemble an international conference of States claiming rights or interests in the Antarctic, the primary object of which would be to determine a juridico-political status of that region accepted by all these States." The note added that the new map showed a sector as a Dependency of the Falkland Islands "which the Argentine Government, on justified grounds, has always considered an inalienable part of its national territory and against *de facto* occupation of which it has never ceased to make formal protests to the British Government." In view of the fact that this suggestion of an international conference had not been put forward in the form of an invitation, it was decided that the note might safely be ignored.

A 2127/321/407  
of 1940.

A 4514/2382/2  
of 1940.

228. On March 27th 1941 the Buenos Aires press published an official communiqué issued by the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to conversations between legal advisers of the Argentine and Chilean Governments which appeared to indicate an agreement between these two Governments to pursue in common the "undoubted sovereign rights of Chile and Argentina in the Antarctic zone" (paragraph 265). This was followed on May 20th by the publication of statements made by representative Young of Ohio and approved by the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mr. Fish, to the effect that the United States Government would do well, as a sign of friendship towards Argentina, to exert its influence for the return by Great Britain to Argentina of the Falkland Islands.

A 9773/152/2  
of 1941.



action was unnecessary, since it was not the first time that a reservation of this kind had been made. The President's action ought accordingly to be treated as a matter of routine and ignored. It had, moreover, been the consistent policy of His Majesty's Government to avoid an open controversy with the Argentine Government over this matter. The greatest care had therefore always been shown in the face of the various provocations in which the Argentine Government had seen fit to indulge in the past in connexion with their claim. The Foreign Office saw no advantage in departing from the above-mentioned policy. As regards the suggested representations to the Argentine Government, the latter were fully aware of the attitude of His Majesty's Government, and there was no reason to suppose that they did not regard this attitude as affecting not only the Falkland Islands themselves, but their Dependencies as well. Representations would not lead to any withdrawal of the Argentine claim, but were more likely to afford the Argentine Government an opportunity they would otherwise lack to formulate in some definite manner a claim which it would be embarrassing for His Majesty's Government to receive. In the Foreign Office view, the longer the Argentine Government confined themselves to protests and reservations of this character while refraining from the presentation of any formal and official claim, the stronger would become the position of His Majesty's Government. For these reasons it was doubtful whether any useful purpose would be served by acting as suggested. On July 21st the Colonial Office concurred in the views thus expressed by the Foreign Office.

A 5018/3582/2  
of 1939.

A 5787/3582/2 ;  
A 6137/3582/2  
of 1939.

224. In July 1939 the Buenos Aires press gave great prominence to the announcement that Argentina intended to participate in the proposed International Polar Exhibition and Congress of Polar Explorers to be held at Bergen from May to September 1940, and at which His Majesty's Government were also to be represented. A Decree of July 15th set up a Committee, under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "to make a comprehensive study of the present state of Antarctic problems and of their eventual relation to Argentine interests." It was stressed in numerous press articles that this opportunity would be taken to assert Argentine claims to sovereignty in the Antarctic. *La Prensa* for July 24th 1939 contained what was probably an officially inspired article from which the following statement is quoted: "If Great Britain considers that by virtue of a geographical extension of the Falkland Islands she has juridical rights over the group of islands situated in the frozen Antarctic Ocean known under the name of South Georgia, South Orkneys, South Shetland and South Sandwich and the territory known under the name of Graham Land, it is obvious that Argentina, which has never recognised Great Britain's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, reserves all its rights in that region by virtue of the same theory as is propounded by the British Government." On the following day the *Buenos Aires Herald* was more explicit, stating that Argentina claimed absolute sovereignty to the Antarctic sector between longs. 20° W. and 68° W., and would strongly contest all British claims within this area and also any attempt of the United States to extend the Monroe Doctrine into the Antarctic.

A 6140/3582/2  
of 1939.

225. On August 8th 1939 the *Buenos Aires Herald* announced that the forthcoming Antarctic summer would be one of the busiest on record, and that the Byrd Expedition, which the United States Government were sending south (paragraph 338), was considered "a political challenge to all nations claiming territory in the Antarctic region." Public opinion in Argentina was vigorously demanding that the Government should take steps to assert Argentine territorial claims in the Antarctic. That Government sent a naval transport each year to the meteorological station in the South Orkneys; very little expenditure would be required to send this transport on to the Weddell Sea. Both the Argentine and the United States Governments were hoping to establish their Antarctic claims without arousing political conflict between the two countries. Señor Galmarini, a member of the newly appointed commission charged with drawing up

International Postal Union to the fact that the jurisdiction of the Falkland Islands Administration extended also to the Dependencies of the islands, to which South Georgia belonged (paragraph 206).

A 3713/128/2  
of 1928.

219. Argentine claims to South Georgia were again put forward in press articles of 1930 and 1931. In 1936 the Argentine post office issued a propaganda postcard which bore a map of South America showing Argentine territory with the Falkland Islands coloured in such a way as to imply Argentine sovereignty; what was obviously meant to represent South Georgia was also marked on the map, but the scale was too small to allow of colouring. About the same time the Argentine post office issued a one peso stamp with the Falkland Islands coloured as Argentine, but South Georgia was not depicted. No action was taken by His Majesty's Government in regard to either of these productions.

A 5707/1437/2  
of 1930  
A 3595/1278/2  
of 1931.

A 3368/889/2  
of 1936.

A 6720/889/2  
of 1936.

220. South Georgia is seldom mentioned in the Foreign Office archives, and the question of its sovereignty arises only in connection with the larger question of the Falkland Islands themselves and that of the Dependencies generally. Since 1927 the Argentine Government have asserted their claims to the Dependencies on numerous occasions. They undoubtedly assert a claim to South Georgia, but they have not done so in any formal communication to His Majesty's Government. The closest approach to such a communication was their refusal to disavow the action of the Argentine Postal Administration in 1927, but even in this case no formal notes passed between the two governments, the only written communications passing between His Majesty's Embassy and the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs being in the form of memoranda. Explicit claims to South Georgia have, however, been put forward during recent years by the Argentine press (paragraph 224).

A 3390/12/2  
of 1942.

*Falkland Islands Dependencies, 1938-1944*

221. *Developments in Argentina, 1938-42.* On September 22nd 1938 the Argentine President, when promulgating the ratification of the various postal conventions signed at Cairo on March 20th 1934, added an express categorical reserve reasserting the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies, which were described as belonging to the Argentine nation by inalienable right. At the same time the President sent a message to Congress explaining that this reservation had been made, not as a modification of the law, but as a partial rectification of the convention which prejudiced, as a matter of principle, rights of sovereignty which had always been invoked and would ever be maintained. This rectification, it was pointed out in the Argentine press, related to the action of the British Delegation to the Cairo Postal Conference, who had included the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies as British possessions at the time of signature.

W 13032/842/50  
of 1938

222. On June 13th 1939, the Colonial Office stated that the Governor of the Falkland Islands had raised the point that the President's message to Congress of September 22nd 1938 (see paragraph 221) had disclaimed the implied acceptance of the declaration of the British delegation to the Cairo Postal Conference in so far as it included the "Islas Malvinas and Dependencies," which belonged to the Argentine nation by inalienable right. The Governor went on to say that this was, so far as he was aware, the first occasion on which the Argentine Government had made any claim to sovereignty over the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands other than the South Orkneys, and submitted that, as the wording of the Decree accompanying the message to the Argentine Congress constituted a direct assertion of the sovereignty over these Dependencies, appropriate action should be taken to cause this claim to further British territory to be withdrawn.

A 4204/3582/2  
of 1939.

223. The Colonial Office were informed in reply, on July 8th 1939, that the possibility of some counter-declaration to the above-mentioned statement had been contemplated by the Foreign Office at the time, but that the conclusion had been reached that such

A 4204/3582/2  
of 1939.

character and purpose of the conference had nothing to do with any questions of jurisdiction. It was added, however, that His Majesty's Government must in their turn declare that the Argentine reservation could in no way affect the British right to the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies.

215. After 1937, the history of Argentine claims to the South Orkneys is so closely connected with their claims to the other Dependencies of the Falkland Islands that it is necessary to revert at this point to the earlier history of these claims. The account of events relating to the South Orkneys after 1937 continues in paragraph 221.

*South Shetland Islands and Graham Land, 1892-1937*

216. Argentine interests in the South Shetlands and Graham Land date from 1892, when an application was made to the Argentine Government for fishery rights in those waters (paragraph 125). It is evident that the Argentine Government were considering annexation of the South Shetlands in 1901, but no action was taken (paragraph 127). In 1906, an Argentine Decree described Booth-Wandel Island, to the south of Bismarck Strait in west Graham Land, as "Southern Argentine Lands" (paragraph 192). Apart from these early indications of interest, it is only since 1937 that the Argentine Government have shown an evident intention to extend their Antarctic claims to the whole of Graham Land as well as to the South Shetlands. The account of events relating to this area after 1937 continues in paragraph 221.

*South Georgia, 1906-1937*

217. A lease of land in South Georgia was granted on March 8th 1906, to the Cia. Argentina de Pesca of Buenos Aires (paragraph 142). The Colonial Office took the view that, having regard to the fact that the Argentine Company had taken out a British lease with the certain knowledge of the Argentine Government, that Captain Nuñez, technical adviser to the company and a high official (Director of Armaments in the Ministry of Marine) of that Government, was one of those who waited upon the British Chargé d'Affaires at Buenos Aires to prefer, on behalf of the company, a request for a British lease, that neither the company\* nor the Argentine Government vessel *Guardia Nacional*\* hoisted the Argentine flag on the island, and that no protest had been received from the Argentine Government to the grant of the lease to the South Georgia Exploration Company (paragraph 138) or to their constant flying of the British flag on the island or to their request to the Argentine Company to desist from further operations, His Majesty's Government might definitely assume that the Argentine Government did not question the British title to South Georgia. Since that date the Cia. Argentina de Pesca has continued to pay licence fees and dues on whale and seal oil to the Falkland Islands Government, and they have fully conformed to all the regulations of that Government.

218. What appears to have been the first claim of an official nature advanced by the Argentine Government to sovereignty over South Georgia was made in 1927, when the Argentine Postal Administration notified the International Postal Union that Argentine territorial jurisdiction extended *de jure* and *de facto* over the South Orkney Islands and South Georgia (paragraph 205). By the words *de facto* it can only be assumed that the Argentine Government referred to the concession granted to the Cia. Argentina de Pesca, which still maintained its whaling and sealing station at Grytviken. It is notable, however, that when His Majesty's ambassador remonstrated against this communication, the Argentine Government replied by justifying their claim to the Falkland Islands and to the South Orkneys, but omitted all reference to South Georgia. His Majesty's Government, for their part, called the attention of the

\* Certainly one of the four ships of the Cia. Argentina de Pesca flew the Argentine flag.

9740.  
(F 938/1906).

A 6555/381/2  
of 1927.

A 1313/128/2  
of 1928.



211. In 1930 the Colonial Office arranged an inter-departmental discussion on the suggestion made by the Foreign Office on the desirability of ceding the South Orkneys in return for the abandonment of claims by the Argentine Government to the Falkland Islands. In view of the repercussion which arbitration of the former might have on the latter, it was decided that any question of arbitration must be ruled out, and that there were serious objections to cession (*see* Appendix VII, pp. 176-177).

Confidential  
(14775) of 1936.

212. On October 25th 1933, His Majesty's Ambassador at Buenos Aires (Sir H. G. Chilton) wrote semi-officially to Sir R. Vansittart, suggesting that the moment was propitious for a settlement, following the ratification of the new Anglo-Argentine Convention, and the conviction that would seem to exist on both sides that close economic co-operation, not to mention closer cultural relations, would be to the mutual advantage of both countries. He also (1) revived for consideration the idea of exchanging the South Orkneys for an Embassy House site in Buenos Aires; and (2) raised the question whether the British expedition, which had just sailed from England in the *Discovery II* for a voyage of 20 months, should touch at the South Orkneys during her voyage. The advisability of taking any, and if so what, political action upon Sir H. Chilton's letter was very fully explored, but it was eventually decided to let "sleeping dogs lie." Sir Henry's suggestion that the *Discovery II* should pay the islands a visit, however, was considered to be a good one, and a visit was subsequently arranged in April 1934.

A 8428/479/2  
of 1933.

A 9468/479/2  
of 1933.  
A 1558/1118/2  
of 1934.

213. In a despatch of April 13th 1936 His Majesty's Ambassador at Buenos Aires (Sir Nevile Henderson) recommended, in view of the growing irredentism in Argentina, the cession to her of the single island of the South Orkney group on which the meteorological station is situated, and the recognition by His Majesty's Government of her legal rights to the Falklands in return for Great Britain's actual undisturbed occupation thereof. He further proposed a formal reassertion of the British title to the South Orkneys. This suggestion was discussed with the Colonial Office, who concurred in the terms of the reply, in which it was pointed out that the legal basis of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands was far less weak than was at one time supposed. Either the island was *terra nullius* at the time of British occupation in 1832, or, if at that time Argentina had possessed sovereignty, Great Britain had by her occupation for over 100 years acquired a title by prescription (*see* Appendix VI, pp. 174-176). For these reasons it was considered that the admission of Argentina's legal right, and still more the proposed cession of an island in the South Orkneys, was too high a price to pay for the sake of bringing the controversy to an end. Arbitration as a solution of the problem was also rejected, since His Majesty's Government could not afford to run the risk of losing their whole strategic position in the South Atlantic, and it was finally decided that there was no practical alternative to leaving matters as they stood. Sir N. Henderson's view that British rights to the South Orkneys should be affirmed was endorsed, and he was informed that it was being arranged for the *Discovery II* to call at some port in this group for that purpose.

A 3851/889/2  
of 1936.

A 6469/889/2  
of 1936.

214. On June 1st 1937, the Argentine Ambassador called at the Foreign Office and drew attention to a statement made by the British Minister of Agriculture at the inaugural session of the Whaling Conference in London, that the Government of the Falkland Islands had been given jurisdiction over a number of adjacent islands. The Ambassador had entered a reservation that no document to which the Argentine Government might subscribe as a result of the conference would in any way prejudice the rights claimed by them over the Falkland and other islands. This had caused Mr. Morrison to produce a draft counter-statement, the terms of which led the Ambassador to declare that if it were made he had not the smallest doubt that his Government would instruct him to withdraw from the conference. A counter-statement was finally agreed upon, however, in which His Majesty's Government expressed the view that the

Confidential.  
(15978) of 1940.

Postmaster-General represented on Postal Union Affairs. It was added that these territories were and remained under British jurisdiction, and that the title of the Postmaster-General to represent them could not be regarded as qualified in any way.

A 6503/128/2  
of 1928.

207. At the same time the general position, including the proposed exchange of the islands for a Legation site, was again discussed with the Admiralty and the Colonial Office. The latter definitely refused to consider parting with the islands upon any grounds whatever. The revenue value of the islands had increased tremendously, and it was feared, moreover, that for any other power to take them over would result in the development of a foreign whaling industry in direct antagonism to British interests in those waters. A note to the Argentine Government was drafted, pointing out that His Majesty's Government could not now consider the cession of the islands, reiterating the grounds of the British claim to sovereignty over them, and calling upon the Argentine Government to apply formally for a British licence to operate a wireless station there.

A 8193/128/2  
of 1928.

A 855/324/2  
of 1929.

208. His Majesty's Minister was instructed to present the note, but replied on November 9th 1928, demurring to taking any action which would prejudice the existing excellent relations between the two countries. He suggested that, in view of the attempts being made by the United States Government to improve their relations with Argentina, the time was not propitious for raising any contentious points with the latter, which might have the effect of diminishing the regard in which His Majesty's Government was held. This view was supported by the Foreign Office, and at an inter-departmental conference on January 31st 1929, it was proposed that the matter should not be pursued by replying officially to the Argentine Government's notes, but that Sir M. Robertson should enter orally a "caveat" in regard to the Argentine claims. Further efforts to induce the Argentine Government to apply for a wireless licence would in this case have to be abandoned. It was pointed out, however, that a continuance of the controversy could lead, in the end, only to arbitration, which on general grounds was undesirable and which, whatever the result, would raise afresh the question of the Argentine claims in the Falkland Islands and elsewhere. The suggestion originally put forward in 1910 for the absolute cession of the South Orkneys in return for an unreserved waiver by the Argentine Government of any claim to the Falkland Islands was not pressed because it was not clear how such a proposal would be received in Argentina, though it was felt that the suggestion deserved careful examination should evidence become available that an agreement on these lines would be acceptable to the Argentine Government.

A 2902/324/2  
of 1929.

A 3596/324/2  
of 1929.

209. As a result of a semi-official enquiry, Sir M. Robertson made it clear that he was averse from raising the question with the Argentine Government in any form, officially or otherwise. The Secretary of State was advised that, having regard to the consistent British attitude in the past, the position of His Majesty's Government was not likely to be prejudiced by failure to reply to the Argentine Government's notes of 1927 and 1928 (paragraphs 204 and 205), and, after further consultation with the departments concerned, Sir M. Robertson was instructed in a despatch of August 26th 1929, to avoid for the time being any discussion of the question with the Argentine Government.

A 5335/324/2  
of 1929.

210. In February 1929, information was received by His Majesty's Minister at Buenos Aires that H.M.S. *Despatch*, with the Governor of the Falkland Islands on board, contemplated a visit to the South Orkneys. Sir M. Robertson's deprecation of such a proceeding as likely to precipitate the question of the sovereignty of the islands when the Foreign Office were trying to avoid raising it was supported by the Colonial Office, and definite instructions were sent to the Governor that he should on no account visit these islands.

202. His Majesty's Minister, acting on instructions, informed the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs on April 14th 1926, that, while the precise meaning of his reply was not quite clear, His Majesty's Government did not interpret it as an assertion of sovereignty over islands which were undoubtedly British on the grounds of discovery and formal taking of possession and to which no Argentine Government appeared ever to have put forward a claim in any communication to His Majesty's Government. No answer was returned to this note.

A 2586/542/2  
of 1926.

203. On April 6th 1927, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Buenos Aires reported that the station had begun to work, and gave particulars of the installation, adding that it had the call signal LRZ. No application for a licence or a proper call signal had been made through the Governor of the Falkland Islands. The Admiralty and Colonial Office held that the matter could not be allowed to rest where it was, and pressed for further action at Buenos Aires. Enquiry was at once made of the International Telegraph Bureau at Berne whether any notification respecting a call signal for the station had been made by the Argentine Government, and, if so, in what terms. The reply of the Bureau showed that the Argentine Government had applied for a call signal two years before, and that their notification to the Bureau was of such a nature as to imply an assumption of Argentine sovereignty over the islands, the wireless station having been transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture and incorporated in the Argentine system of coastal stations under the control of the Ministry of Marine. His Majesty's Minister accordingly addressed a note, dated September 8th 1927, to the Argentine Government, calling attention to his communication of April 14th 1926 (paragraph 202), and stating that, as His Majesty's Government had heard nothing further on the subject from the Argentine Government, they had assumed that their view was shared by the latter. The notification to the Berne Bureau appeared, however, to imply an assumption which His Majesty's Government could not admit, although the meteorological station was, with their assent, handed over to the Argentine Government in 1904, by a British subject. His Majesty's Minister had, therefore, to point out, in the most friendly manner, that the existence of the wireless station was quite irregular, and to express the hope that the matter might be placed upon a proper footing at an early date by application for a British licence, which application would readily be granted.

A 2534/381/2  
of 1927.

A 4811/381/2  
of 1927.

A 5915/381/2  
of 1927.

204. To this the Argentine Government replied, on January 20th 1928, that they could not admit the British position, and that they themselves laid claim to the South Orkneys, apart from other inalienable rights, on the ground of first effective occupation constantly maintained. This note was accompanied by an unofficial memorandum from the Argentine Government suggesting that the negotiations of 1914 for the exchange of the islands against a Legation site in Buenos Aires should be reopened.

A 1313/128/2  
of 1928.

205. It had meanwhile been brought to the notice of His Majesty's Government that, in response to a circular letter from the International Postal Bureau at Berne, the Argentine Government had formally declared that Argentine territorial jurisdiction extended *de jure* and *de facto* over the South Orkney Islands and South Georgia, and *de jure* over the Falkland Islands; *de facto* jurisdiction over the latter being prevented by British occupation. This statement was, with the other replies, published by the Bureau and circulated to members of the Postal Union. An aide-mémoire contesting these statements, left by Sir M. Robertson on December 17th 1927, brought from the Argentine Government the reply that, as regards the South Orkneys, they formally reaffirmed the claim they had already put forward.

A 6555/381/2  
of 1927.  
A 6728/381/2  
of 1927.

A 1313/128/2  
of 1928.

206. It was decided that the position of His Majesty's Government should be clearly stated to the Postal Union authorities, and through the General Post Office the Berne Bureau were notified that the South Orkney Islands and South Georgia were included in the Falkland Island Dependencies, the Administration of which the

A 3713/128/2  
of 1928.



A 384/128/2 of  
1928.

the expense which their part of the bargain would have involved. This question was not raised again until 1928\* (paragraph 204).

48935  
(F 169/1913).

198. In the meantime the Argentine Government had continued to send out annual reliefs for the meteorological station without action or protest on the part of His Majesty's Government; though in October 1913, after a report had appeared (for the second time) that the Argentine Government intended to establish a wireless telegraph station on the group, His Majesty's Minister took the opportunity of intimating to the director of the Meteorological Department that it would be necessary to consult the Governor of the Falkland Islands before such a scheme was carried out—a statement in which the director expressed his concurrence.

A 5844/5844/2  
of 1920.

A 1857/783/2  
of 1921.

199. In July 1920 the head of the Argentine Meteorological Department informed His Majesty's Minister that in the budget just presented to Congress no item had been inserted for the upkeep of the meteorological station, that the station would have to be closed when the next relief ship went there, and that the Argentine flag would no longer fly over the islands. A strong press agitation, which took the line that the closing of the station would involve the loss of sovereignty over the South Orkneys, proved too strong for the Argentine Government, and the sloop *Uruguay* left Buenos Aires in February 1921 to relieve the personnel of the station.

A 783/783/2;  
A 5568/783/2;  
A 6029/783/2  
of 1921.

200. The attitude of His Majesty's Government at the time of this incident was that no special steps should be taken to reassert British sovereignty until such time as the Argentine Government should protest. Suggestions that the position might be safeguarded by requiring the Argentine Government to pay a quitrent for the station, or by assuring them of the support of the Falklands Government in the decision to retain the meteorological station in the interests of science, were both rejected on the recommendation of His Majesty's Minister at Buenos Aires.

A 3008/1682/2  
of 1925.

201. In 1925 the Argentine Government erected a wireless station at the observatory. As a result His Majesty's Minister was, on June 23rd 1925, instructed to inform them that the necessary licence would be granted, but that they should have applied for it beforehand, that they must apply for a call signal through the Governor of the Falkland Islands, whereupon a call signal from the list of groups reserved for stations in the British Empire would be allotted; and that, when the station was installed, the particulars to be furnished to the International Bureau at Berne under the International Telegraphic Conventions of 1906 and 1912 should be communicated through His Majesty's Government. In reply, the Argentine Government stated that, with regard to wireless stations constructed in Argentine territory, the republic would act in accordance with the provisions of the International Radiotelegraphic Conventions, of which they were signatories.

A 6597/1682/2  
of 1925.

\* When the Argentine Government, in a memorandum of December 15th 1927, attempted to reopen these negotiations, they implied, without stating in so many words, that the original negotiations had broken down because Dr. Bosch, the then Foreign Minister, had found it difficult to accept the word "cession" in regard to the South Orkneys, and His Majesty's Ambassador (Sir M. Robertson) in transmitting the memorandum appears to have accepted this as a true statement of the position without any reference to the early correspondence.

Unless Sir R. Tower withheld such a vital piece of information, which is hardly imaginable, no objection of this sort was raised at all. A draft convention was submitted by Sir R. Tower in which the word "cession" was used. The Argentine Government replied with a counter-draft in which they made use, without any comment, of the expression "S.M. Britanica dá por incorporadas al dominio argentino las Islas Orcadas." An amended draft was handed to Dr. Bosch by Sir R. Tower on January 10th 1914, and almost immediately afterwards there was a change of government. In March 1914, in the absence of any reply to his note of January 10th, His Majesty's Minister asked the new Foreign Secretary whether he might expect an expression of the views of the Argentine Government in this matter. He was informed in reply that "Dr. Plaza (Acting President) had given his opinion that the present was an inauspicious moment to put forward any suggestion entailing expenditure by the Argentine Government, and that he felt that the contemplated purchase of a site for a British Legation house in Buenos Aires would prove onerous at a moment when every endeavour was being made towards effecting economies in all the Departments of State." The Foreign Secretary acquiesced, then, in Sir R. Tower's suggestion that perhaps, in the circumstances, it would be preferable to drop the question altogether.

The final paragraph of Sir R. Tower's despatch reporting the above conversation does not support the suggestion made by the Argentine Government in 1928. He says "Both President Peña and Dr. Bosch were, I believe, genuinely desirous of giving effect to the exchange of courtesies with His Majesty's Government. That generation has passed away and the present Administration shows no favour to anything which will entail expense."

Majesty's Government in the previous July. As the reference was presumably to the Letters Patent, a copy of the *Falkland Islands Gazette* containing that instrument was sent to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires for communication to the Argentine Government, who acknowledged the receipt of this communication on March 18th 1909, without comment.

14079  
(F 34/1909).

195. Shortly afterwards His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires (Mr. C. Russell) reported that an Argentine vessel had visited the South Orkneys in connexion with the observatory there, and that in various official decrees that had appeared in reference to the expedition, the islands had not been described, as on previous occasions, in terms implying Argentine sovereignty. Mr. Russell attributed this to a politic abstention from raising the question of their claim rather than to any abandonment of it. The Argentine Government had specially acquired a ship for the purpose of keeping up communication with the observatory; and Mr. Russell found it difficult to attribute this action, with the expense entailed, to any interest in meteorological science, but ascribed it rather to a wish to establish a link with the islands with a view to the ultimate assertion of their claims. Mr. Russell suggested the visit of one of His Majesty's ships to the group, for the purpose of performing acts of ownership, while avoiding any formal action likely to call in question the validity of former British claims. The Admiralty, however, in view of the dangers, were not prepared to risk a modern ship in those waters, and had no other available.

24132. 30924  
(F 34/1909).

196. Following a violent press campaign in Argentina during 1909-10, a proposal was made by Mr. Townley, then British Minister at Buenos Aires, that the South Orkneys group should be ceded to the Argentine Government. The suggestion had been made to him by British subjects residing in Argentina, who pointed out that the islands were useless to Great Britain, though valuable to Argentina on account of the observatory. The cession was proposed as a free gift, and appears to have been contemplated as a complimentary gesture on the occasion of the Argentine centenary celebrations. The Admiralty had no objection. The Board of Trade could not suggest a *quid pro quo*. The Colonial Office vetoed the proposal on the ground that the South Orkneys were valuable as a base for the whaling industry, in which many of the Falkland Islanders were interested, and which provided a small but useful revenue for the Administration. Inter-departmental correspondence continued in 1911, and the proposal appears then to have first been put forward that the price of the cession of the South Orkneys should be recognition by Argentina of British claims to the Falkland Islands. The Colonial Office considered that an offer to cede the South Orkney group would be interpreted by the Argentine Government as an indication that His Majesty's Government had doubts as to the strength of their position in the Falkland Islands, and the proposal was consequently rejected. The Colonial Office were, nevertheless, prepared to consider any Argentine proposal on its merits.

File 10549 of  
1910.

197. Sir R. Tower, having by then succeeded as British Minister at Buenos Aires, suggested in October 1911 that the South Orkneys should be ceded in exchange for a site for a Legation. The Colonial Office eventually agreed to this proposal and, after making informal enquiries of the Argentine Government as to whether the cession of the islands on these terms would be agreeable to them, Sir R. Tower was instructed to arrange with them an "exchange of courtesies" in the form of a convention, under which the South Orkneys would be ceded to Argentina in return for a suitable site for a British Legation house. In the draft convention provision was made for safeguarding the rights of British subjects interested in the whaling industry. The text of the convention had been agreed upon by His Majesty's Government and the Argentine Government when, in 1914, a new Argentine Government came into office, who were unwilling to go to

Confidential  
(13781) of 1930.

190. His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Buenos Aires, who had been instructed to make representations in this sense to the Argentine Government, pointed out that the Colonial Office seemed to be unaware that the Argentine Government had been officially invited, through His Majesty's Legation, to take over the observatory (paragraph 188). In reminding the Colonial Office of this, it was suggested that the fact that the Argentine Government had taken over the observatory at the invitation of His Majesty's Minister, made the British claim to the islands all the stronger, and that the fact that the Argentine flag had been hoisted there, without any objection on the part of His Majesty's Government, need not weaken it, as it was doubtless flown for the protection of the station. No claim to the islands had apparently been asserted, while the note from the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs accepting the charge of the station made no such claim, indeed since none was made, none might appear to be contemplated.

18617  
(F 6793/1906).

191. In these circumstances it was decided, with Colonial Office concurrence, not to make the proposed communication to the Argentine Government. A notice having, however, appeared in a Buenos Aires newspaper to the effect that the Argentine Government were about to inform foreign Powers that a permanent observatory had been established in the South Orkneys, His Majesty's Minister, acting on instructions, addressed a note to the Argentine Government on August 23rd 1906, intimating that the group was British territory, and that the intervention of His Majesty's Government was based not less on British ownership than on the British status of the expedition which had originally established it.

28638  
(F 11449/1906).

192. A Decree, dated December 15th 1906, having been issued by the Argentine Government making appropriation for the salaries of the staffs of the meteorological stations at the South Orkneys and Booth (Wandel) Island, and alluding to these islands as "stations in Southern Argentine lands," His Majesty's Minister was, after consultation with the Colonial Office, instructed to renew to the Argentine Government the declaration of August 23rd 1906, to the effect that the South Orkneys were British. In a note of January 4th 1907, Mr. Townley pointed out to the Argentine Government that the description of islands in the Decree was misleading and renewed the declaration as instructed. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in replying to Mr. Townley's note, asked for time to consider the question, but in conversation he expressed his surprise that His Majesty's Government claimed this group. No further communication from the Argentine Government at this period is recorded.

42670  
(F 11449/1906).

193. Mr. Townley, who had replied to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that there could be no question of the soundness of the British claim, asked, in reporting home the matter, that he might be furnished with further evidence in support of the claim. The Admiralty, of whom enquiry was made, pointed out that no Spaniard had ever explored or discovered anything in that region; that the land in question was far outside any territorial limits to which the Argentine Government could lay claim; and, further, that the South Orkneys had been formally taken possession of by British subjects long before the Argentine Government had ships to visit the locality. Moreover, even under the ruling of Pope Alexander VI, in 1494, though its validity as an argument in support of a claim to territory could not be admitted by His Majesty's Government, the meridian of partition between the Spanish and Portuguese possessions would place the South Orkneys under Portuguese and not Spanish authority.\*

4505  
(F 660/1907).

194. Following the issue of Letters Patent on July 21st 1908, appointing the Governor of the Falkland Islands to be Governor of the South Orkneys, and providing for the government of the latter as a Dependency of the former group (paragraph 131) the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed a wish, on November 13th 1908, to be informed of the terms of the "declaration" made by His

\* This last conclusion can hardly be upheld; see paragraph 289.



186. The position in the Falkland Islands Dependencies is now regulated by the Whale Fishery (Consolidation) Ordinance of 1936, which applies only to ships working in territorial waters. In practice, therefore, British control of foreign pelagic whaling in the Dependencies can only be applied to these few companies which still hold shore leases at South Georgia.

Falkland  
Islands  
Ordinance  
No. 9 of 1936.

#### ARGENTINE CLAIMS

187. Argentine claims in the Falkland Islands Dependencies are to a considerable extent bound up with her claims to the Falkland Islands themselves (see Appendix VI, pp. 174-176 and Appendix VII, pp. 176-177). Argentine interests date from 1892 (paragraph 125), and, until 1937, may best be considered under the heading of each Dependency:—

##### *South Orkney Islands, 1904-1937.*

188. In March 1903 Dr. W. S. Bruce, leader of the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition, established a meteorological station on Laurie Island. He hoped to make this a permanent observatory, but failed to gain the necessary financial support in Great Britain. Early in 1904 His Majesty's Minister at Buenos Aires (Mr. Haggard) communicated to the Argentine Government an offer from Dr. Bruce to convey to the South Orkneys four Argentine scientists into whose care he would place the observatory. This offer was accepted and a Decree issued by the Argentine Government authorizing their Meteorological Department to take over and to maintain the observatory in question (paragraph 68). The transfer took place on February 22nd 1904, one British observer, Mr. Mossman, remaining in charge of the work for the first year of Argentine control. On their arrival, the Argentine observers hoisted the Argentine flag in Scotia Bay, but there was no indication that this implied Argentine ownership. There was no ceremony of taking possession. One of the new staff came provided with a supply of Argentine postage stamps and a specially designed post mark, "Orcadas del Sud. Distrito Rio Gallegos," but this is believed to have been in the interests of philatelists. The first mail to Buenos Aires was taken north in the *Scotia* and posted from Cape Town, a fact which has since been advanced as proof that an Argentine post office was recognised by the British authorities.\* Nothing in the correspondence which passed between His Majesty's Minister at Buenos Aires and the Argentine Government at this time can be construed as a recognition, either express or implied, of Argentine sovereignty over the islands. After consultation with the Admiralty and the Colonial Office, neither of whom attached any importance to the islands, as to the action of the Argentine Government, His Majesty's Minister at Buenos Aires was told that he need not take any steps in the matter.

Confidential  
(13781) of 1930

Mr. Haggard,  
No. 2, January  
5th 1904.

Mr. Haggard,  
No. 7, January  
20th 1904.

R. N. Rudmose  
Brown:  
*A Naturalist at  
the Poles.*  
London, 1923,  
pp. 172-73.  
A 6363/5382/2  
of 1939.

To Mr. Haggard,  
No. 8, April  
26th 1904.

Mr. Harford:  
No. 79,  
November  
30th 1905.

189. In November 1905, the Legation at Buenos Aires reported that the Argentine Government had acquired, for the purpose of keeping up communication with the observatory, a vessel employed by Dr. Charcot, the French explorer, in his Antarctic expedition. In view of the facts as to discovery and the declaration of possession detailed in paragraph 144, the Colonial Office suggested that it should be intimated to the Argentine Government that the South Orkneys were British territory; that His Majesty's Government assumed that it was in ignorance of this fact that the Argentine meteorological station had been maintained there since February 1904 without any notification having been made to His Majesty's Government, but that it was hoped that the Argentine Government would not discontinue the use of the islands for this useful scientific purpose because the territorial status of the group was not what they apparently thought it to be when they took over the station from Dr. Bruce.

\*In a paper read before the Philatelic Society of Johannesburg [n.d.], Dr. J. H. Pirie, one of the members of the Scottish expedition, states that Señor Acuña arrived "fully accredited by the Argentine postal authorities as a postmaster." However, only two outside deliveries could have been effected by this post office, since neither the second nor any of the subsequent parties until 1941 (see paragraph 229) included an accredited postmaster.

an effective control over the industry, for all whaling was conducted from territorial waters. When, in 1922, Petter Sørille patented the slip-way for factory ships, a vent through which whales could be hauled on deck to be flensed, the need for harbours and shore facilities passed. From 1925 onwards pelagic whaling became general; expeditions made up of catchers and factory ships could remain at sea for long periods, following the main concentrations of whales, catching fresher whales, and thereby obtaining larger quantities of oil. Under this new regime, intensive pelagic whaling was carried on unrestricted by the regulations imposed on the shore stations by the Colonial Government. There was a marked increase in the number of whales killed annually, and fears of the depletion of the stock were widely entertained. In 1929 the Norwegian Government passed a Whaling Act to regulate the activities of Norwegian pelagic whalers, and in the succeeding years restrictive international agreements were made (Appendix XIV, pp. 188-190), but these have not proved sufficiently effective to conserve the stock of whales.

W 6429/494/50  
of 1928.  
File 51/50 of  
1929.  
W 5457/209/50;  
W 7320/209/50  
of 1933.

183. For this reason, since October 1928 the Falkland Islands Government has exercised a stricter control over those companies which wished to make use of territorial waters in the Dependencies. Whaling licences and leases have been granted only on the condition that companies holding a lease or licence for one Dependency shall not fish within specified distances of the other Dependencies. The Government has further required that the companies concerned should conduct their whaling operations throughout the whole of the area defined by the Letters Patent of March 28th 1917 (paragraph 133), whether inside or outside territorial waters, as if the law regulations and conditions of leases and licences applicable inside territorial waters applied throughout the whole area. Foreign companies wishing to operate from shore stations or inside the territorial waters of the Dependencies have thus been subject to British control when conducting pelagic operations on the whaling grounds outside territorial waters. There has never been any question of using force against foreign vessels which do not conform with the regulations when outside territorial waters, but a licence to operate inside territorial waters could be withheld from any company not observing its contract.

184. It was only in this way that the control necessary to conserve the stock of whales could be maintained over some of the pelagic whalers operating outside territorial waters. Conditions could naturally be imposed on British ships, wherever they were. The conditions regulating whaling inside territorial waters had been embodied in the Norwegian law of 1929 and their observance might therefore be expected from Norwegian ships. The only other foreign vessel which had been conducting pelagic operations in the Falkland Islands Dependencies belonged to the Cia. Argentina de Pesca, which also possessed a shore sealing station at South Georgia, and for this reason could be made amenable to local regulations. The lease for the Cia. Argentina de Pesca's shore station at South Georgia has thus been granted subject to an agreement debarring the company from pelagic whaling in the territorial waters of the remainder of the Dependencies.

185. The regulations enforced under the Falkland Islands Government's licences contained substantially the same provisions as those in the Geneva Whaling Convention of 1931 (Appendix XIV, p. 188). Article 8 of this Convention laid down that no vessel of any of the High Contracting Parties should engage in whaling without a licence or certificate of notification from the said High Contracting Party, and that "nothing in this Article shall prejudice the right of any High Contracting Party to require that, in addition, a licence shall be required from his own authorities by every vessel desirous of using his territory or territorial waters for the purpose of taking, landing or treating whales, and such licence may be refused or may be made subject to such conditions as may be deemed by such High Contracting Party to be necessary or desirable, whatever the nationality of the vessel may be."

*League of  
Nations  
Convention for  
the Regulation  
of Whaling,  
Geneva,  
September 24th  
1931.*

whaling factory *Anglo-Norse*, with a small fleet of catchers, but most of their work was carried out in the shelter of pack ice far from any land. The expedition was accompanied by Mr. J. E. Hamilton, of the Discovery Committee's scientific staff. In 1930 *Discovery II* spent 20 days making a running survey of the entire group, and succeeded in obtaining much new and detailed information. No harbours were found, but at most of the islands there are anchorages where a vessel may obtain some shelter. Even in the finest weather there is a heavy swell and the coast is generally precipitous and rocky. Where beaches exist they shelve steeply and there is a strong undertow. As a consequence landing can only be made with difficulty, and on some islands landing is probably impossible. Sea-ice conditions in the southern part of the group are usually severe, and, owing to volcanic activity or heavy glacierization, there seems little prospect that any of the islands will become of much value to man. They certainly provide no facilities as a whaling centre.

179. It is probably for these reasons that no dispute has ever arisen about the ownership of the South Sandwich Islands. When, in December 1906, the question arose of including this group in the Colonial Office List as a Dependency of the Falkland Islands, the Colonial Office were told that the British claim to these islands was very slender; but that as the Governor had been authorized in September 1906 to treat them as Dependencies of the Falkland Islands, there would seem to be no objection to including them in the Colonial Office List, which, being an unofficial publication, would be no bar to the consideration of any duly authenticated claim should such be subsequently advanced in another quarter. The Governor of the Falkland Islands was authorized in January 1909 to apply the Seal Fishery Ordinance of the Falkland Islands (No. 1 of 1899) to the South Sandwich Islands, and, under that Ordinance, to deal with an application from the Cia Argentina de Pesca for a sealing licence including the latter group. The only recent visit to the islands has been that of the *William Scoresby* in November 1937, when a landing was made on Saunders Island.

40656  
(F 11449/1906).

C.O. 33258/08.

#### BRITISH CONTROL OF WHALING IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DEPENDENCIES

180. The history of the shore whaling stations in each of the Dependencies has already been discussed in the preceding sections. It is necessary, however, to give some account of the whaling industry in its relation to British control over the Dependencies as a whole.

181. The whale fishery was first dealt with by law under Falkland Islands Ordinance No. 3 of 1906, which made it unlawful to take whales without a licence, and imposed royalties on each whale caught. This system was, however, considered unsuitable. The Ordinance was repealed and replaced by Ordinance No. 5 of 1908, and amending Ordinances, and by separate regulations for South Georgia and the other Dependencies. The policy of 1908 aimed at limiting the extent to which the pursuit of whales might be carried on and reducing the amount of waste involved to the narrowest limits consistent with existing rights and with not involving the companies in work entailing an actual loss. To secure the first of these objects it was decided to issue no further leases or licences, other than renewals of annual licences already granted, and to allow no further addition to the number of vessels authorized to catch whales. No attempt was made to regulate the number of whales taken in any one season; but the shooting of whale calves, or of female whales accompanied by calves, was prohibited.

Cmd. 657 of  
1920,  
pp. 50, 59-60.

182. During the war of 1914-18 it proved necessary to relax the regulations for the prevention of waste of the less valuable portions of the whales, and it was also necessary to allow the temporary employment of additional whale catchers at South Georgia. After the war, up to the season 1924-25, whaling operations were conducted on a moderate scale, and the British Government was able to maintain



C.O. Gov.  
88027/41.

A.3532/2673/G  
of 1942.

Admiralty R.O.  
Case 5051,  
Vol. 2,  
M.07918/41.

S. Kemp and  
A. L. Nelson:  
*Discovery  
Reports*,  
Vol. 3, 1931,  
pp. 133-198.

Cmd 657 of  
1920, p. 59.

one factory ship operated from Deception Island in the season 1929-30. The Hektor Whaling Company's station at Deception Island was finally abandoned in 1931, and after that year the installations were allowed to become delapidated. The Company went bankrupt in 1935 and left as bad debts £27,000 owing to the Inland Revenue and £10,700 to the Falkland Islands Government for export duty on whale oil. The Falklands debt was eventually written off.

175. Between 1935 and 1939 there were various proposals for establishing a new factory at Deception Island, but none have materialized. In correspondence about one of these applications in 1937, the Governor of the Falkland Islands stated that he was influenced not so much by revenue considerations as by a certain feeling of uneasiness regarding the tenuous hold by the Falklands Government over the South Shetlands area. He submitted that no opportunity should be lost to display control in some wider form than that of leasing a disused whaling station.

176. During 1940 the seven oil fuel tanks formerly owned by the Hektor Whaling Company at Deception Island were reported to contain between 1,500 and 7,000 tons of fuel oil. The Admiralty considered it important that this stock should be denied to the enemy. Accordingly, on March 5th 1941, H.M.S. *Queen of Bermuda* visited the island. The oil tanks were found to be empty and showed no sign of having been used for many years. The oil installations and remaining coal stocks were destroyed. The history of the South Shetland Islands and Graham Land since 1941 has been mainly connected with Argentine and Chilean plans to extend their territorial claims to this area, and is continued in paragraph 228.

#### THE SOUTH SANDWICH ISLANDS

177. The South Sandwich Islands form a curved chain of 11 volcanic islands stretching for 193 miles from north to south, the northernmost of the group being about 290 miles east of South Georgia. The southern part of the group was discovered by Captain James Cook, in H.M.S. *Resolution*, on January 30th 1775; he made no landing. Forty-five years later, in 1819, Cook's discoveries were extended by Admiral Bellingshausen, with the Russian corvettes *Vostok* and *Mirnyi*. Bellingshausen discovered the three northernmost islands, and made a rough survey of the whole group; he landed on Zavodovski Island. Since that date the islands must have been sighted many times by sealers and whalers, but very few have recorded their visits. The following are visits of which records have been traced: Captain James Brown in the *Pacific* (1830), Captain John Biscoe in the *Tula* (1830), Captain C. A. Larsen in the *Undine* (1908), Lieutenant W. Filchner in the *Deutschland* (1911), Captain O. Jørgensen in the *Thulla* (1911-12), Sir Ernest Shackleton in the *Endurance* (1914), Commander F. Wild in the *Quest* (1922), Captain H. Hansen in the *Busen VII* (1927), the whaling factory *Anglo-Norse* with her catchers (1927-28), R.R.S. *Discovery II* (1930), and R.R.S. *William Scoresby* (1937).

178. Captain C. A. Larsen's visit in 1908 was made in the hope of finding a site for a whaling station. Owing to the lack of harbours he failed in his main object, but he made a close investigation of seven of the islands. In 1911-12 a large Norwegian whale catcher, the *Thulla*, spent four months near the islands. The voyage proved a commercial failure. In 1912-13 no ships visited the group, but six Norwegian companies had optimistically taken out whaling licences for the South Sandwich Islands. No further activities took place until 1927, when the expanding whaling industry induced the A/S. Tønsberg Hvalfangeri to send one of their catchers, the *Busen VII*, to prospect for whales in South Sandwich waters and to make another search for a site for a shore station. The expedition reported that whales were plentiful, and notwithstanding the lack of anchorages and fresh water, the Tønsberg Company applied for a licence to work round the islands. In 1927-28 they sent out the

the Norwegian, Captain C. A. Larsen, took the *Jason* south to make a whaling reconnaissance in these waters. Although this expedition was also to some extent a failure, new discoveries were made in East Graham Land, and much useful information was collected about whaling possibilities. In 1893-94 Captain Larsen again commanded a larger reconnaissance expedition, consisting of three vessels, *Jason*, *Hertha* and *Castor*.

173. The first modern whaling expedition to the South Shetlands was a direct result of a crisis in the Norwegian whaling industry in the Arctic in 1903-05. In the autumn of 1905 Mr. Alexander Lange took the factory ship *Admiralen* and two catchers to Deception Island. The season was a success, and in 1907-08 four companies were operating in the South Shetlands, the total catch being about 650 whales, mainly from Bransfield Strait. In May 1907 a licence to take whales in the territorial waters of the South Shetlands and Graham Land for the period of one year was granted to the Sociedad Ballenera de Magallanes, of Punta Arenas, Chile. In 1908 the Newfoundland Steam Whaling Company took out a similar licence. By 1912-13 there were 12 factory ships and 32 catchers working in the South Shetlands area, all holding licences issued by the Falkland Islands Government. On October 21st 1912 the Hektor Whaling Company obtained a 21 year lease for a shore station on Deception Island, and the first whale was hauled up there on December 24th. Owing, however, to the lack of convenient sites and to the extended area over which whaling was conducted in the South Shetlands, it did not prove practicable to establish any further shore stations, and the bulk of the whaling was carried on by floating factories. In 1914 licences were held by eight Norwegian companies, one British company and one Chilean company. All these licences, except that of the Hektor Whaling Company, were subject to annual renewal. Most of the factory ships were moored at Deception Island, but some used Admiralty Bay. The majority of whales were taken in or near Bransfield Strait, but in the latter part of the season they were sometimes more plentiful further to the south-west, and some factories would move down to anchorages in the Melchior Islands and Port Lockroy. A Norwegian maintenance party remained at Deception Island over the winter, and a British Stipendiary Magistrate was resident on the island during each summer season from 1910 to 1930. In 1912 Port Foster at Deception Island was constituted a port of entry for shipping. A post office was maintained by the Stipendiary Magistrate from 1912 to 1927\*. Falkland Island stamps were used, at first bearing an overprint "Port Foster," but from 1913 onwards this overprint was replaced by a rubber cancellation date stamp with the words "Deception Island, South Shetlands."

173a. The following is a list of the Stipendiary Magistrates appointed to Deception Island by the Falkland Islands Government:—

1910-11.	H. Newing (?)	1922-23.	A. G. Bennett and A. G. Hardy.
1911-12.	E. B. Binnie.	1923-24.	J. E. Hamilton, S. Riches and J. G. Turner.
1912-13.	W. Moyes.	1924-25.	S. Riches.
1913-14.	A. G. Bennett.	1925-26.	A. G. Bennett and George Bennett.
1914-15.	W. Barlas.	1926-27.	A. G. Bennett.
1915-16.	J. I. Wilson.	1927-28.	— Stewart.
1916-17.	A. G. Bennett.	1928-29.	G. Brechin.
1917-18.	A. G. Bennett.	1929-30.	G. Brechin.
1918-19.	A. G. Bennett.		
1919-20.	S. Riches.		
1920-21.	J. E. Hamilton.		
1921-22.	A. G. Bennett.		

174. It is difficult to say exactly when local whaling in the South Shetlands came to an end. Prior to the season 1927-28 the factory ships were moored in harbours all through the season, but from then onwards pelagic whaling was adopted on an increasing scale. Only

\* It is likely that this post office was maintained until 1930 but no evidence of this can be traced after 1927.

Cmd. 657 of 1920.

C.O. 6418/1908.

Cmd. 657 of 1920.  
C.O. Gov. 14539/1912.

C.O. Gov. 22977/1913, Dispatch of June 10th.

S. Kemp and A. G. Bennett: *Discovery Reports*, Vol. 6, 1932, pp. 165-190.

C.O. Gov. 18264/1912.

B. S. H. Grant: *London Philatelist*, Vol. 44, 1935, pp. 158-162.

W. L. G. Joerg:  
*Geog. Review*,  
Vol. 26, 1936,  
pp. 454-62;  
Vol. 27, 1937,  
pp. 430-44;  
*Proc. American  
Philosophical  
Society*,  
Vol. 82, 1940,  
pp. 821-32.

A. Stephenson:  
*Geog. Journal*,  
Vol. 94, 1940,  
pp. 167-80, 229.

J. R. Rymill:  
*Southern Lights*  
(London, 1938);  
*Geog. Journal*,  
Vol. 91, 1938,  
pp. 297-312,  
424-38

*Geog. Journal*,  
Vol. 94, 1939,  
p. 256.

*Polar Record*,  
No. 22, 1941,  
pp. 427-499.

of Graham Land. Ellsworth himself confirmed Wilkins' erroneous "discovery" of Stefansson Strait, but it has since been claimed in the United States that he conclusively demonstrated the peninsularity of Graham Land and that he also discovered King George VI Sound. The latter claim, however, was not put forward until after this Sound had been reported by the British Graham Land Expedition and described in a wireless message to the *Times* of December 12th 1936. There can be no doubt that Ellsworth flew over and photographed both the Stefansson Strait area and King George VI Sound. However, at the time he definitely did not recognize that Stefansson Strait is a glacier rising to 6,000 ft. above sea-level or that King George VI Sound is in any way an unusual feature. He did not, in fact, himself have any precise ideas about where he had been and what he had seen in this region.\*

169. The British Graham Land Expedition of 1934-37, under Mr. J. R. Rymill, was the only large-scale British expedition that has yet made land investigations in the southern part of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. This expedition was promoted by the Royal Geographical Society and had the financial support of the Colonial Office. An advance party spent a month at Deception Island at the end of 1934. The ship *Penola* proceeded to Port Lockroy in January 1935 and shortly afterwards established a base in the Argentine Islands, where a hut was built and occupied by 16 men. From here various sledge and plane journeys were made during 1935 which elucidated much of the local geography. In February 1936 the ship moved south to Marguerite Bay, where a new base was established on the Debenham Islands. From here important sledge journeys were made across Graham Land to the east coast and far southwards into King George VI Sound. Numerous reconnaissance flights were also carried out. This expedition showed that Graham Land, contrary to previous reports (paragraph 166), is a part of the Antarctic continent, and that all of the channels reported by Sir Hubert Wilkins are in reality glaciers. Other important results were the surveying of the southern part of Graham Land, the discovery of King George VI Sound and research on the natural history of the locality.

170. In 1938 plans were well advanced for another expedition to continue the work of the British Graham Land Expedition, this time under the leadership of Dr. G.C.L. Bertram. The plans were approved by the Council of the Royal Geographical Society in November 1938, but had to be abandoned owing to the war. It had been proposed to establish a number of small parties of scientists to carry out detailed research work and to take advantage of King George VI Sound as the obvious route for further explorations to the south.

171. Since the outbreak of war the exploration of south Graham Land has been continued by the United States Antarctic Service, 1939-41. This expedition had one base in the Ross Dependency at the Bay of Whales (paragraphs 338-342) and a second base at Neny Fjord in Marguerite Bay, south-west Graham Land (paragraphs 277-280). During a series of important flights and sledge journeys knowledge of the east coast of Graham Land was extended southwards to lat. 77° S., and the southern part of King George VI Sound and of Alexander I Land were surveyed to the western boundary of the Falkland Islands Dependencies.

### Commercial Exploitation and British Administration

172. In 1892-93 four ships of the Dundee whaling fleet were sent to Erebus and Terror Gulf (on the east side of Trinity Peninsula). As a whaling venture this was a failure, for they were only equipped to kill Right whales and could not capture the much larger Antarctic species. However, a number of seals were taken. In the same year

\* This conclusion is based not only on a consideration of Mr. Ellsworth's published accounts but also on personal correspondence and discussions which he had later with members of the British Graham Land Expedition. In view of the extreme difficulty of interpreting such country from the air and Mr. Ellsworth's lack of technical ability, this result was not unexpected.



December 1933.

*Discovery II* called at Deception Island on a voyage to the south-west.

December 1934 to January 1935.

*Discovery II* spent seven weeks on a running survey of the South Shetlands, making a great advance in the charting of the group, and visiting also Melchior Islands, Port Lockroy, Trinity Peninsula, etc. Innumerable soundings were made, and miscellaneous observations and collecting carried out.

December 1936 to January 1937.

*Discovery II* spent a month continuing and extending the previous survey of the South Shetlands with similar miscellaneous research. The latest Admiralty charts are based on these surveys.

February 1938.

*William Scoresby* called at Deception Island and made a running survey of Bridgeman Island in the course of a whale-marking cruise around the South Shetlands.

Apart from the above instances, the Discovery Committee's ships have on many occasions been engaged in oceanographical research and in studying ice conditions in the neighbourhood of the South Shetlands without actually visiting the islands.

166. On December 20th 1928 Sir Hubert Wilkins made a flight from Deception Island down the east coast of Graham Land to about lat.  $71^{\circ} 30' S$ . He saw much new land, but mistook glaciers for channels (Crane Channel, Casey Channel, Lurabee Channel and Stefansson Strait), which appeared to separate Graham Land from the continent. At the furthest point reached he dropped a Union Jack on Hearst Land (see p. 161). He had hoped to make explorations further west in the Pacific sector, but did not on this occasion go outside the boundaries of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. In the following season, with the help of the *William Scoresby*, Sir Hubert Wilkins planned to fly from Graham Land to the Ross Sea, and he carried a Royal Commission to take possession of any territory then unknown which he might discover (paragraph 102). Owing to adverse weather conditions, however, he was only able to make several short-distance flights, of which the most successful were (1) from Deception Island due south over Graham Land, practically to the western limits of the Weddell Sea; (2) from the edge of the pack ice to the south of Charcot Land and back, proving that Charcot Land is an island and not part of the mainland; and (3) from lat.  $70^{\circ} S$ , long.  $101^{\circ} W$ . southwards to approximately lat.  $73^{\circ} S$ , where he failed to locate the mainland of the Antarctic continent (paragraph 424). During the second of these flights, on December 29th 1929, he dropped Union Jacks and proclamations on Charcot Island, claiming the area for Great Britain (see p. 162).

H. Wilkins :  
*Geog. Review*,  
Vol. 19, 1929,  
pp. 353-76.

H. Wilkins :  
*Geog. Review*,  
Vol. 20, 1930,  
pp. 357-88.

167. In the course of extensive Antarctic voyages the Norwegian ship *Norvegia* made brief visits to Deception Island in the seasons 1928-29 and 1930-31. A member of the expedition (Olaf Holtedahl) subsequently published a valuable report on these and other islands, but his observations were mostly made from Norwegian whaling ships.

168. In the season 1934-35, Mr. Lincoln Ellsworth planned to fly across the Antarctic continent from Graham Land to the Ross Sea. Adverse weather conditions compelled him to postpone the flight, but, on January 3rd 1935, he was able to make a short reconnaissance flight over the Nordenskjöld Coast of Trinity Peninsula. In November 1935, Mr. Lincoln Ellsworth made a second and successful attempt to cross the Antarctic, flying from Dundee Island to the Bay of Whales. This was an important flight, but its significance applies mainly to the Pacific sector (paragraph 430), and it cannot be said to have added much accurate information to the geography

Lincoln  
Ellsworth :  
*Natural History*,  
May 1935,  
pp. 397-402.

Lincoln  
Ellsworth :  
*Geog. Journal*,  
Vol. 89, 1937,  
pp. 193-213.

the mapping of the west coast of Graham Land. The *Belgica* was beset in the Bellingshausen Sea, and was the first ship to winter in the Antarctic pack ice.

162. In 1902-03, the Swedish expedition under Dr. Otto Nordenskjöld discovered some new land and carried out important work off the north-east coast of Graham Land. His ship, the *Antarctic*, was lost in the Weddell Sea. Parties wintered on shore at Snow Hill Island, Hope Bay and Paulet Island, and much research was carried out, notably on the geology and biology of the region. An Argentine naval officer was a member of one of the wintering parties, and the whole expedition was rescued by the Argentine corvette *Uruguay*.

163. Important and extensive surveys of the west side of Graham Land were made by the French expeditions of 1903-05 and 1908-10 (more particularly the latter) under Dr. J. B. Charcot in the *Français* and the *Pourquoi Pas?* The *Français* wintered at Port Charcot, Booth (Wandel) Island, and the *Pourquoi Pas?* wintered at Port Circumcision, Petermann Island. The published results of these two expeditions included a number of charts together with various papers on the natural history of these regions.

164. Sir Ernest Shackleton's expedition of 1914-17 did not explore the South Shetlands or Graham Land, but, after the loss of the *Endurance* in the Weddell Sea, 22 of his party spent a considerable period at Elephant Island and were able to carry out some research on the natural history of the island. The stranded party was rescued by the Chilean Government ship *Yelcho* (paragraph 259). In 1921-22 two members of a British expedition, T. W. Bagshawe and M. C. Lester, wintered ashore at Andvord Bay in west Graham Land and made observations on natural history, tides and meteorological conditions. In 1922, after the death of Sir Ernest Shackleton at South Georgia, his ship, the *Quest*, visited Elephant Island and landings were made at Cape Lookout and Minstrel Bay.

165. During the 12 years from 1927 to 1938 the ships of the Discovery Committee have made a long series of visits to the South Shetlands and the coasts and islands of Graham Land, and have carried out a comprehensive programme of surveying, hydrology, sounding, natural history and collecting (see Fig. 13). These activities may be listed as follows:—

February to April 1927.

*Discovery* visited Deception Island, the Palmer Archipelago and King George Island; seven weeks spent in surveying, marine research, collecting, etc.

February 1929.

*William Scoresby* visited Deception Island and carried out an oceanographical survey of Bransfield Strait.

November 1929 to February 1930.

*William Scoresby* acted as mother ship for Sir Hubert Wilkins' second expedition, visiting Deception Island, Melchior Islands, Port Lockroy, Beascochea Bay (Graham Land), etc.

December 1930 to February 1931.

*Discovery II* visited Deception Island, Marin Darbel Islands, Port Lockroy and Melchior Islands, with further surveying, an oceanographical survey of the Bransfield Strait, and miscellaneous research.

November 1932.

*Discovery II* again carried out oceanographical observations in Bransfield Strait, visiting Deception Island and including further topographical observations.

February 1933.

*Discovery II* continued oceanographical observations in Bransfield Strait, visiting Gibbs Island, Penguin Island, etc.

were virtually exterminated (see footnote on p. 143). A very large number of vessels participated in this slaughter, and the history of these early years is somewhat obscure (see Appendix X, pp. 180-182).

159. The rest of the South Shetlands and the other parts of Graham Land and the associated islands were discovered piecemeal during a subsequent period of more than a century. The following is not a complete list of explorers, but gives the names of those who reported some part of the land for the first time\* (see Fig. 10).

William Smith	.. ..	British	.. ..	1819, 1820-21
Edward Bransfield	.. ..	British	.. ..	1820
George Powell	.. ..	British	.. ..	1820-21, 1821-22
James Weddell	.. ..	British	.. ..	1820-21, 1821-22, 1822-23
Thaddeus Bellingshausen	.. ..	Russian	.. ..	1821
N. B. Palmer	.. ..	United States	.. ..	1821
Edward Hughes and James Hoseason	.. ..	British	.. ..	1824
Henry Foster	.. ..	British	.. ..	1829
John Biscoe	.. ..	British	.. ..	1832
Dumont D'Urville	.. ..	French	.. ..	1838
James Ross	.. ..	British	.. ..	1842-43
Eduard Dallmann	.. ..	German	.. ..	1873-74
T. Robertson	.. ..	British	.. ..	1892-93
C. A. Larsen	.. ..	Norwegian	.. ..	1893-94
A. de Gerlache	.. ..	Belgian	.. ..	1898
Otto Nordenskjöld	.. ..	Swedish	.. ..	1902-03
J. B. Charcot	.. ..	French	.. ..	1903-05, 1908-10
Hubert Wilkins	.. ..	British	.. ..	1928-29, 1929-30
Lincoln Ellsworth	.. ..	United States	.. ..	1934-35, 1935
J. R. Rymill	.. ..	British	.. ..	1934-37
Richard B. Black	.. ..	United States	.. ..	1940-41

160. After Smith's discovery of the South Shetlands, Edward Bransfield was ordered by the senior British naval officer at Valparaiso to survey the islands in 1820. He produced a chart of the South Shetlands and of Trinity Peninsula. Some of the early British sealers also made charts of this region, the best being those of George Powell and James Weddell.

161. In 1821 the Russian Admiral, Thaddeus von Bellingshausen, leader of a major expedition which circumnavigated the Antarctic, discovered Alexander I Land far to the south-west of Graham Land. He also made a running survey of parts of the South Shetlands. In 1829 the surveying was considerably extended by Captain Henry Foster, in H.M.S. *Chanticleer*, who visited various parts of the South Shetlands, and took formal possession of Hoseason Island in the Palmer Archipelago on January 7th 1829 (see p. 158). In 1832 Captain John Biscoe, in the *Tula*, discovered Adelaide Island and the mainland coast northwards to the Palmer Archipelago. He named this coast Graham Land, and took formal possession on February 21st 1832 (see p. 158). The position of his landing is uncertain, but was probably on Anvers Island in the Palmer Archipelago. In 1838 Commandant J.S.C. Dumont D'Urville, with the French naval vessels *Astrolabe* and *Zelée*, explored part of Trinity Peninsula in the course of an important expedition to various parts of the Antarctic. Being unaware of Bransfield's previous discovery, he called it Louis Philippe Peninsula. In 1842-43 Captain James Ross, with H.M.S. *Erebus* and *Terror*, explored the islands off the east side of Trinity Peninsula. This again was an incident among explorations elsewhere, but on January 6th 1843 he landed on Cockburn Island and took formal possession of the island and contiguous lands (see p. 159). In 1873-74 Captain E. Dallmann, in the *Grönland*, discovered Bismarck Strait and made surveys in the Palmer Archipelago. In 1898 the Belgian expedition under A. de Gerlache, in the *Belgica*, discovered de Gerlache Strait and made an important further contribution to

\* For a full list, see Appendix I, pp. 142-155.