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GEHEIM.

PRETORIA.

- 4 OCT 1957

Die Ambassadeur,
WASHINGTON.

DEPARTMENT VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE.

Besprekings oor die toekoms van die
Suidpoolgebied.

Met verwysing na my telegram nr. 122 van 20 September 1957 en Londen se diensbrief nr. 19/88/2 van 27 September 1957 stuur ek u hiernewens 'n afskrif van 'n memorandum wat in die Departement opgestel is ten aansien van die voorgestelde Britse plan insake 'n internasionale beheerliggaam vir die Suidpoolgebied.

Daar sal bemerk word uit die dokument wat na die Londense besprekings opgestel is vir gebruik in die Washingtonse samesprekings (waarvan 'n eksemplaar deur die Hoë Kommissaris, Londen, aan u gestuur is) dat die "ou" Gemenebeslande wat in Londen verteenwoordig was, die Unie se belange in die Suidpoolstreek aanvaar en saamstem dat Suid-Afrika tot 'n toekomstige beheerliggaam vir die Gebied toegelaat word. Dit is derhalwe die eerste keer dat ons posisie in hierdie verband formeel deur die betrokke lande erken word.

Onder die omstandighede keer die Minister van Buitelandse Sake die Britse voorstel in beginsel goed, maar voel dat Suid-Afrika moet aandui dat die besonderhede van die gesaghebbende orgaan verdere studie verg. Die Minister is egter begaan oor die moontlikheid dat so 'n "opperste gesag" uiteindelik onder die Verenigde Nasies ingesleep sal word en sou graag sien dat wanneer die Unie sy goedkeuring van die beginsel te kenne gee, terselfdertyd daarop gewys moet word dat die Unie-regering ten sterkste sou aanbeveel dat alle stappe gedoen word om te verhinder dat die Verenigde Nasies 'n hand in die voorgenome liggaam kry. Die Londense dokument oor die Suidpoolgebied se weergawe van die Verenigde State se planne vir die Gebied laat blyk dat die Amerikaanse sienswyse ook is dat 'n ooreenkoms oor die Suidpoolstreek heeltemal buite die Verenigde Nasies moet geskied.

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During the current International Geophysical Year a wide range of scientific activities are being carried on in the Antarctic area by a number of countries, as the Union Government is aware, and accordingly the Government of the United States of America feels that it will be particularly useful during this time to maintain close contact with the Government of the Union of South Africa in the hope that close cooperation between the two Governments will lead to satisfactory solutions of any problems that may be encountered.

Department of State,

Washington, October 8, 1957.

[The following text is extremely faint and largely illegible. It appears to be a memorandum or a letter detailing the Department of State's position and actions regarding the International Geophysical Year activities in the Antarctic region, specifically mentioning contact with the Government of the Union of South Africa.]

SECRET.

AIDE-MEMOIRE.

The Government of the United States of America has given careful consideration to the Aide-Mémoire of the Embassy of the Union of South Africa, dated October 3, 1957, in which there are set forth the reasons which in the Union Government's view justify the Union's association with any organization or machinery which might be devised for the control and administration of Antarctica.

The Aide-Mémoire of the South African Embassy states that the Union Government, in view of its real interest in the area, would appreciate it most highly if they could be invited to participate in discussions about Antarctica between representatives of the United States and certain Commonwealth Governments. It is assumed that this suggestion relates to general or formal discussions of a multilateral character, and would not necessarily refer to informal conversations which representatives of the Government of the United States may have with the representatives of other Governments interested in the Antarctic area, particularly if the initiative for such informal conversations comes from another Government.

The Government of the United States of America welcomes the expression of views of the Union Government, and is glad to reiterate its willingness to consult with that Government at any time in regard to Antarctic problems, and to exchange information in this field of mutual interest to the fullest extent practicable. It is believed that this policy of consultation will serve the purposes of the two Governments without the necessity of either one participating in all informal talks which representatives of either Government may have with representatives of other Governments on this subject.

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Government, in view of its real interest in the area, would appreciate it most highly if they could be invited to participate.

SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
October 3, 1957.

It is suggested that the Government of the United States should be invited to participate in discussions about Antarctica with representatives of the United States and various interested Governments. It is assumed that this suggestion would be general or formal discussions of a multilateral character, and would not necessarily refer to informal conversations with representatives of the Government of the United States and also with the representatives of other Governments interested in the Antarctic area, particularly if the initiative for such informal conversations comes from another Government.

The Government of the United States of America wishes the expression of views of the Union Government, and is glad to appreciate its willingness to consult with that Government at any time in regard to Antarctic problems, and to exchange information in this field of mutual interest to the fullest extent practicable. It is believed that this policy of consultation will serve the purposes of the two Governments without the necessity of either one participating in all informal talks which representatives of either Government may have with representatives of other Governments on this subject.

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in Antarctic waters in recent years, but serves as an intermediate base for the whaling and factory ships of other nations as well. Antarctica is extremely important to the Union from the meteorological point of view and we may in time have to establish permanent weather stations there. From the point of view of air communications Antarctica may provide an essential staging post for the Union and other countries in the southern hemisphere. In the event of any disruption of Suez, the passage between the Cape and the Antarctic coast will be a vital lifeline between East and West; South Africa is therefore bound to be essentially concerned about who holds and has access to the Antarctic coast on the opposite side.

It is clear therefore that, in addition to its desire to play a full and useful part in the administration and development of Antarctica, the Union cannot ignore the vital importance of Antarctica from the point of view of international security and, indeed, its own national security.

It will be recalled that the Union Government also informed the United States Government that it might wish to acquire certain territorial rights in the Antarctic area; but that the manner in which such rights might be acquired remained a matter for further consultation with the countries with specific interests in the Antarctic continent.

The Union Government understands that discussions about Antarctica between representatives of the United States and certain Commonwealth Governments are expected to take place in the near future. To the extent that these discussions may have a bearing on any régime for the future control and administration of Antarctica, the Union

SECRET.

AIDE MEMOIRE.

The Government of the Union of South Africa has on previous occasions invited the attention of the United States Government to the specific South African interest in the control and administration of Antarctica, and asked that the United States Government should bear in mind the desirability of South African association with any international discussions that might take place on this subject.

In March, 1956, the United States Government indicated that it welcomed the South African Government's proposal for continuous consultation and exchange of information on the Antarctic.

The reasons which in the Union Government's view justify the Union's association with any organisation or machinery which might be devised for the control and administration of Antarctica have been formally put forward before, but it may be useful to refer to them in outline again.

The proximity of the Antarctic Continent to South Africa is apparent from the map; in the field of long range and long term strategy the nature of the control, and the composition of the controlling authority, must always be a matter of primary concern to South Africa. When the time comes for economic exploitation and development of the Antarctic Continent, the Union will be one of the countries most closely involved. This is illustrated by the whaling industry which is as yet the only 'Antarctic' industry; the Union has not only participated extensively in whaling

to crash our way in to the wider circle at this stage, but rather to work carefully along the lines indicated to us towards consolidation of our position as an interested Power.

Copy to London.

W. C. DU PLESSIS

AMBASSADOR.

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purpose. He explained his personal call firstly by the fact that he had only very recently assumed his new functions and that to this extent his visit was a courtesy one. He would also be calling in due course on the Ambassadors of the other countries specially interested in Antarctica (France, Norway, Chile, Argentina). He placed some emphasis on the fact that he was calling on me first, and he seemed to wish me to attach significance to the fact that he was delivering the State Department's reply in person. My impression was that he wished to convey to me that the State Department recognises that we have a real interest in Antarctica. He was extremely cautious about everything he said, and I was left more with impressions and hints than with factual statements. He seemed to wish to convey to me that while our interest is recognised the State Department would not wish to commit itself on this now or for some time. Here he also suggested to me indirectly that any conclusive talks on the future of Antarctica are still some way off.

On the question of our participation in the quadripartite talks Ambassador Daniels confirmed that the consultations, which at our first interview he had said he would undertake had in fact taken place, but he gave me no indication of the nature or result of those consultations. He did not say that the matter had been discussed with the Commonwealth Missions, although we know that it was on the first day of the talks; and I feel I have some reason to believe from the nature of our conversation that one or more of our Commonwealth colleagues may not have been very enthusiastic in support of our participation, at least at that stage. The talks concluded yesterday and we hope to obtain some details of them from our Commonwealth colleagues.

As for bilateral consultation with the State Department, Ambassador Daniels took the initiative in suggesting that he and I have a further talk, and he even offered to come to the Embassy for the purpose. We agreed in the end that, accompanied by members of my staff, I should meet him and his assistants at the State Department for a further exchange of views during the week commencing October 21st. According to your telegram No. 122 certain background material for use in discussions is being sent to the Embassy. It would be useful if this could reach me by October 21st.

It was disappointing that we were not admitted to the quadripartite discussions, but to what extent our participation could be justified can better be judged when we have had an opportunity of ascertaining the nature and scope of those discussions. On the other hand I am reasonably satisfied that there exists now in the State Department a proper awareness of our real interest in Antarctica and encouraging indications of a preparedness to exchange views with us, admittedly not on a multilateral basis - but then they must also be aware that we are likely to be kept informed on the multilateral talks by our Commonwealth colleagues. The desirability of avoiding any impression of the establishment of a "group" appears to weigh very heavily with the State Department, and I think it would be wise for us not to try

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a possible Russian reaction.

I told him that we were fully aware of the delicate nature of the proceedings and that we understood just how important it was that the matter should be treated as one of the utmost confidence between those who already had exchanged and also those who were now about to exchange views on the subject. I assured him that as far as we were concerned he need not have any qualms at all about the observation of secrecy in regard to any conversations in which we might participate. We also understood that the projected discussions were not of a formal nature but nevertheless because of our real interest in the region and everything that pertained to it and further more in view of the fact that we had participated in the London talks we strongly hoped that it would be found possible to include us in the forthcoming exchange of views.

Ambassador Daniels said that he fully understood our interest and appreciated our approach. He emphasised that he would at all times be eager and willing to hold any bilateral talks that we might desire on the subject but that as far as our inclusion in any forthcoming multi-lateral talks might be concerned he was not in a position at once to give me a specific reply. He would have to consult, and as it was clear to me that by consulting he also meant the other Commonwealth countries concerned, I hastened to say that I understood the need for such consultation and that I would therefore leave the matter confidently in his hands. It seemed to me that he was not sure that all our Commonwealth colleagues would agree.

He pondered the question as to whether he could give me an early reply so that I would be enabled to advise my Government and in that connection he considered sending me a reply before the talks commenced on Monday. I ventured to suggest that a reply be sent after he had had an opportunity of discussing the matter with the other Commonwealth representatives concerned, to which he agreed. (I made this suggestion on the supposition and in the hope that in accordance with what was discussed in London the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand would not only not object but would actively support our request).

Ambassador Daniels undertook to consult the Missions concerned at the earliest possible moment, but in any event not later than October 7th when the quadripartite talks were to begin.

On October 8th Ambassador Daniels delivered his reply in the form of an Aide Memoire of which I attach a copy. The reply is based largely on an assumption in the second paragraph which was not justified by the representations I had made. Be that as it may, it amounts to a polite refusal of our request to participate in the quadripartite talks, coupled with a renewed offer to consult and exchange information bilaterally. My interpretation of the final sentence of the third paragraph is that the Union and United States would consult with each other but separately with the group comprising the three other Commonwealth Governments.

This Aide Memoire was delivered to me by Ambassador Daniels himself, who called on me at the Embassy for the

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had participated in the London discussions. Apparently the State Department, which attaches the utmost importance to the strictest secrecy being maintained about the exchanges of view on Antarctica, had been given the impression that the London discussions would be confined to the Australians, British and New Zealanders, who would be talking to them later in Washington. They had not been told that the Union would be participating in London or that Canada would have observers. The British worry was that the State Department might be concerned that in London information on American policy would have been communicated, without the authority of the State Department, to other Governments.

We agreed therefore to hold over our approach to the State Department until the British Embassy had informed the State Department of the Union's participation in the London discussions. This the British Embassy did on October 3rd, and we were told later that the State Department's reception of the information had been non-committal apart from a reiteration of the secrecy attaching to matters of American policy on Antarctica.

At the State Department matters relating to Antarctica fall under the immediate direction of Ambassador Daniels, a former senior State Department official (and an expert on Latin American affairs) who was recalled from private life at the beginning of this month to take up the position of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

I called on Ambassador Daniels on October 4th, and put to him the Union's request as embodied in an Aide Memoire which I left with him and of which a copy is attached.

The Ambassador listened most attentively to what I had to say especially when I stressed South Africa's interest in the region in question and therefore in any discussions which may be held concerning any measures related to control machinery for Antarctica. I added that it would naturally be understood that we were not concerned in any way with discussions of a domestic nature relating to Antarctica which the State Department might wish to have with any particular Government but that we were anxious to join in any group discussions which might flow forth from the talks which had recently been held in London and in which we had participated.

Ambassador Daniels said that he had been advised of our part in the London talks and he then proceeded, most carefully, to explain that any talks which might be held in Washington would not be held at the initiative of the United States Government but would merely be a result of the recent London discussions. It was clear that he wanted to impress on me in the first place that the discussions projected for the next week were not of any formal nature and secondly that the United States Government was not acting as an inviting power. He elaborated on this by saying just how important it was that the impression should not be created that a "group" was being established as this, if it became known, could at once lead to other claimants - notably France and Norway - coming forward. What also had to be avoided at all costs was

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TOP SECRET.

October 9, 1957

THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
PRETORIA.Antarctica.

On the 4th October, 1957, I approached the State Department, in terms of the instructions in your telegram No. 134, to express the desire of the Union authorities to participate in any discussions on the future control and administration of Antarctica.

Before my approach to the State Department the matter had been discussed informally by the Counsellor separately with officials of the Australian, British and New Zealand Embassies. From these discussions it was ascertained that the quadripartite talks with the Americans had been postponed to commence on October 7th. Also that these talks were not strictly speaking being held at the invitation of the State Department - the initiative had come from the Commonwealth Embassies which, after bilateral talks with the State Department, had suggested last May that quadripartite talks would be useful; to this the State Department had later agreed.

As to the probable scope of the talks commencing October 7th, a difference of opinion was apparent between the New Zealanders and the British. The New Zealanders thought that it was probable that, as suggested in London's telegram No. 141, the talks would be concerned in the initial stage with United States co-operation with the Australian and New Zealand zones; and they did not consider that the Union would have any real interest at that stage. The British, on the other hand, made it clear to us that they did not anticipate any clear cut division of the talks into stages; for their part they would hope to put forward their plan for an international authority and have it discussed at an early stage; they thought that the talks from the commencement could range over any of the aspects of the matter covered in the working paper prepared in London. The Australians, who were awaiting the arrival of Mr. Tange who had represented them in London, professed to be in some doubt as to what was intended.

In view of the British view as to the scope of the quadripartite talks we thought it necessary to make an immediate approach to the State Department on the subject of Union participation in those talks, at least to the extent that they might have a bearing on any régime for the future control and administration of Antarctica.

When we told the British of our intention of making this approach, they asked us to hold it over to enable them to clear up first with the State Department one point which was obviously occasioning them some embarrassment. This was that the State Department had not been informed that the Union

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With the
Compliments of the
Embassy
of the
Union of South Africa
Washington, D.C.

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This report from Washington, on the State Department's reaction to our request to participate in the talks on Antarctica, is very disappointing.

The impression which the State Department tried to convey to our Ambassador

was

a) that the talks in Washington were taking place on the initiative of the Commonwealth countries

b) that the Commonwealth countries were reluctant to affirm our interest in participation

is not borne out by the facts as we know them here.

Please see in his report the background document prepared in London, with particular reference to page 1 and page 16.

McDeville
15/10

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The British for their part outlined their proposals for an international authority including the Russians and other countries with an interest in the area and appear to consider that it evoked a fairly encouraging interest on the part of the Americans. The advantages and disadvantages were apparently fully discussed without, however, bringing out any factors not covered in the London talks. There was some difference of opinion on the question of the timing of any initiative towards an international authority should this be decided upon. As in London, the British view was that no steps should be taken until after the Argentine elections next year, but that the scheme should be launched before the next United Nations General Assembly meets in order to forestall any other proposals. The Americans and the others, however, were not sure that it might not be better to await the conclusion of the International Geophysical Year when the intentions of the Russians might become more clear. The question of presenting the scheme to the United Nations was apparently also inconclusively discussed. None was anxious to bring the United Nations into the picture but all recognised some dangers should this not be done. There was some support for the view that if the Russians were included in the scheme it might be easier to keep the question of reference to the United Nations under control.

The desirability or otherwise of Russian participation is, of course, a key factor in any scheme for an international authority. From the initial American reaction it seems that they might have serious qualms about the possibilities of fruitful co-operation with the Russians, but these of course would have to be weighed against the difficulties which the Russians could no doubt cause if excluded. The question of Russian participation is also connected with the question of demilitarisation of the Antarctic. It seems that the Americans were loath to express any definite views on demilitarisation as they did not have the advice of their Defence authorities. They were apparently hesitant also on the possibility of including the Russians in any demilitarisation scheme, but the British feel they may have been successful in convincing them that demilitarisation without Russian participation would have little chance of success. In the British view agreement on demilitarisation is a necessary condition precedent to the establishment of an international authority. Their argument seems to run that the international authority can only be set up after agreement on demilitarisation, that demilitarisation can only be effective with Russian participation, and that if the Russians agree on demilitarisation they can hardly be left out of the international authority.

From the foregoing it will be evident that the discussions were largely exploratory, and nothing very definite came out of them. What the meeting did agree on before closing, was that each country should give further thought to the problem. In doing so they would bear in mind three main questions which could perhaps be broadly stated on the following lines:

- (1) Is a scheme for demilitarisation with or without the Russians desirable and practical?

TOP SECRET.

October 17, 1957

THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
PRETORIA.



Antarctica.

Please refer to my despatch 43/44 of the 9th October, 1957, about the talks on Antarctica which were held between representatives of the State Department and of the Australian, British and New Zealand Embassies. I set out below such information as we have been able to obtain on the scope and nature of those talks. This information is necessarily of a general nature for it is based on informal discussions with some of the Commonwealth officials who took part in the quadripartite talks. We have not been given or shown any written account of the talks; in fact we gather that no record of the meeting or of its conclusions was kept. The information which is given below cannot, therefore, be regarded as comprehensive or detailed, but rather as a resumé of some impressions gained at second-hand.

The main difficulty in the way of making any progress towards elaboration of a common policy appears to have been due to the fact that the Americans had not yet formulated their ideas to the point where they were in a position to contribute much of a positive nature to the discussions. This was not unexpected, for Ambassador Daniels had only been appointed a few days before to his present duties with the express function of working out proposals for such a policy; and understandably his first step must be to survey the existing position. He appears to have devoted himself at the meeting mainly to obtaining elucidation of the views of the Commonwealth representatives.

The three Commonwealth delegations did not attempt to present any sort of united front to the Americans. Their standpoints were broadly those that they had adopted at the London discussions. The New Zealanders, and perhaps to a lesser extent the Australians, do not appear to be entirely convinced of the desirability of the British plan for an international authority. They would seem to be more inclined to hold on to what they have if they can be assured of American co-operation and support. They do not have the same reasons, based on the dispute with the Argentine and Chile, for surrendering sovereignty in the area. Furthermore strategic considerations must weigh more heavily with them. However, as the Americans were uncommunicative about their intentions, the New Zealanders and Australians were apparently of necessity more non-committal than might otherwise have been the case.

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With the
Compliments of the
Embassy
of the
Union of South Africa
Washington, D.C.

October 17, 1957



AL AFFAIRS,

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Ali Hoi Kow
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Ice and Fire

One squabble has already broken out in Antarctica. International rivalries, and the advance of science, may bring more serious ones in the future.

ANTARCTICA is no longer for the penguins. Man has arrived in numbers, and an unaccustomed heat is already stealing across the frozen expanses. The dispute that has broken out between Dr Fuchs and Sir Edmund Hillary, conducted at long range with the ultimate weapon of intercontinental telegrams, is unlikely to be the last international argument over the region. About Sir Edmund's actions there seem to be two things that can fairly be said on the evidence available to those outside Antarctica.


The substance of his argument, as distinct from the manner in which he has tried to get it accepted, carries a good deal of weight. Dr Fuchs's party, in its laborious progress towards the pole, is at present basking in what passes for high summer at the bottom of the world. These fair conditions are likely to come to an end by late February or early March, when the blizzards that killed Scott will close in again. Even if Dr Fuchs can keep up his comparatively fast pace of the last few days, he will probably not reach the pole before about January 18th. He then has another 1,200-odd miles to accomplish if he wants to complete the passage to Scott Base on the other side of the continent. If this takes him as long as it took Sir Edmund, when the latter was heading for the pole, he will not reach safety until the beginning of April; and even if, at the most improbably optimistic estimate, he maintains his recent 30-mile-a-day pace all the way (across terrain some of which made Sir Edmund go much more slowly, and probably in worse weather than he had) it would still take Dr Fuchs until the end of February.

There is thus going to be a period, of anything from a few days to several weeks, in which Dr Fuchs's party may be exposed to considerable danger, and in which it might be very difficult even for modern methods of rescue to find him and extract him from the snowstorms. If Sir Edmund had confined himself to saying this, and then waiting in his appointed post at Depot 700 until the matter had been thrashed out, he could not be criticised. He is apparently not to blame for the fact that the quarrel became public, for the leakage occurred in New Zealand. Nor is his independent sprint to the south pole relevant to the main issue; although it was not part of the expedition's plan, and although it left a taste of melodramatic opportunism, it would not have prevented him from returning to Depot 700 and performing his main task, to guide the commander of the expedition from there to Scott Base. Where he seems to have offended is in what looks very like an attempt to force his views on Dr Fuchs

and the committee that controls the expedition—by rejecting Dr Fuchs's request to wait at the pole for him, by going back to Scott Base and by invoking the "concern" of the American expedition at the pole, which it is up to the Americans, if they feel it, to express for themselves.

After all, there is no need for a final decision until Dr Fuchs reaches the pole and can see how much time he has left. Sir Edmund's party would meanwhile have been in no danger. If Dr Fuchs and the London committee then agree that the risk is a manageable one, Sir Edmund's responsibility is to go as far back along the line of march to the pole as is necessary to help the main party safely home. He now seems to have accepted this; and it is to be hoped that Dr Fuchs will not be stung into carrying out his threat to go it alone.

IN the end it may turn out that this dispute reflected little more than the difference between British and New Zealand ideas about the lengths to which a subordinate can go in pressing his views on his leader. The world will be lucky if Antarctica is vexed by no more earnest matters than this. At a time when everyone is wondering what the Russians will do next, and sure that, whatever it is, they will do it sooner than expected, it is natural that the West should look uneasily



at the enigmatic red star lately erected by a Soviet sailor on an uninhabited British island in the South Sandwich group. There is a gentleman's agreement that neither the Russians nor anyone else taking part

Mr. Ormsby-Gore: Her Majesty's Government welcomes scientific exploration in the Falkland Islands Dependencies during the International Geophysical Year. In common with other nations possessing territories in Antarctica, Her Majesty's Government do not regard International Geophysical Year activities as affecting in any way sovereignty over the area explored.

Where, however, there has been some doubt as to whether the activities of other countries in British territories are connected with the International Geophysical Year and no prior notification has been received, Her Majesty's Government have felt obliged to make their attitude on the question of sovereignty clear to the Government concerned. This has recently been done in the cases of the Soviet landing on Zavodovsky Island and of the visit of the Argentine ship "Les Eclaireurs" to Deception Island on its Antarctic cruise.

That the whole question of sovereignty in Antarctica is likely to transform itself into a concrete problem at the end of the International Geophysical Year has been underlined in a recent article in The Economist (11th January), which displays a remarkably accurate knowledge of the lines on which the "Old Commonwealth" countries at least, have been thinking in the last few months.

Copy to Washington.

L. F. A. de VILLIERS.

Minister.

AFD/JH

Argentine territory by the Argentine Government. The British Government "have no doubts as to their sovereignty over the area and have offered to submit the question to the International Court of Justice. H.M.S. Protector, which was in the area, therefore welcomed the Argentine ship and her passengers to British territory" on behalf of the British Government.

This statement met with a sharp, though not unduly hostile, response in Argentina. A spokesman of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs is reported to have said that Argentina rejected British claims to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies and that her inalienable claims to these regions would have to be raised in the Organisation of American States. The Under-Secretary of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, told the British Ambassador that, in general, the Argentine Government wanted to play down their differences with the United Kingdom in the Antarctic. They would answer the British statement about the tourist cruise in the lowest key they could manage, and hoped that "The Deception incident" would soon be forgotten. In reply to an expression of opinion from the Ambassador that it was a pity that the Argentine Government had used the Russian landing as a pretext to tilt against the British position in the Falkland Isles and Antarctic Dependencies, the Under-Secretary said that they were under such attacks from Nationalist politicians that they were obliged to show themselves as defending the whole Argentine position in the area.

We understand that a second and last cruise by the same Argentine ship is due to depart on 1st February and is likely to reach Deception Island two or three days later. We have not yet heard what procedure the Foreign Office intend to adopt to deal with the situation, but they will no doubt have to bear in mind the unfavourable reaction in Argentina to the "welcome" given to the first cruise. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires has pointed out that, although both the Argentine Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have so far taken the affair lightly, the controversy could take a nastier turn and become a factor in the Argentine elections; and as you may know, this is a perennial possibility that the United Kingdom has always striven to avoid. At the same time, the Ambassador says, the very fact that public indignation in Argentina has been aroused by the attitude adopted by the United Kingdom towards the first cruise perhaps shows the necessity for that attitude: the Argentinians were beginning to interpret the United Kingdom's tolerance of their activities in the area as implied condonation.

The Russian and Argentine moves formed the subject of the following question and answer in the House of Commons on 21st January:

Mr. Riggs-Davison (Conservative, Chigwell)
asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what steps have been taken to meet any infringement of British sovereignty in the South Sandwich Group and other parts of Antarctica.

integral part of the British Falkland Islands Dependencies, established by Letters Patent in 1908.

Her Majesty's Government, while welcoming scientific exploration in the Falkland Islands Dependencies by other countries during the International Geophysical Year, would nevertheless be grateful for prior notification of any other landing which it may be proposed to make on British territory, and would be glad to render any available assistance required."

The Russian landing also evoked reactions in the Argentine. On 11th January, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a Press communique re-affirming Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland and South Sandwich Islands, South Georgia and the Argentine Antarctic sector, and recalling the agreement that installations in the Antarctic for scientific purposes should not be regarded as acts of sovereignty during the International Geophysical Year. The communique made the following points specifically about the South Sandwich Islands:

- (a) Argentina has performed acts of possession,
- (b) Argentina has reserved its sovereign rights on various occasions, including the reservation made on the signature of the Reciprocal Assistance Treaty at the Rio Inter-American Conference in 1947, denying the right of European Powers to colonies or possessions in the defence zone, and
- (c) the islands lie within the hemisphere defence zone.

Commenting on this statement, the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires says that it was clearly directed at the Soviet incursion into the South Sandwich Islands and, to that extent, was not altogether objectionable. Its emphasis on the South Sandwich Islands being within the "hemisphere defence zone" and the denial of the right of any "European" Power to exercise sovereignty within that zone seemed intended to appeal to Pan-American and, particularly, United States, opinion. The Ambassador adds that it is possible that the statement foreshadows a new turn in Argentine Antarctic policy, with the accent on a Pan-American approach, (such as was once favoured by President Roosevelt), as distinct from either an international settlement or the simple prosecution of Argentine sovereignty as hitherto. In any event, the wording of the statement suggests that the Argentine Government hope to obtain United States support in resisting Soviet claims, and that they are not particularly concerned to make common cause with Her Majesty's Government in the matter.

A subsequent development, as you will no doubt be aware, was the arrival on 18th January at Deception Island of the Argentine naval transport "Les Eclaireurs" carrying tourists on a cruise. This, in turn, led to the issue of a statement by the Foreign Office the following day, which said that Deception Island formed part of the British Falkland Islands Dependencies and was claimed as

Copy for 25.16/2

P. S. 16/3

AIR MAIL

CONFIDENTIAL

30th January, 1958.

THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Antarctica : The South Sandwich Islands

You will have been informed by the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Pretoria of the British Government's intention, as a result of the Russian landing on Zavodovsky Island early in January, to send a Note to the Soviet authorities reaffirming British sovereignty over the South Sandwich Islands.

According to press reports, the Russian landing was followed almost immediately by claims from Shcherbakov, chairman of the Council of Antarctic Researches of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, that Zavodovsky Island and two others in the South Sandwich group were discovered in 1819 by a Russian Antarctic expedition. Shcherbakov said the attempts of certain foreign correspondents to dispute the "primary discovery" of these islands by Russians in 1819 was "surprising to say the least." He added that Captain Cook "discovered, as he called it, Sandwich Land" in 1775. The Russians, however, had established that the points regarded by Captain Cook as capes of Sandwich Land were in fact separate islands.

In case you have not seen it, the text of the British Note, delivered in Moscow on 20th January, was as follows:

"Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to refer to announcements made by the Official Soviet News Agency Tass on January 4, concerning the visit by a party of scientists and seamen from the Soviet research ship *Glava 15* to Zavodovsky Island at position latitude 56° 28 minutes south and longitude 27° 35 minutes west. The fact that the Island of Zavodovsky and the 2 others were first sighted by the Russian explorer, Admiral Bellingshausen, is not disputed, but these Islands form part of the South Sandwich group, which is a single geographical unit and was discovered by the British explorer Captain James Cook some 45 years earlier. The South Sandwich Islands have always been regarded as British territory and were constituted on

NEW ZEALAND

No N 20a/58

February 3, 1958.

SUPPLEMENTARY NEW ZEALAND NEWS BULLETIN



Minister 84/2

AIRFIELD IN ANTARCTICA

Mr Nash's Statement

The following statement was issued by the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr Walter Nash, today:

When asked about American plans to build an airstrip at Cape Bernacchi (McMurdo Sound), the Prime Minister said that he was quite happy about permanent bases being set up in New Zealand's Antarctic territory but was not in favour of military bases being set up anywhere in the Antarctic.

"I think such a base is an excellent idea and I think it should be made available, by agreement, to the flyers of all nations", said Mr Nash.

"A permanent United States I.G.Y. type of base in the Antarctic would be splendid and only good could come of it providing that no military bases are started in any part of the Antarctic", he said when asked if the proposal of such an airstrip indicated the establishment of a permanent base there.

"If one starts a military base then others will follow. I hope there will be no suggestion of military bases", said Mr Nash.

Support Bases

The Prime Minister said he had noted with interest the announcement of the United States I.G.Y. authorities that they intended to retain some of the American bases in Antarctica after the International Geophysical Year ends next December and the suggestion that American support bases would be retained in New Zealand.

Mr Nash said that the American support bases in Christchurch had been set up by agreement with the New Zealand Government for the duration of the I.G.Y. He expected therefore, that if the United States authorities wished to maintain those bases after the conclusion of the I.G.Y., further negotiations would be necessary.

Mr Nash said that there had been an excellent record of co-operation with the United States personnel in New Zealand and between the two Antarctic expeditions.

Reciprocity

"The facilities we have been able to provide have been of assistance to the Americans and have enabled them to mount their operation 'Deep-freeze' in the Antarctic with notable success", said Mr Nash. "In return we have received from Admiral Dufek and his men a great deal of invaluable assistance, particularly in the matter of the transport of men and stores to Scott Base". - New Zealand Government Cable.

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PRESS SECTION.
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH,
TEM. 3241.

NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT OFFICE,
415, STRAND,
LONDON, W.C.2.

He did not think that events so far could be regarded as unfavourable to South Africa and he promised to keep me informed of further developments.

Copy to Washington.

10th November, 1950.

J. F. A. de VILLIERS.

Minister.

On 10th November, 1950, I was invited to the 10th meeting of the Western and United Nations Association for the Commonwealth Relations Office, to call attention to the following statement about Apartheid. It is necessary to state before giving an account of the statement which was made, by the exchange between the State Department in Washington and the State Department at Pretoria in the former's cable No. 6154 of October 9, 1950.

Idv/JGL

You will recall that the State Department attempted to convey to our Ambassador the impression, first, that the October talks in Washington were taking place in the initiative of the Commonwealth countries and, secondly, that not on behalf of the Commonwealth countries had been reluctant to advise her interest in participation in the talks. These suggestions were, as you know, contradictory to statements made in the Working Paper prepared in London on the basis of discussions between representatives of the "old" Commonwealth countries: Page 1 of the Paper refers to "discussions which the United States Government had suggested should be held in Washington with interested parties in October" and Page 16 contains the statement that "the disadvantages of excluding South Africa with her legitimate interests in the area should therefore be kept in mind". I was subsequently informed by Mr. Harry Linstedt, Deputy Under-Secretary of State of the Commonwealth Relations Office, that he was not aware of any reluctance on the part of the Commonwealth countries to invite South Africa to the Washington talks and that the State Department must be held solely accountable for the fact that the Union was not invited to be present.

Mr. Bass again expressed regret that South Africa had not been present at the October meeting at Washington but said that progress had been slow and that no agreement had been reached on that occasion. The Americans had been unprepared for a detailed discussion of the future of Apartheid. They had, however, shown themselves ready to give further thought to the concepts of internationalisation and desegregation.

See the Commission

1/11

Mr. Bass pointed out that the real difficulty arose from the fact that South Africa had no claim based on past performance in the region. In assessing the claims of interested countries to participate in an Antarctic Authority, those which had claimed sovereignty in consequence of their record of discovery fell naturally into the first group. There was a second group consisting of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. whose claims arose from the fact that they were world powers and though not territorial claimants as yet could show a substantial record of discovery and exploration. South Africa might be regarded as falling in a third group but there was some difficulty about drawing the line at that point as there might then also be claims by other interested parties like Belgium, Japan and India. It was possible to draw a firm line after the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.; a line drawn after South Africa must necessarily be a somewhat faint one.

I said that I could not entirely accept his criteria: since claims to sovereignty were not universally recognised and past performance was in some cases of little substance, potential interest in the future of Antarctica might be a more realistic qualification for participation in the international Authority. Mr. Bass conceded that there was some validity in this argument and said that it was his impression that the Americans were by no means unsympathetic to South Africa's case. He did not think, however, that any good purpose would be served by badgering the Americans at this stage. It would be sufficient to remind them from time to time of our continuing interest.

It was most important that the French, Norwegians, Argentinians and others should not be prematurely alerted by an attempt to enlist their support at this stage. The Argentinian elections are due to take place in February this year and it was essential that the main political parties remain uncommitted on the question of Antarctica. The Australians had also seen possible political difficulties in respect of conceding their sovereignty in Antarctica to an international Authority; if Australia dropped out the entire plan for internationalization might have to be abandoned. Mr. Macmillan had been asked to take up the question with Mr. Menzies in Canberra.

Mr. Bass said that he had not yet seen the article in the Economist to which I referred in my report No. P.S.16/3 of January 30th. He had no idea where that paper had received its information. Mr. Macmillan had, however, made a slightly indiscreet reference to the internationalization of Antarctica in a speech in Dunedin; the Foreign Office had had an immediate enquiry from the Norwegian Embassy and had had to cover up as much as possible.

In general, Mr. Bass said that there had been no new developments in the discussions so far but that it was hoped to reach general agreement with Australia and the United States in time to start a wider series of talks with the other countries concerned shortly after the Argentinian elections.

/He

In December, 1957, the Americans had without warning invited the British, Australian and New Zealand representatives in Washington for a further series of talks. These had taken place at an official level and it was emphasized that the American expressions of opinion did not as yet even represent finally accepted State Department policy. In general, however, they were inclined to think that the four countries represented should seek agreement on the following points:

- (a) An international Authority over Antarctica should be established by countries with real interests, but the Authority should operate for the common good of mankind.
- (b) Attention should be given to the possibilities of economic exploitation and there should be universal access to any economic resources that might be found.
- (c) The concept of demilitarization was essential to the plan.
- (d) The "countries with real interests" would comprise the present claimants to a territorial segment plus the United States of America. The Americans were not as yet ready to agree to Russian participation but, if such participation proved inevitable, more thought should be given to the manner in which Russia should be invited to take part. They wondered, for example, whether it would be possible to invite Russia to a conference on Antarctica and there to engineer her non-participation in the international Authority.
- (e) The Authority might consist of a Board of Governors of the interested nations mentioned above. In a lower tier there might also be an Advisory Council of other interested countries, including South Africa.
- (f) The Authority should not be under United Nations control. Final agreement should be reached by the interested parties outside the United Nations, the Secretary-General of the United Nations being informed subsequently of the fact accomplished. The Authority should, however, offer to submit reports on the administration of Antarctica to the United Nations and to the Specialized Agencies concerned.

Mr. Bass asked me whether the South African Government had any further views on Antarctica. I said that I had no further instructions but that to the best of my knowledge we stood by the firm declaration we had made at the London meetings on our interest in participation. While the question of Antarctica was not yet in the forefront of public attention in South Africa there was no doubt that South Africa's interest would increase rather than diminish in the future. In view of the support given by the "old" Commonwealth countries in September and the generally sympathetic re-action of the other claimants when we had discussed our interests with them in 1948, I wondered whether it would be correct to deduce that the United States was the only serious opponent to South African participation. If this were the case, was it his Department's view that a good purpose would be served by further representations to the State Department?

/Mr. Bass

In December, 1957, the Americans had without invited the British, Australian and New Zealand P.S.16/2. lives in Washington for a further series of talks. These had taken place at an official level and it was explained that AIR MAIL. can expressions of opinion did not as yet even represent finally accepted State SECRET. of policy. In general, however, they were inclined that the four countries represented should seek agreement on the following points: 4th February, 1958.

- (a) An international Authority over Antarctica should be established by countries with real interests, for the common good of the world.
- THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
- (b) Attention should be given to the possibilities of economic exploitation and there should be universal access to any economic resources that might be found.
- (c) The concept of Antarctica. was essential to the plan.

On Friday, the 31st January, 1958, I was invited by Mr. H.G.M. Bass, Head of the Western and United Nations Department of the Commonwealth Relations Office, to call on him for an informal discussion about Antarctica. It is necessary to refer, before giving an account of the discussion which took place, to the exchange between the Union Ambassador in Washington and the State Department as described in the former's minute No. 43/44 of October 9, 1957.

You will recall that the State Department attempted to convey to our Ambassador the impression, firstly, that the October talks in Washington were taking place on the initiative of the Commonwealth countries and, secondly, that one or more of the Commonwealth countries had been reluctant to affirm our interest in participation in the talks. These suggestions were, as you know, contradictory to statements made in the Working Paper prepared in London on the basis of discussions between representatives of the "old" Commonwealth countries: Page 1 of the Paper refers to "discussions which the United States Government had proposed should be held in Washington with interested parties in October" and Page 16 contains the statement that "the disadvantages of excluding South Africa with her legitimate interests in the area should therefore be kept in mind". I was subsequently informed by Sir Henry Lintott, Deputy Under-Secretary of State of the Commonwealth Relations Office, that he was not aware of any reluctance on the part of the Commonwealth countries to invite South Africa to the Washington talks and that the State Department must be held solely accountable for the fact that the Union was not invited to be present.

Mr. Bass again expressed regret that South Africa had not been present at the October meeting at Washington but said that progress had been slow and that no agreement had been reached on that occasion. The Americans had been unprepared for a detailed discussion of the future of Antarctica. They had, however, shown themselves ready to give further thought to the concepts of internationalization and demilitarization.

Die Hoi Kommission

/In

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Norway

5. Norwegian officials are reported to be not (repeat not) unsympathetic towards United Kingdom viewpoint.
6. In general we can feel some relief that Governments concerned, particularly Argentine and Chile, did not adopt an uncompromising attitude.

CONFIDENTIAL

C.R.O. Tel. to U.K.H.S., Pretoria

Mr de Villiers has seen

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AS*

Z. No. 18 CONFIDENTIAL

18th February 1958

ANTARCTICA

Reactions of Governments of Argentina, Chile, France and Norway to approach mentioned in paragraph 4 of my telegram under reference were as follows.

Argentina

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that in view of publicity Argentine Government would have to put out a statement but he claimed that it would not repeat not shut the door on consideration of any future proposals for internationalisation. He showed particular interest in the question of sovereignty under an international regime and our Ambassador stressed that United Kingdom proposals envisaged a suspension of sovereignty not repeat not a renunciation. Statement was issued on 14th February in following terms: Begins.

As regards the possible internationalisation of the Antarctic announced at Canberra by the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, the Argentine Republic maintains its classical position of sustaining its rights over the territories and seas included within the limits that define our sovereignty.

2. With regard to collaboration for the advance of science which has characterised the international geophysical year shortly to end, Argentina will give her support to all the nations that have shown interest therein. Following the pacific line of conduct traditional in our history, we find the idea of "not militarizing" the Antarctic very appropriate. Ends.

Chile

3. Statement issued by Ministry for Foreign Affairs said that Chilean policy towards Antarctica had been made clear on numerous occasions and that it would not be modified.

France

4. United Kingdom Ambassador has reported that it is unlikely that French Government, who are at present fully taken up with other matters, will make any public statement on this question.

/Norway

PRESS CUTTING.

From *The Times*

Dated 13th February 1958.

ARGENTINE VIEW ON ANTARCTIC

CONTROL INADMISSIBLE

FROM OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

Señor Candiotti, the Argentine Ambassador, received your Correspondent yesterday to discuss questions concerning Antarctica, after reports that the British Government were considering proposals to establish an international commission or régime for that region. Argentina claims Sovereignty over a sector of territory in Antarctica overlapping the British sector.

Señor Candiotti said that the idea of internationalization was not acceptable to his Government in any way, because it could not admit the internationalization of Argentine territory. Asked if Argentina could take part in an international commission—possibly linked to the United Nations—to ensure that the area did not become militarized, the Ambassador replied that he could not yet give his Government's views. But the aim of keeping the area demilitarized was certainly desirable. It was a pity, he added with a smile, that the Powers were seeking to avoid the cold war only in the frozen south.

DANGEROUS HIATUS

Britain has not put forward proposals yet, but certain ideas have been discussed with the New Zealand and Australian Governments, and the United States has been kept informed. There will be soundings of the Norwegian, Chilean, Argentine, and other Governments before any proposals are made. The British Government attach importance to a system which would preserve the peaceful nature of international contacts.

An annual agreement between Britain, Argentina, and Chile, limiting the degree of naval patrolling in the area, has worked satisfactorily for a number of years. The danger is that interested Powers like the United States and Russia may establish military bases in the area if no international commission can be negotiated to control it.

PRESS CUTTING.

From *Daily Telegraph* Dated 12th February, 1958

BRITAIN TO PROPOSE ANTARCTIC PACT

RULE BY INTERNATIONAL BODY: NO ARMS BASES

BY OUR DIPLOMATIC STAFF

A plan for the international control of Antarctica is being formulated by the British Government. As Mr. Macmillan said yesterday in Canberra [Report—P9], the Antarctic should be allowed to develop as a free area and not be used for military purposes.

Progress towards drawing up such a plan has been slow, since the question of sovereignty over the sectors into which Antarctica is divided has been of paramount importance. These sectors are claimed by Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Norway.

Both the Argentine and Chile have put in overlapping claims to the British sector. The United States and Russia recognise no sector claims whatever in the Antarctic region.

I understand Britain has already taken the first tentative steps towards securing some support for her proposal. These have mainly been taken within the Commonwealth, but the United States has been kept informed of what is going on.

INTERESTED POWERS Nine or 10 Nations

Broadly speaking, it is the British Government's intention that Antarctica should become subject to the control of an international commission consisting of those Powers which have a direct interest in the region.

Apart from the five sector Powers, these would be the United States, Russia, the Argentine, Chile and possibly South Africa. The commission would not come under the direct control of the United Nations, but would be linked with it in a manner yet to be defined.

It is argued that the Antarctic region is unique and should therefore, come under the control only of those Powers which have shown the greatest interest in it. It would be unwise if the method of control of the region became the subject of international dispute between uninterested nations.

The commission's main objective would undoubtedly be to keep the region free of military installations. Indeed, any project to be carried out by any nation in the region would have to be sanctioned by the commission.

NO EXCLUSION Freedom of Research

The internationalisation of Antarctica under the British plan would by no means contemplate excluding any country or organisation from undertaking scientific research there. The commission would, however, be the means of avoiding duplication of research. At the same time it would have power to initiate projects.

The proposal would entail the renunciation of sovereignty by the present sector Powers. In this Britain's sacrifice would be the greatest, since she has claimed control over, and administered, the Falkland Islands Dependencies, within her sector, since at least 1908, and has strenuously resisted both Argentine and Chilean claims to them.

By taking this forward-looking attitude towards Antarctica, the British Government would be revers-

ing its policy, but, it is claimed, along lines in keeping with modern trends of thought.

There is no doubt in London that neither the United States nor Russia intends to vacate the bases in Antarctica which they occupied at the beginning of the International Geophysical Year. The Russian bases are in the Australian sector, and the American in the British, Australian and New Zealand sectors.

The United States base at the Pole dominates all the sectors. All the bases, both Russian and American, have been costly and all have the appearance of being intended to be permanent.

Since the end of the last war competition between Britain, on the one hand, and the Argentine and Chile on the other, for bases in the British sector, principally in the Grahamland Peninsula, has led to friction and to wasteful duplication of research.

Throughout the International Geophysical Year there has been a tacit agreement not to protest against Argentine and Chilean encroachment on British territory in the region. This "honeymoon" will end with the expiration of the Year.

Accordingly, the present is considered a propitious time for the negotiation of an international régime.

The proposals, as I understand them to exist at present, would entail a minimum of expenditure on the part of the participating nations, since the commission would be kept as small as convenient. Certainly no new massive international body with a large secretariat is contemplated.

ANTARCTICA

Mr. MACMILLAN has done well, at a time when the West needs to show its capacity for initiative, in giving an imaginative lead on the future development of Antarctica. For all the fascinating expeditions now being conducted there to mark the International Geophysical Year, Antarctica has long since moved out of the realm of science fiction into the sphere of world strategy. The possibilities of conflict between prospecting Powers in what is virtually a vacuum of 6m. square miles of inhospitable waste land are obvious: a military base could be set up as easily as a scientific research station. This is the one great area where the established pattern of sovereignty falls to command the normal respect for national boundary lines. It may not matter much that Argentina and Chile should have made overlapping claims to Britain's sector. But the fact that the United States and Soviet Russia refuse to recognise any sector claims whatever in Antarctica cannot be conjured away; and as both these Powers are unlikely to vacate their new bases at the end of the Geophysical Year, the time for a new deal is now.

The idea of allowing Antarctica to be developed as a free area to the exclusion of all military considerations is the only right and sensible one. It is right because Britain, as the country with the greatest claims at stake in this area, has the most to contribute to a solution of this difficult problem. It is also sensible because Britain, by this gesture, gives proof of her willingness to keep abreast of changing world trends even at the cost of time-honoured policy. Given parallel gestures on the part of other interested Powers, Antarctica will no longer be the same place by the time the present Geophysical Year is ended.

PRESS CUTTING.

From

The Times

Dated

12th February, 1958

RIVAL CLAIMS IN ANTARCTICA

NEED FOR WORLD AUTHORITY

BRITISH INITIATIVE

From Our Diplomatic Correspondent

One outcome of Mr. Macmillan's Commonwealth tour has been the greatly increased interest in the establishment of an international régime or authority for Antarctica. This is now urgently required before the interested Powers establish rival military bases in what otherwise might have been called up to now nature's perfect demilitarized zone.

Mr. Nash, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, emphasized the increasingly urgent need to Mr. Macmillan, who has since discussed Mr. Nash's views with the Australian Government. At his final Press conference in Canberra Mr. Macmillan declared that Antarctica should not be allowed to develop into an arena of military bases. Meanwhile, it may be assumed that the United States is being kept informed of the views of the British and Commonwealth Governments.

NO PLAN PREPARED

While, therefore, reports of any cut-and-dried British plan are premature, it is certain that much thought is now being given to this problem in London, and that views will be exchanged and proposals before long, probably, put to the other interested Powers.

The present situation is indeed chaotic and might long since have led to a serious international incident—a Fashoda played out against snow and ice rather than desert sand. For the immediate present there is, however, a form of standstill agreement. The claimants to different sectors of the Antarctic have agreed that other Powers may enter their territory and set up bases there for scientific purposes during the International Geophysical Year—but without prejudice to existing claims to sovereignty.

The countries which claim sectors of the Antarctic are Britain, Australia, New Zealand, France, Norway, Argentina, and Chile. Australia claims the widest sector. The British claim to a sector south of the Falkland Islands Dependencies is based on effective and continuous occupation over a long period since at least 1908. The Argentine and Chilean claims overlap the British claim, and this has been the source of some recurrent friction in recent years.

U.S. AND SOVIET POLICIES

Meanwhile, the United States and Russia have claimed no sector themselves, but do not recognize the claims of others. They have established large-scale and expensive bases which should be vacated at the end of the International Geophysical Year, but are most unlikely to be. The I.G.Y. ends on December 31, 1958, but in practice the Antarctic season runs on until the spring of 1959. The present agreement should therefore come to an end in practice at the end of March, 1959, unless it is prolonged in some way in the meantime.

There seems some prospect, therefore, that the claimants might now drop their differences—if not their claims—and seek agreement with the other interested Powers to establish an international authority. A number of the interested countries clearly are thinking on these lines. The United States itself proposed a condominium for Antarctica in 1948 and was supported by Britain and New Zealand; but the plan was opposed by other Governments. A condominium would mean the sacrifice by claimants of their claim to sovereignty over particular sectors.

POSSIBLE LINK

Present thinking appears to be that an international authority might be linked with the United Nations. Membership would not necessarily disturb the existing claims to territory, though it would have some limiting effect upon sovereignty.

Clearly, there are many difficulties ahead—not the least being that Russia will certainly claim that her establishment of bases for the I.G.Y. entitles her, if nothing else, to membership of any authority; and it is by no means certain that all the other Powers would in that case agree to take part. The present is, however, obviously an appropriate moment to start negotiations, and one brighter spot on the horizon is the fact that the Antarctic would be an exceptionally suitable territory in which the operation of such an agreement could be inspected by, for instance, aerial photography.

France:

The British Ambassador in Paris reports that Mr. Macmillan's remarks at Canberra have aroused little interest in the French press, which is of course at present pre-occupied with the crisis in Franco-Tunisian relations. He adds that Antarctica is in any case not a matter of great public interest in France and that it is unlikely that the French Government will find it necessary to make any public statement. The French official at the Quai d'Orsay with whom the British Embassy discussed the matter, and who was merely acting in the absence of the desk officer dealing with Antarctica, thought it unlikely that the French Government would commit themselves publicly in such a way as to jeopardise in advance any proposals that might emerge from the United Kingdom's discussions with the Commonwealth Governments concerned.

Copy to Washington.

As reported in A. 12/7 of the 12/11/57 report.

Attached are some cuttings from The Times and the Daily Telegraph reporting that the British Government are considering proposals for the establishment of an international regime for Antarctica.

Minister.

As reported in my previous statement, it was not the intention to give any publicity to these proposals until after the Antarctic Committee. The Minister's statement to Mr. Macmillan's Canberra statement was, in the words of Sir Robert Kilbride during an informal conversation I had with him following my visit to London, that "I have been asked to make a statement on the subject of Antarctica". I have since spoken to Mr. Jones of the Commonwealth Relations Office, who accompanied Mr. Macmillan on his visit. Mr. Jones stated that Mr. Macmillan's statement was made in reply to a specific query regarding the proposals in very general and unqualified terms. It was apparently the broad substance of what was said by the press - and by the newspapers well-informed Daily Telegraph correspondent in particular - which got the best of the alleged and responsible French explanation to Ministers with interests in Antarctica.

IdV/AD/AG

We have received from the Foreign Office the following information about the reactions of those countries

concerned:

The local press carried full reports of the alleged British "plan" for Antarctica, but is reasonably and equitably toned. There was a feeling of surprise that the plan involved the renunciation of claims to sovereignty in the area mentioned by the speaker concerned. The statement by the speaker concerned is taken that the plan does not and will never be opposed to internationalization which would transfer the territorial sovereignty of Antarctica over an integral part of our territory" also received some publicity.

Nothing more

In the knowledge of...

States Government "had been kept informed", and this appeared to satisfy the Foreign Minister.

On 14th February the Chilean press published a statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding the British Ambassador's visit to him. The statement concluded by saying that Chilean policy towards Antarctica had been made abundantly clear on numerous occasions and that there would be no modifications in it. Apparently, however, it was a spokesman and not the Minister himself who said this, and it did not necessarily rank as an official announcement.

A few days later, the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs was given the assurance by the British Embassy that the British Government was not contemplating the renunciation of sovereignty by anyone, but rather the freezing of the present position.

This was followed on 18th February by a further statement by the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs which emphasised that:

- "(a) Chilean Antarctic territory is included in the security zone of the Rio Treaty;
- (b) The Chilean Government cannot but reject any proposition which will involve internationalisation or condominium of any part of its national territory;
- (c) The Chilean Government is prepared to consider closer understanding to assure the continuity of scientific collaboration started in the International Geophysical Year; and
- (d) The idea contained in the recent British declaration of continuing such collaboration and suspending armed demonstrations, is supported by Chile, which has always been in favour of annual Antarctic declarations exchanged between Chile, Argentina and the United Kingdom."

So far as the continuation of international scientific co-operation is concerned, the British Ambassador reports that Chilean thinking is on the lines of excluding Russia but including the United States.

Norway:

The British Embassy in Oslo explained the position to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The British Ambassador reports that the Ministry understood the United Kingdom's viewpoint and were not disposed to prejudge the Antarctica question on the basis of press reports. He adds that one Oslo newspaper carried a report on 27th January rejecting the basis of Mr. Macmillan's talks with the New Zealand and Australian Governments regarding the establishment of an international regime. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented at the time that the Norwegian Government had received no official information about such a move, but would naturally study any proposals when these were received; and in the meantime Norway saw no reason to modify her existing claims to sovereignty over her Antarctic territories.

/France

Acting on instructions, the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires raised the matter on 13th February with the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs. As the Argentine press had assumed from the London reports that the "British plan" postulated a surrender of sovereignty claims, the Ambassador emphasised that tentative discussions were on the basis of an abeyance (in Spanish "a suspension") of sovereignty. This is a key point in Argentina where there is an obsession with "sovereignty".

The Minister received the Ambassador's remarks in a friendly spirit, and although his reaction was reserved, he seemed to accept the importance of not prejudicing the chances of an eventual international solution. The Minister asked the Ambassador whether the United Kingdom's ideas applied to the Falkland Islands, but he was not surprised when the latter explained that they were not included in the Antarctic and that their situation was totally different.

The Minister told the Ambassador that, in view of all the publicity, the Argentine Government would have to put out a short statement which would rehearse Argentina's "classical" position in regard to "the Malvinas and all the other territories concerned". It would refer to the Argentine Government's strong support of non-militarisation of the Antarctic area (he preferred not to talk of demilitarisation, which implied that there were already military bases). The Minister agreed with the Ambassador's suggestion that the statement might also come out in favour of continued international scientific collaboration after the end of the geophysical year.

In the event, the statement issued by the Argentine Government on 15th February was in the following terms:

"As regards the possible internationalisation of the Antarctic announced at Canberra by the British Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, the Argentine Republic maintains its classical position of sustaining its rights over the territories and seas included within the limits that define our sovereignty.

"With regard to collaboration for the advance of science which has characterised the international geophysical year shortly to end, Argentina will give her support to all the nations that have shown interest therein. Following the pacific line of conduct traditional in our history, we find the idea of 'not militarising' the Antarctic very appropriate."

Chile:

The British Ambassador in Santiago made a similar approach simultaneously to the Chilean Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs told the Ambassador that he fully appreciated the propriety of consultations between the Commonwealth countries, but he expressed himself as shocked to see in the press that there also had been discussion with the United States Government. He said that the Chilean Ambassador in Washington had been instructed to enquire. The British Ambassador replied that the United

/States

AIRMAIL

Confidential

20th February, 1958.

THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Antarctica

My despatch P.S.16/2 of the 4th February refers.

Attached are press cuttings from The Times and the Daily Telegraph concerning the reports that the British Government are considering proposals for the establishment of an international regime for Antarctica.

As reported in my previous despatch, it was not the intention to give any publicity to these proposals until after the Argentine elections. The immediate reaction to Mr. Macmillan's Canberra statement was, in the words of Sir Gilbert Leithwaite during an informal conversation I had with him on the following day, that "there seems to have been a good deal too much free talk". I have since spoken to Mr. James of the Commonwealth Relations Office, who accompanied Mr. Macmillan on his tour; Mr. James states that Mr. Macmillan's statement was made in reply to a specific press question and was phrased in very general and cautious terms. It was apparently the broad constructions put upon it by the press - and by the remarkably well-informed Daily Telegraph correspondent in particular - which set the cat amongst the pigeons and necessitated further explanation to Governments with interests in Antarctica.

We have received from the Foreign Office the following information about the reactions of these countries:

Argentina:

The local press carried full reports of the alleged British "plan" for Antarctica, but in reasonable and moderate terms. There was a tendency to assume that the plan involved the renunciation of claims to sovereignty in the areas maintained by the countries concerned. The statement by the Argentine Ambassador in London that "we have been and will always be opposed to internationalisation which would impair the absolute sovereignty of Argentina over an integral part of her territory" also received some publicity.

/Acting

Die Hoë Kommissaris *W.M. 1972*

PRESS CUTTING.

From *Manchester Guardian* Dated 22nd February, 1958

Antarctica

Mr Nash, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, does well to keep hammering home his point that some form of international regime should be set up for Antarctica as soon as possible. National claims which, by tacit consent, have been kept in the background during the International Geophysical Year may well be raised with added zeal before long. As the British Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition has shown, the continent is nothing like the forbidding mass we used to think it only a short time ago, and the bases which have been maintained there winter and summer during the I.G.Y. prove that with modern equipment it is possible to live and work in the Antarctic all the year round. Indeed, the knowledge gained by all these expeditions, knowledge which is readily available to all, is likely to encourage all those who were thinking of the possibility of establishing military bases in the area or hoped to discover valuable deposits of uranium, oil, coal, and other products in territory they claimed. Internationalisation seems the only effective answer to the problem of regulating future activities in Antarctica. It was first proposed in 1939, and on more recent occasions a United Nations trusteeship has been suggested. In 1947 the United Kingdom proposed submitting her dispute with either Argentina or Chile to the International Court of Justice, but no reference to the court has been possible. The General Assembly of the United Nations could, by virtue of its powers, seek an advisory opinion from the court on this vexed problem. Since, however, the International Council of Scientific Unions is preparing to extend the I.G.Y. programme relating to the establishment of Antarctic bases the time is opportune for an international conference on the broader issue of state claims to the whole of Antarctica.

Activity in the South Polar regions began in 1775, when Captain Cook landed on and formally annexed South Georgia in the name of George III. Since then various discoveries and explorations have led to many States making claims to sovereignty over parts of the continent. Between 1906 and 1939 the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Norway, and France all made claims as a result of their discoveries and activities in various sectors of the Antarctic. These sectors have been notionally drawn to denote the boundaries of any State, since they possess a unique and convenient geographical relationship with the claimant States' discoveries. Although the sector principle expresses an indifference to symbolic or other acts of discovery and occupation, it is related to the activities of the particular State in that area. These countries, which have found a place for themselves in Antarctica by virtue of discovery and occupation, accept each other's claims, but their views are far from being generally recognised. The most contested claims are those involving the United Kingdom and the republics of Argentina and Chile. The Soviet Union also contests the Norwegian claims to one of the islands and since 1947 has shown active interest in establishing other claims. Until that time only a Russian admiral, Von Bellingshausen had made any discoveries. When the United States proposed an international conference in 1949 the Soviet Union asserted that it was entitled to a voice at any such conference. The United States, though entitled to credit for discovering the most inaccessible and hitherto unclaimed sector through Byrd and Lincoln Ellsworth, so far have not staked any claim to the territory and have not recognised any made by others. Japan, who had ambitions in the area between the wars, renounced any claims she might have had by Article 2 (E) of the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951.

Nazi Germany was similarly active; in the post-war period Germany has shown no signs of interest.

The most immediate problem involves the South American challenge over the Falkland Island Dependencies. Unpleasant incidents have occurred in that area from time to time; in 1952 an Argentine party fired on a British expedition landing at Hope Bay. Such actions could be a foretaste of what may happen all over Antarctica if no form of international control is accepted. These Argentine and Chilean claims cannot be based on discovery, for neither has made any discoveries and neither, with minor exceptions, had displayed any State activity before the Second World War. Their claims are based on alleged rights of inheritance from Spain and on the geographical factor in terms of contiguity with the Graham Land Peninsular, which juts northwards towards the South American coast. The contiguity and continuity theory (as it is known) is generally discredited in international law as merely a paper assertion. The only basis to sovereignty claims rests upon discovery and occupation. As the United States Secretary of State Hughes declared in 1924 in a well-known statement:

Discovery of lands unknown to civilisation even when coupled with a formal taking of possession does not support a valid claim of sovereignty unless the discovery is followed by an actual settlement of the discovered country. . . .

The more general statement of the rule of law is that there must be some actual exercise or display of sovereign authority which might be less than actual settlement. In the Eastern Greenland case of 1933, the Permanent Court of International Justice considered this question of occupation. Denmark was held to have possessed sovereignty over a disputed area of Greenland during long periods when there were no settlements at all and later when some of the settlements had been established by Norwegians over whom Denmark did not exercise any local administration. In spite of the difficulty of drawing general conclusions—certain Norwegian Ministers had made declarations which were held to be binding obligations—the Court recognised assertions of authority that were unsupported by the exercise of actual administrative control or occupation.