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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES.
DEPARTEMENT VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.

GEHEIM
SECRET

FILE No. 455 S.G.
LÊER No.

SUBJECT South African Legation of Australia Antarctic
ONDERWERP General

FILE No. 455 S.G.

LÊER No.

- (1) Japanese whaling in Antarctic
- (2) Visit of Research Ships whaling grounds.

REFERENCES:
VERWYSINGS:

TERMINAAL STAATSARCHIEF
BUIEGEBOU
BROMKODE HEN
WARTONN. 2491

- (b) DR. ROBERTS said that the Foreign Office would be prepared to consider Dr. Fuchs' plan sympathetically, but the question must be considered in the light of the proposed approach to Ministers on the general problem of the U.K. position in the Antarctic.
- (c) MR. MORRIS agreed with Dr. Roberts. He said that the expedition would serve to enhance Commonwealth prestige and to increase our activities without affecting the legal position in the Antarctic. In short, it appeared to have scientific value, prestige value and Commonwealth advantages.
- (d) MR. PERKINS said that the Admiralty would want to know much fuller details before their support could be promised.
- (e) MR. O'GRADY said that the Air Ministry saw no great advantages per se in the proposal to use air support, but they could consider supporting the expedition if other Departments could make out a strong enough case on political grounds.
- (f) MR. ROBINSON said that the Canadian Government would be interested, but it was almost certain that they would not wish to contribute; Canada was too remote from the scene of activities and had other commitments in the Arctic.
- (g) MR. JOCKEL said that he could not answer for his Government without further reference. He was sure they would want to know more details. He pointed out that the paper circulated as P(54)3 did not represent the views of his Government.
- (h) MR. BECKER said that his Government were interested in the meteorological possibilities of the expedition. He would ask the Secretary to circulate a note of some detailed points they had raised.

The Committee agreed the following Conclusion and instructed the Secretary to inform Dr. Fuchs accordingly:

The Committee considered a proposal by Dr. V.E. Fuchs for a trans-Antarctic journey and took note of the fact that this had already received the commendation and support of the Royal Geographical Society, the Scott Polar Research Institute and the Falkland Islands Dependencies Scientific Committee. The Committee was further impressed with the scientific value and political and prestige advantages of such an undertaking to the Commonwealth. The Committee recommended that the proposal should now be pursued by the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office, in consultation with other interested Departments as necessary, so that it might be considered in the context of the approach to Ministers on the general question of Antarctic activities which, the Committee understood, was already under consideration. The Committee considered that an approach to Commonwealth Governments for support should be deferred until the U.K. Government's attitude was ascertained.

The Committee further noted that at least a year was required to mount the expedition and that it was therefore important, if the Expedition was to start in the autumn of 1955, that decisions should be reached at an early date and, if possible, this autumn.

Perre

- (1) The estimated cost of £200,000 did not include the cost of air and naval support, which it was hoped would form part of the U.K. contribution. It did however include the expedition ship.
- (ii) It was difficult at present to provide a further breakdown of the £200,000.
- (iii) Similarly, it was difficult to estimate how much would be required from Governments in kind and how much in cash. The accuracy of the estimate depended on what the expedition was required to do and this in turn depended on how much support was forthcoming.
- (iv) It was possible that £100,000 could be raised from private sources, but this was contingent on Governments giving a lead.
- (v) It was hoped that this would be a joint Commonwealth expedition. New Zealand might contribute towards the base to be set up in the Ross Dependency which, if maintained, would be of value in the Geophysical Year. Australia had her own commitments in the Antarctic, but the journey through her sector would add something to the knowledge of this area. South Africa might co-operate on the scientific and, especially, meteorological side.
- (vi) The "Kista Dan" would not necessarily be required; other ships could be used.

THE CHAIRMAN thanked Sir John Slessor and Dr. Fuchs for the account that they had given of their proposals. Members would now wish to discuss the matter in Committee.

When the Committee resumed its discussions, THE CHAIRMAN said that the Committee now had to decide whether Dr. Fuchs' plan should be recommended in principle and, if so, how it could best be put to Governments. He assumed, and the Committee agreed, that as a result of the advice tendered by experts the Committee no longer wished to consider Mr. Carse's plan. If it was agreed that a trans-Antarctic expedition was desirable and would prove of scientific and political value, it was now only necessary to decide whether Dr. Fuchs' plan met the bill.

In discussion, the following points were made:

- (a) The Committee could reach a decision in principle, it being understood that members, by so doing, were not necessarily committing their respective Departments to support such a decision.

MINUTES OF MEETING OF POLAR COMMITTEE,
13TH MAY, 1954.

PROPOSALS FOR A TRANS-ANTARCTIC EXPEDITION.

(Previous reference: P(53) 2nd meeting,
Minute 2).

Dr. FUCHS briefly sketched the two alternative routes that he had originally proposed (P(53)15). Since then, there had been a change of plan (P(54)19) and the proposal to use air support made the Stonington Island route more feasible and more attractive politically. It was proposed that flying-boats should be used moving southward from Deception Island and often operating at extreme range; this would mean, in addition, ships, a tanker, maintenance personnel, as well as the expedition ship all operating in the area where Argentina and Chile had set up bases. Ski-equipped aircraft would also be used for establishing land bases. The change of plan would mean slight alterations in the scientific programme, but the plan for the second half of the journey remained unaltered. The expedition would take altogether 18 months, starting in the autumn of 1955 and finishing early in 1957. Dr. Fuchs stressed the urgency of taking a decision; it was believed that an American expedition was planned for 1957 or earlier and, in addition, he required at least a year to make his preparations. The estimated cost was now £200,000, the increase being accounted for partly by the greater distance now involved. Private sources would no doubt cover some of the cost, and the Royal Geographical Society had already contributed, but it was clear that the expedition must have support from Governments. Such support would in turn encourage private contributors. An unofficial Working Party had been set up under the Chairmanship of Sir John Slessor to assist Dr. Fuchs and other bodies would have to be set up later to consider financial and scientific aspects in fuller detail.

Some discussion ensued on the role of the Polar Committee and its competence to approve and to recommend such an expedition to Governments. MR. WORDIE and DR. ROBERTS cited previous occasions on which the Polar Committee had recommended expeditions to Governments for support and had even approached the Treasury direct through the Chairman. THE CHAIRMAN agreed that precedents showed that the Committee was competent to make recommendations; presumably the Colonial Office would make the necessary approach to the U.K. Treasury for support and Commonwealth representatives on the Committee would take the matter up with their Governments. But Governments like to know exactly what they were supporting; much fuller details would be required before they could reach decisions and it was probable that Governments would want to be represented on any controlling body that was set up. As a preliminary it might be necessary for a sub-committee of the Polar Committee to go into further details with Dr. Fuchs. It appeared that the primary objective of the expedition was political; if this was so, it was important that it should not fail.

In reply to questions, DR. FUCHS made the following additional points:-

- (c) The use of air support makes the STONINGTON ISLAND plan practical and disposes of any concern about the difficulty of finding a safe and sheltered anchorage at the head of the WEDDELL SEA.
- (d) Air support reduces the time required for the STONINGTON ISLAND plan by one year.
- (e) Should it prove impossible to reach STONINGTON ISLAND by ship in the first season the necessary depots could still be laid by air from DECEPTION ISLAND and the ARGENTINE ISLANDS (the land reception party would be put down by Beaver ski-plane). This ensures that the expedition will not be baulked by a bad ice season.

9. It is suggested that if the R.A.F. take part in the expedition as envisaged there would be the following advantages to the Air Force:

- (a) Training in long distance flying and operations over little known areas of sea and land.
- (b) Experience in aerial photography for mapping.
- (c) Experience of flying and maintenance under polar conditions.
- (d) Considerable publicity which could be used to encourage recruiting.

Finance.

10. The change from the VAHSEL BAY to STONINGTON ISLAND plan will raise the general cost to approximately £200,000. The greater part of this increase will be due to the necessary provision of a ski-fitted Beaver aeroplane.

11. It is intended that as much financial support as possible shall come from private sources including industry, press rights and book rights. At present it is too soon to say what these sources may provide, but preliminary negotiations indicate that a pre requisite is official approval of the project.

12. It is considered that it will also be necessary to ask Governments to provide financial assistance, but the amount of money involved will depend upon the provision in kind of ships, base installations, equipment and other material.

13. It is emphasised that the estimated sum is to cover costs both at STONINGTON ISLAND and at McMURDO SOUND.

Conclusion.

14. It is intended that this should be a joint Commonwealth Expedition through Commonwealth territories. It is hoped that all Governments with polar commitments and experience will take part. The expression of these common interests in such a major venture should do much to show the world that the countries of the Commonwealth have the will to study, work and develop the polar regions.

Progress of Organisation.

1. The Royal Geographical Society and the Falkland Islands Dependencies Scientific Committee have both approved the objects of the proposed expedition. In addition the Royal Geographical Society have already granted £1,000 towards the costs.
2. Steps have been taken to set up a General Committee to further the organisation of the expedition. Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor has agreed to be Chairman of this committee and acceptances have been received from the other individuals invited.
3. It is intended that an Executive Committee and a Scientific Committee shall be formed, but this has not yet been done. In addition either a Finance Committee or trustees will be appointed to handle the finances of the expedition.
4. Efforts are already being made to find a suitable individual (preferably a service officer) to handle the administration and service liaison aspects.
5. It has not seemed suitable to produce a more detailed scientific plan for general circulation until it is possible to have the advice of the Scientific Committee which has yet to be formed.

Modification of Original Plans.

6. The original study of the problem showed that for a number of reasons the most practical route was that beginning at VAHSEL BAY in the WEDDELL SEA as opposed to the route starting from STONINGTON ISLAND. If large scale air support became available the objections to the STONINGTON ISLAND route would be removed.
7. Preliminary discussions with the Air Ministry have shown that there is some possibility that such air support could be provided by the Royal Air Force. While the Air Ministry are as yet in no way committed they have asked for an appreciation of the requirements. It is hoped that the Royal Navy may be persuaded to provide some support for the air operations.
8. The reasons for this proposed alteration of the original plans are as follows:
 - (a) There would be political advantages in starting from Graham Land and in the operation of a number of aircraft in the Dependencies together with the necessary supporting ships - (aircraft Depot Ship, fuel tanker, and expedition ship).
 - (b) The aircraft would not only support the expedition's ground operations but would carry out air photography of the FALKLAND ISLANDS, the SOUTH SHETLANDS and the west coast of GRAHAM LAND. This photography would make it possible to compile maps of these areas which have long been required for a variety of purposes.

P(54)6. NOTE ON MEETING OF ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY HELD TO CONSIDER PLANS FOR A TRANS-ANTARCTIC JOURNEY SUBMITTED BY DR. V.E. FUCHS.

Dr. Fuchs' plans were given preliminary consideration by the Royal Geographical Society on January 14th, when a Sub-Committee of Antarctic experts and others concerned was asked to report. The Committee reported to the Council on the 2nd February. The following resolution of the Sub-Committee was adopted by the Council:

"The Sub-Committee consider that the plan of the proposed Trans-Antarctic journey is a reasonable one produced by an Antarctic explorer of considerable experience and one well worth attempting. The Sub-Committee recommend that the project should be warmly encouraged by the Royal Geographical Society on grounds of geographical exploration apart from other considerations".

Following this, the Council took note that Dr. Fuchs would be consulting the Royal Society in due course in regard to the scientific aspects of the plan.

Here

accurate height determinations in the time available. It was also considered that any measurement of precipitation in the area was not really feasible. Dr. Bertram pointed out that the two plans differed completely in their approach to the problem. Mr. Kirwan emphasised that whilst the plan prepared by Dr. Fuchs was in all ways scientific, that of Mr. Carse was not and Dr. Roberts agreed that Mr. Carse's plan was not intended to be scientific in its approach.

The following motion was formally proposed by Mr. Kirwan - that the Committee consider the plan submitted by Dr. Fuchs as one of considerable scientific importance on its own merits and without reference to its comparative value in relation to other antarctic projects. The motion was seconded by the Bishop of Portsmouth and carried unanimously. Regarding the leadership of either or any expedition, the Committee did not feel itself qualified to comment because the plans were in so early a stage that neither sponsoring authority nor source of funds had yet emerged.

Mr. Kirwan suggested the need for a Steering Committee to be formed immediately on the receipt of a reasonable assurance that the necessary finance was available, and that representatives of Australia and New Zealand should be invited to sit on this Committee.

It was further proposed by the Bishop of Portsmouth and seconded by Dr. Bertram that the Committee, having regard to the possibility of the expedition departing in October, 1955, considered it was essential that at least one year's preparation should be made available to the leader after the receipt of the necessary financial backing; this proposal was carried unanimously. It was also considered that when the Steering Committee was formed they should at an early date consider the estimates provided by Dr. Fuchs accepting the figures therein as a useful basis for planning.

Berke

P(54)4. MINUTES OF MEETING OF FALKLAND
ISLANDS DEPENDENCIES SURVEY SCIENTI-
FIC COMMISSION.

PROPOSED COMMONWEALTH TRANSANTARCTIC
JOURNEY.

The Chairman in introducing the subject stated that the Committee had been asked by the Polar Committee to comment on the scientific aspects of such a journey. He emphasised that the Committee were considering both plans not as the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey Scientific Committee as such, but as a suitable body of Antarctic experts capable of giving advice on the scientific value of such a project. There was no question of the project as a whole being included as an integral part of the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey. At the request of the Chairman Dr. Fuchs introduced his plan briefly indicating the major points of interest. The Chairman then asked Dr. Roberts to introduce the plans submitted by Mr. Duncan Carse. Dr. Roberts explained that the plan was essentially the same as that put forward by Dr. Fuchs with the exception that, whereas Dr. Fuchs' plan was essentially a scientific one Dr. Carse's was obviously not, although he intended to include scientists in his party.

At the request of the Chairman, Dr. Fuchs left the meeting while his proposal was discussed. The Committee was then asked to consider the scientific value of a trans-continental journey and after much discussion the following points emerged.

- (i) Seismology. It was agreed that in the trans-continental journey following one of the proposed routes, any seismic soundings on the inland ice would be of great scientific value.
- (ii) Meteorological. It was agreed that surface meteorological observations taken during such a journey would be interesting in as much as they would be the first observations taken in an unknown area, but it would hardly be practicable to attempt the more valuable upper air observations in the course of such a journey. The value of the upper air observations proposed for Depot 300 would be great and if it were possible to associate these with a simultaneous programme of upper air observations at MacMurdo Sound, then the value would be increased. It was emphasised by Mr. Absalom that the longer the period of the upper air observations from one point, the greater in far more than a proportionate degree, their value; if possible, five months should be regarded as the minimum period.
- (iii) Geology. It was agreed that any geological observations which might be possible during the journey would be of especial interest as the region was completely unknown geologically.
- (iv) General. It was agreed that the geographical and glaciological results which might accrue from such a journey would be of value. Doubts were expressed as to the value of gravimetric observations in view of the probable inability of the party being able to obtain

To establish this party at Depot 300 a second journey will be made using five vehicles of which two will be from those reserved for the main journey in the following summer. These two will remain at the depot where they will be maintained by the meteorological party. Their presence at the depot represents a safety factor for the men stationed there.

The three general purpose weasels will return to the base after delivering the living hut and stores for the depot party.

During June and July there will be no travel, but according to conditions seismic sounding over the route to Depot 300 will begin in August or September. The party carrying out this work will relieve the depot meteorological party.

Early in October two dog teams leave the base for Depot 300.

Start of Main Journey.

The main journey will begin in early November. Fuel consumption and replenishment during the whole journey is shown diagrammatically in Appendix B. The first 300 miles should be covered quickly because the seismic work on this stretch will have been completed and the dog teams will be at Depot 300 by the time the weasel party arrive. Six "new" vehicles will then be at Depot 300 together with two dog teams and all eight men.

The dog teams are regarded as a safety factor in the event of weasel trouble or difficult terrain requiring dogs to break the trail. The teams will travel light, carrying about 300 lbs. of dog food each. One hundred miles beyond Depot 300 the fuel already used by the six weasels will be equivalent to the total weight of two sledges, two teams and 1000 lbs. dog food. Arrangements could therefore be made to carry the dogs and sledges during a part of each day, or as necessary, in order to speed travel.

Four hundred miles from Depot 300 and 100 miles before reaching the Pole two weasels will be abandoned. This will set free over 2 tons of fuel for the remaining four vehicles. Their total range from this point will then be 1150 miles. This is 150 miles further than the objective Ross Island or 500 miles further than the depot to be established in the vicinity of Mt. Albert Markham (see page 8).

For a distance of 100 miles after the two weasels have been abandoned the dog team will again be committed to marching, since the weasel loads will be at their maximum until fuel is consumed.

In emergency two more weasels could be abandoned at any time after passing the Pole and to provide an increased mileage safety factor. This is shown in Appendix B at mile 1200. It has, however, to be remembered that the risks due to breakdown would increase with only two vehicles, especially since they would have already travelled 1200 miles.

In the case of (a) there would be no need for a ship to relieve the base in the following year - a great economy. But in this case sufficient stores must be left to maintain the party for a second winter in case unforeseen events force them to abandon the main journey and retreat to this base.

In the case of (b) the ship must return in the following year to pick up the local party. Should this prove impossible an emergency escape route exists via the head of the Weddell Sea to Stonington Island, but such a journey could require air support from Stonington Island. This infers the re-establishment of a British base on that island, should it become necessary to use this escape route. In view of this possibility and on the grounds of economy in ship expenses the proposal at (a) will alone be considered.

Establishment of the Base at Vahsel Bay.

On the arrival of the ship in the vicinity of Vahsel Bay during January a light aeroplane (? Auster float fitted) carried ready assembled* on deck will reconnoitre for a suitable landing place. The site should be away from the area of the active glaciers entering Vahsel Bay. This air reconnaissance will also establish that there is access from the base site to the inland ice.

While rapid unloading of stores and equipment is in progress further flights and the taking of oblique air photographs will pave the way for the first ground reconnaissance party.

During the establishment of the base the ship will be required to stand by (at least until the roof of the hut is complete), but it should be possible for her to depart within seven to ten days, taking with her the reconnaissance aircraft.

Programme at Vahsel Bay base (see time table on page 7).

Once the base has been established the first duty of the land party will be to reconnoitre by dog sledge a safe route for the weasels onto the inland ice. Once this has been accomplished the way will be clear for a depot laying weasel party.

This depot will be laid by three weasels at a distance of 300 miles in a direct line towards the Pole. The depot is marked as "Depot 300" on the map and on Appendix B. The weasels used for this purpose will be those already used for landing stores, not the six required for the main journey which must be retained in "new" condition for that purpose alone. Ultimately these three depot laying vehicles will provide a reserve of replacements or spares for the final journey.

Depot 300 is primarily to provide stores for the trans-continental journey but it is also proposed to establish a hut with essentials for a minimum of two men to winter at the depot. This will enable meteorological records to be maintained at a high latitude, and presumably a high altitude, for a period of approximately six months. A particular advantage will be that this essential depot will not be lost beneath the snow during winter, an event which would prejudice the success of the whole venture.

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* A second plane will be carried crated.

VAHSEL BAY PLAN.

The ice conditions in the Weddell Sea govern the accessibility of the Vahsel Bay region, but there is every likelihood of a modern ice ship being able to reach the area.

From a study of the voyages of Filchner (1912) and Shackleton (1914) it seems certain that open water is to be expected in January - February between the ice cliffs of the glacier covered coast of Coats Land and the pack ice of the Weddell Sea. (See plate figs.(a) and (b) after Filchner).

More recently similar conditions were encountered by the Norwegian - British-Swedish Expedition in 1950, 1951 and 1952. Each year in January - February clear water was found near the coast of the continent and adjacent to the north eastern approaches to the Weddell Sea. The prevalence of these conditions appears to be due to the constant off-shore winds.

The power and design of modern ice ships together with modern knowledge of ice navigation make the problem of the Weddell Sea far simpler than in the early part of the century.

It is worth while remarking that the situation is comparable to that in East Greenland where ships can safely navigate year after year in the zone of "land-water" once they have penetrated the outer belt of pack-ice.

Another problem may be the establishment of a base on the ice shelf or the continental ice sheet since those are generally bounded by precipitous ice cliffs. It was a precipitous ice shelf face which defeated Filchner in 1912, but he was then ignorant of the local conditions. The journey now proposed will be carried out by means of mechanical transport which will provide considerably more latitude in the choice of a landing place since it removes the necessity to set up the base at the extreme southern point attainable.

Filchner and his astronomer Porzybyllok both describe the conditions encountered. At the time large areas of the ice shelf were already detached and in process of moving northward. Thus the lower declivities in the ice cliffs, (one of those was used by the expedition) which had formed over a period, were already broken away and on the move leaving new almost unscalable cliffs to be negotiated. Doubtless the northward movement of the glaciers entering Vahsel Bay was responsible for this break up of the ice shelf. For this reason it will be necessary to look for a landing place somewhat removed from Vahsel Bay itself. The base will, if possible be established on solid land or the inland ice which rests upon it, rather than on the ice shelf.

If the Vahsel Bay area is selected as the starting point the base to be built there could be occupied:

- (a) Solely by the party which is to make the continental crossing.

or

- (b) By the continental party together with additional personnel who would work in Coats Land and at the head of the Weddell Sea.

DISCUSSION OF ROUTE (WEDDELL SEA TO ROSS SEA or vice versa.)

In considering whether the journey should be made from the Weddell Sea to the Ross Sea or vice versa the following factors are relevant:

- (a) The accessibility of the inland ice sheet by weasel from the coast.
- (b) The accessibility by ship of the coast reached at the end of the journey.
- (c) Tracked vehicles should not be risked in heavily crevassed areas.
- (d) At the end of the journey the nature of the descent to the coast is of little importance since the vehicles can be abandoned and the party continue on foot or by dog sledge.

In the Ross Sea area the known routes to the inland ice are via crevassed glaciers which in view of (a) and (c) above make it unsuitable as a starting point. On the other hand it is known that ships can be certain of reaching the coast in the summer. Therefore, on the counts of (b) and (d) the Ross Sea area is suitable for the establishment of a base to receive the party at the end of the journey.

In the WEDDELL SEA area the inland ice sheet is known to descend to a low level near the coast and it seems unlikely that there is more than a narrow belt of crevasses between the coastal ice cliffs and the inland ice. Therefore, on counts (a) and (c) the area is suitable as a starting point.

For the above reasons it is considered that the journey should be made from the Weddell Sea area to the Ross Sea. Therefore, only starting points within the Falkland Islands Dependencies will be considered.

Possible Starting points.

There are two possible starting points within the Falkland Islands Dependencies which are accessible by ship.

- (a) Vahsel Bay area in South Coats Land.
- (b) Stonington Island in southern Graham Land.

The routes beginning at these two points meet at the Pole and thence onwards are identical in course and transport requirements.

Consideration has been given to the possibility of attempting a landing at Vahsel Bay in the first instance and if unsuccessful moving on to Stonington Island in the same year. It seems that this would not be practical because the best period for open water is February at both points. Furthermore, as will be seen later, much of the financial saving of the Vahsel Bay plan would be sacrificed by the need to carry additional aircraft, stores and personnel required for the Stonington plan.

Plans involving these two starting points are now considered separately.

Beyond the POLE the route through Victoria Land (Australian Antarctic Territory) will pass over unexplored areas and will delimit the western margin of the Victoria Land mountains. The eastern limits of these mountains are known from the work of the Scott and Shackleton expeditions.

(b) Seismic Sounding of the polar ice sheet.

An important object of the journey will be seismic sounding of the ice from coast to coast. The profile so provided will reveal the nature of the polar ice sheet. The measurement of its depth and volume is pertinent to problems of world wide significance. These include climatic changes past and present; eustatic changes (world wide changes of sea level), isostatic movements (local elevation and depression of the earth's crust); and the relation between glaciation, sea temperature and the biological balance of the Southern Ocean*.

(c) Gravimetric work.

The lack of gravity stations in the Antarctic leaves a gap in the world wide network of stations now being established. It is planned to make pendulum observations at the Weddell Sea base and at the Ross Island base. Between these two stations a comparative series of observations will be made by gravimeter during the trans-continental journey.

(d) Geology.

Geological work will depend upon the amount of rock which is exposed and accessible. The acquisition of geological knowledge from the unknown area to be crossed is of particular importance since it lies between the known areas of Graham Land, which is tectonically and petrologically an extension of the Andean Chain, and Victoria Land with its older rocks and block-faulted character.

(e) Meteorology.

The upper air winds and temperatures in the interior of the continent are unknown. Observations will be a major contribution in the southern hemisphere. For this reason an advanced meteorological station will be established 300 miles south of the main base. The position will depend upon which of the alternative routes is finally adopted. In addition regular surface observations will be made throughout the main journey. These will be of value since they will be related to simultaneous observations made at numerous circumpolar meteorological stations maintained by the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Argentina and Chile.

In due course a committee will be formed to examine with experts the details of this proposed scientific programme which can be modified in accordance with their recommendations.

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* For details of this suggestion see Appendix A.

^ All distances given in this paper are in statute miles.

TRANS-ANTARCTIC JOURNEY.

Shackleton's attempt to make a trans-antarctic journey in 1914 was frustrated by the loss of his ship the "Endurance". Since that time such a journey has been constantly in the minds of polar travellers. Today the interest of many nations in the Antarctic brings competition into the field. For varying reasons it may be expected that some nation (e.g. United States, Argentina, Chile, France) will initiate such a venture. Success will bring world-wide prestige.

A trans-continental journey made wholly within territory claimed by the British Commonwealth, and with an exploratory and scientific programme as indicated below, would gain prestige and at the same time contribute to the solidarity of Commonwealth interests. At the present time we have the men and the experience required to make certain of success. Other nations competing in the Antarctic are not yet in so favourable a position to make a journey of comparable importance. Now, therefore, is the time to seize the opportunity.

ASSUMPTIONS.

In preparing these plans the following assumptions have been made:

- (a) The planned route must begin and end in the Falklands Islands Dependencies and the Ross Dependency.
- (b) The route must include the POLE area.
- (c) Assistance may be expected from the Commonwealth and from the services.
- (d) The personnel will be selected from the nations taking part.
- (e) The supply conditions must be sufficiently flexible to ensure that the safety factor remains high.
- (f) The importance of the scientific results achieved must be sufficiently great to justify the combined Commonwealth effort involved.

SCIENTIFIC OBJECTS.

The journey will combine geographical exploration with scientific studies given special prominence. The main headings under which the work may be considered are:

(a) Geographical

The crossing of an entirely unknown area between the head of the WEDDELL SEA and the POLE. The coastal mountains WEST of the WEDDELL SEA trend towards the SOUTH WEST, but their extent in that direction remains unknown. According to the location selected for the base, a survey of one or other of these areas will be accomplished. The trans-continental journey will also show whether the polar plateau is or is not interrupted by mountain ranges south of lat. 80°S.

5. Subject to the views of the Union Government and the other Commonwealth Governments concerned, the United Kingdom authorities would propose to conduct a fuller examination of the organisation and financial implications of the project in order that the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth Governments interested may be in a position to take a final decision. The United Kingdom authorities are advised that for the expedition to have a maximum effect on the consolidation of their position it should begin in the Antarctic season 1955-6. This means that detailed planning should begin not later than September this year. It would therefore be a great help if the Union Government could indicate their views on the question of a trans-Polar expedition as soon as possible.

6. Another consideration in this matter is the strength of the United Kingdom legal title. United Kingdom Ministers have decided that Notes should be addressed to the Argentine and Chilean Governments informing them that we propose to apply to the International Court of Justice unless they are prepared to submit the Antarctic dispute to arbitration. The United Kingdom authorities are anxious to deliver these Notes before the next Antarctic season opens. As you know the proposal to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice is not a new one, and the United Kingdom Government indicated last year that they would be prepared to contemplate independent arbitration if necessary as an alternative.

7. I should be very glad if you would let me have as soon as you can the observations of the Union Government on the three decisions of United Kingdom Ministers referred to above.

8. I should add that at this stage it is not proposed to inform the United States Government of these proposals.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) J. Le Rougetel.

The journey will comprise geographical exploration with scientific studies given special prominence. The main headings under which the work may be considered are:

(a) Geographical

The crossing of an entirely unknown area between the head of the MURPHY GULF and the POLAR PLATEAU. The mountains WEST of the MURPHY GULF and the MURPHY GULF WEST, but their extent in the direction of the POLAR PLATEAU according to the existing theories for a survey of one or other of these areas will be accomplished. The trans-continental journey will also show whether the polar plateau is or is not interrupted by mountain ranges south of lat. 60°N.

Bere

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
THE UNITED KINGDOM,

PRETORIA.

(SECRET).

18th August, 1954.

Dear Spies,

Will you please refer to Hunt's letter (F3/44 of 29th August 1953) about United Kingdom policy in the Antarctic.

2. United Kingdom Ministers have again been considering future policy in the Antarctic and have agreed that the scale of activity in the United Kingdom sector of the Antarctic should be increased in order to consolidate the United Kingdom position there. The present level of activity is supported by an annual grant of up to £100,000 from the United Kingdom Government, the balance being met from the revenues of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. The cost of our operations has increased considerably since the grant was first made, and it has now become necessary to obtain a new supply ship in place of the R.R.S. JOHN BISCOE as well as a smaller support ship. It is also proposed to open two new bases, one at Anvers Island for the exploration of copper deposits and probably the re-opening of the old base at Marguerite Bay. The United Kingdom Government regard the above as the minimum steps necessary to restore the level of activity. It would give them at least eight bases instead of the present six.

3. On a longer view it would be extremely valuable if an aerial survey of the Dependencies could be undertaken, since it is not possible to decide on a long term policy in the Antarctic without a much clearer view of the potentialities of the United Kingdom sector. Such a survey would have to be done through an air charter company and the cost for complete survey is estimated about £300,000 spread over three years.

4. Ministers have also decided that the views, and if possible the co-operation, of the Commonwealth Governments concerned should be obtained on the plan to conduct a trans-Polar expedition, linking the U.K. Dependencies with the Australian and New Zealand Antarctic, to start in a year's time. Full particulars of the plans proposed for this expedition are set out in Polar Committee papers, viz. P(54)4, 6, 7 and 19 and the corresponding Minutes of the Meetings of the Committee, at which a representative of the Union High Commissioner in London was present. The United Kingdom Government believe that this project could provide a valuable demonstration of Commonwealth solidarity in the Antarctic. It would also result in the setting up of a base in the Ross Dependency which would be valuable in itself and, together with the expedition's other bases, might be useful in connection with the international programme of observations due to take place in the "geo-physical year" 1957.

/...

D. Spies, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
Union Buildings,
PRETORIA.

gebring sal word en met inagneming van die nypende tekort aan opgeleide personeel word daar gevoel dat die Departement hom nie op hierdie stadium op enige wyse ten opsigte van die beoogde lugopname van die Suidpool en die voorgestelde Trans-suidpoolekspedisie kan kompromiteer nie".

Die Hoof van die Generale Staf het soos volg laat weet: "In opdrag wens ek u mee te deel dat my Minister van mening is dat die Unie wel deeglik in die Suidpoolstreek belang stel maar nie tot so'n mate dat dit aktiewe deelname aan die beoogde ekspedisie uit 'n militêre oogpunt regverdig nie".

Die President van die W.N.N.R. het hom soos volg uitgelaat: "Na grondige oorweging van bogenoemde stukke wens ek u mee te deel dat sover dit die werkzaamhede van my Raad aangaan, daar geen regverdiging sou wees om deel te neem aan die voorgestelde ekspedisie nie..... As daar fondse deur ander kanale beskikbaar gestel kan word, sou die W.N.N.R. moontlik daarin geïnteresseerd wees om 'n waarnemer op die gebied van kosmiese strale met die ekspedisie saam te stuur as hierdie werk nie reeds deur die Britse Regering onderneem word nie. Op die oomblik word die kosmiese strale waarnemings beplan as deel van 'n navorsingsprogram van die Universiteite van Stellenbosch en Potchefstroom".

Aangesien u Departement ook moontlik by die aangeleentheid belang mag hê, is besluit om die saak aan u voor te lê alvorens die Unie-regering se houding aan die Britse Hoë Kommissaris bekend gestel word. Ek sal dit dus waardeer indien u my so spoedig moontlik van u Departement se sienswyse kan voorsien oor die voorgestelde ekspedisie en die wenslikheid van deelneming of medewerking van die Unie in die uitvoering van die plan.

W. P. van der Merwe

SEKRETARIS VAN EUITELANDSE SAKE.

Beere



P.M. 102/2.

UNIE VAN SUID-AFRIKA
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

Departement van Buitelandse Sake
Department of External Affairs.

DRINGEND.
GEHEIM.

GEHEIM
SECRET

PRETORIA.

EZ-10-1954

DIE SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.
DIE SEKRETARIS VAN MYNWESE.

Britse beleid in die Suidpoolstreek:
Voorgestelde Transsuidpoolekspedisie.

Ek heg hierby aan 'n afskrif van 'n brief nr. F.3/44 van 18 Augustus 1954 wat van die Hoë Kommissaris vir die Verenigde Koninkryk in die Unie ontvang is en waarin verskeie aspekte van toekomstige Britse beleid in die Suidpoolstreek uiteengesit is waaroor die kommentaar van die Unieregering versoek word.

Ter ophelderling van die plan vir 'n Gemenebes-transsuidpoolekspedisie wat in paragraaf 4 van die brief genoem word, heg ek ook hierby aan afskrifte van die volgende dokumente:

- (a) 'n Uittreksel van die plan van dr. V.E. Fuchs, 'n amptenaar van die Wetenskaplike Kantoor van die Falklandeilande, waarop die voorgestelde ekspedisie baseer word.
- (b) Gedeeltes van Poolstreke-komitee dokumente wat oor die ekspedisie handel, genommer P(54)4, 6 en 19.
- (c) Gedeelte van die notule van 'n vergadering van 13 Mei 1954 van die Komitee vir die Poolstreke. Uit hierdie dokument sal u merk dat die Komitee aanbeveel het dat die voorstel deur die Britse Buitelandse Kantoor in oorleg met ander belanghebbende Britse regeringsdepartemente ondersoek moes word.

Toe die bovermelde brief van die Britse Hoë Kommissaris ontvang is, is die sienswyse van die Departemente van Vervoer en Verdediging en die Wetenskaplike en Nywerheidsnavorsingsraad oor die inhoud daarvan gevra.

Die Sekretaris van Vervoer het my in opdrag van sy Minister meegedeel dat daar tans ooreweging geskenk word aan die moontlikheid van die stigting van 'n weerstasie op Bouvet- of anders Gough-eiland. Met die oog op die onkoste wat deur die stigting en instandhouding van so 'n stasie mee-

WV
8/10/54

V.A.

vi. Spoelise oorsig

Stroomlyn

Byganger

Beoordel. arb.

met my

J.W.

12/10

Die Waarn. Sekr.

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byge wetenskaplike

of ekonomiese belang

van Unie sal

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te werkende stasie

ant in 'n saak

Vervoer.

J.W.

12/10

12-10-1954

GEHEIM:

DIE DIREKTEUR VAN VISSERYE : KAAPSTAD.

BRITSE BELEID IN DIE SUIDPOOLSTREEK:
VOORGESTELDE TRANSSUIDPOOLEKSPEDISIE.

-- Ek heg hierby aan brief gedateer 7 Oktober 1954, en aanhangsels wat ek van die Departement van Buitelandse Sake ontvang het vir enige kommentaar wat u wil maak.

Indien u meen dat daar enigiets van belang mag wees vir die afdeling Staatsghwano-eilande, dan kan u ook met die Superintendent oorleg pleeg en 'n gesamentlik antwoord stuur.

Die dokumente moet deurgaans as "Geheim" behandel word en moet saam met u antwoord teruggestuur word.

Beskou as uiters dringend asseblief.

P. G. C. ROUSSEAU.

WAARNEMENDE SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.

Mdk.

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er
aad

Die inhoud daarvan gevra.

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van mee
om mee
die moontlike
i werkende
punt is 'n
Vervoer.
J.D.V.
M.D.

/...

12-10-1954

GEHEIM:

DIE DIREKTEUR VAN VISSERYE : KAAPSTAD.

BRITSE BELEID IN DIE SUIDPOOLSTREEK:
VOORGESTELDE TRANSUIDPOOLEKSPEDISIE.

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Beskou as uiters dringend asseblief.

P. G. C. ROUSSEAU.

WAARNEMENDE SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.

MdK.

*V.N.V.
Hon oor tot 20/10/54
12/10/54
Sub 25/10*

*om me
die woorde
i werkende
sent in 'n
Bervoer.
J.L.V.
M.S.*

oor die inhoud daarvan gevra.

Die Sekretaris van Vervoer het my in opdrag van sy Minister meegedeel "dat daar tans oorweging geskenk word aan die moontlikheid van die stigting van 'n weerstasie op Bouvet- of anders Gough-eiland. Met die oog op die onkoste wat deur die stigting en instandhouding van so'n stasie mee-

/...

Telegramadres
Telegraphic Address "PLANKTON."
Telefoon Telephone 4-1737.



455

C.I. 10.

Adresseer asb. alle briewe aan die
Direkteur van Vissery.
All communications to be addressed to the
Director of Fisheries.
Verwys in antwoord asb. na | F.S. 12/11
In reply please quote

UNIE VAN SUID-AFRIKA.—UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.



GEHEIM
SECRET

Beachweg, SEEPUNT, Kaap,
Beach Road, SEA POINT, Cape.

15th Oktober 1954 194

W
21/10/54

DIE WAARNEMENDE SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID,
P R E T O R I A

BRITSE BELEID IN DIE SUIDPOOLSTREEK: VOORGESTELDE
TRANSUIDPOOLEKSPEDISIE

Met verwysing na u diensbrief nr. H.N. 455 van 12 deser en bygaande stukke, wat hiermee soos vereis terruggestuur word, wens ek mee te deel dat in so verre dit ons visserye betref my afdeling wel deeglik in die weerkunde en oseanografie van die suid-poolstreek belang stel, maar dat die beoogde ekspedisie van son aard is dat uit visserye oogpunt beskou deelname nie geregverdig kan word nie.

Die dokumente is ook met die Superintendent, Afdeling Staatsghwano-eilande, bespreek, en ek is gemagtig om u te verwittig dat sy Afdeling gn belang by die aangeleentheid het nie.

H. K. f.
Lees B/Sake uit.
weet in lig van wintre
rapport - in rapport van N.A.
J. van
2/10

M. Marchand.

DIREKTEUR VAN VISSERYE.

Bern

GEHEIM:

27-10-1954

DIE SEKRETARIS VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE : PRETORIA.

BRITSE BELEID IN DIE SUIDPOOLSTREEK -
VOORGESTELDE TRANSSUIDPOOLEKSPEDISIE.

Met verwysing na u brief P.M. 102/2 gedateer 7 Oktober 1954, moet ek meedeel dat die Departement twyfel of dit van enige wetenskaplike of finansiële belang vir die Unie sal wees om deel te neem aan bogenoemde ekspedisie.

Sover dit die afdeling Visserye betref stel hierdie Departement wel deeglik belang in die weerkunde en oseanografie van die suidpoolstreek, maar die beoogde ekspedisie is van so 'n aard dat deelname ten behoewe van visserye ook nie geregverdig kan word nie.

Uit die oogpunt dus van hierdie Departement se verskillende aktiwiteite is die mening dat aktiewe deelname aan die beoogde ekspedisie op hierdie stadium nie geregverdig is nie.

P. G. C. ROUSSEAU.

WAARNEMENDE SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.

W

Mdk.

Bone

GEHEIM:

27-10-1954

DIE SEKRETARIS VAN BUITELANDSE SAKKE : PRETORIA.

BRITSE BELEID IN DIE SUIDPOOLSTREEK -
VOORGESTELDE TRANS-SUIDPOOLEKSPEDISIE.

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Uit die oogpunt dus van hierdie Departement se verskillende aktiwiteite is die mening dat aktiewe deelname aan die beoogde ekspedisie op hierdie stadium nie geregverdig is nie.

P. G. C. ROUSSEAU.

WAARNEMENDE SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.

Mdk.

Rou

 10/26/10/54

Rou

have already announced their decision to maintain the majority of their present bases in Antarctica after the official termination of IGY) would appear to have persuaded the Americans to put one side - temporarily, at least - any ideas of condominium - in fact, any aspect of the Antarctic problem which involves questions of sovereignty.

PRETORIA,
March, 1958.

UITERS GEHEIM
TOP SECRET

the Union's case be accepted. If the Union could show active participation in IGY activities in Antarctica, then it would be easier to exclude countries other than the Union, Belgium and Japan.

- (c) Those countries now claiming sovereignty over parts of Antarctica would not be required to renounce their claims. The idea was that the existing position would be "frozen" for the duration of the Treaty. No activities undertaken by any country while the Treaty was in force would "in themselves" give that country any claim to sovereignty.
- (d) Any conference on the subject would have to take place before the next U.N. General Assembly.
- (e) Present consultations were bilateral. As soon as the Governments approached had made known their views, the Soviet Union would be approached.
- (f) A pattern of regular consultation would necessarily have to be followed "in the next few weeks".

(3) The present cable from Washington, dated 25th March, setting out the terms of the State Department aide-memoire reveals little information which is not already in our possession. The following additional points do, however, emerge:

- (a) The Americans have apparently decided to approach all the twelve countries involved, including the Soviet Union, simultaneously, and not to first await comments from the "Western group".
- (b) They apparently have discarded their previous doubts as to the eligibility of the Union (and Belgium and Japan) for inclusion at least amongst those countries whose comments are desired. IGY performance in Antarctica has been the decisive factor.
- (c) The United States reserves "the rights which it has consistently asserted in Antarctica".
- (d) The inescapable fact of the Russian presence in Antarctica (both the United States and the Soviet

/...

approaches were being made to other (unspecified) countries. Any comments which might be made would not be considered in any way binding, but would assist the United States Government in shaping (or re-shaping) their current thinking.

In a general way, the Americans were exploring the possibility of an international agreement - which could take the form of a multi-lateral treaty to which Russia would of course be a party - outside the U.N. but consistent with the U.N. Charter, on the prohibition of any sort of militarization of the Antarctic and on the peaceful exploitation of Antarctica. Adequate measures of control and inspection would naturally have to be provided. The parties to such agreement, besides the United States and the U.S.S.R., would be those countries with "direct, substantial interests in the continent".

The United States was also tentatively in favour of extension of IGY activities.

Mr. Campbell was told that the Union Government would give the matter its attention, and that in the meantime he could accept that the inclusion of the Soviet called for consideration of the matter at the highest level, and that the Union had direct and important interests in Antarctica which entitled it to a say in the future of that continent.

An Aide Memoire presented by the United States Embassy after these conversations agreed substantially with the above.

(2) A subsequent despatch from our Embassy in Washington reported that the Embassy had been advised of the above approach. A report on conversations on the matter in the State Department brought the following additional facts to light:

- (a) Should some form of agreement on the lines proposed be reached, the main emphasis in its presentation to the world was to be placed on the continuation of the IGY programme.
- (b) As the Union was the only country without a record of discovery and exploration, it might be difficult to exclude other countries such as India and Ceylon, Belgium and Japan, the two latter in particular, should

XVI. REACTIONS OF COUNTRIES APPROACHED BY UNITED KINGDOM RE INTERNATIONALISATION.

Argentina: Will not agree to any renunciation - apparently as opposed to mere suspension - of sovereignty, but will support collaboration in the scientific field on the lines of IGY. The idea of "not militarising" the Antarctic is considered "very appropriate".

Chile: No surrender, and scientific collaboration only.

France: Too busy elsewhere to worry.

Norway: Not unsympathetic.

XVII. NEW ZEALAND RAISES THE SPECTRE OF U.N. CONTROL.

Mr. Nash, the New Zealand Prime Minister, stated on February 18th, 1958, that New Zealand was prepared to raise in the U.N. proposals for international control of Antarctica, or to support such a move by some other country. He wished to see the principles applied which has made IGY such an outstanding example of peaceful international collaboration. He would prefer to see smaller nations taking the lead in starting a scheme for an international administration, which could not be successful without the blessing of the United Nations.

XVIII. SOVIET NON-IGY ACTIVITIES IN THE ANTARCTIC AREA.

Early in January the British reported that a Russian naval party had landed on Zarodovsky Island (South Sandwich Island). A protest was lodged in Moscow. The Argentines also protested.

The British felt that the Russians were testing the United Kingdom reaction prior to putting forward claims not only in the area but in others, possibly to strengthen their claim to be considered an Antarctic power.

XIX. AMERICAN "RE-THINKING" ON ANTARCTICA.

(1) On the 10th March, 1958, a representative of the American Embassy in Pretoria (Mr. Campbell) called at the Department at his request. He informed the officials to whom he spoke that the Embassy had received instructions to make an exploratory approach to the Union Government regarding current thinking on the Antarctic: Similar

- (d) The authority should not be under United Nations control. The Secretary-General of the United Nations should only be informed of the fait accompli. Submission of reports on the administration of the area should, however, be submitted to the United Nations and Specialised Agencies.

XV. BRITISH VIEW ABOUT PARTICIPATION.

Our High Commissioner's office in London enquired of the British whether only the Americans could be considered as opposing South Africa's participation, the other "old" Commonwealth countries having already decided to support the Union's participation.

The British spokesman pointed out that the real difficulty stemmed from the fact that the Union had no claim based on past performance in the region. He assessed the claims of interested countries as follows:

First group: Those who had claimed sovereignty in consequence of their record of discovery.

Second group: The United States and the U.S.S.R., whose claim arose from the fact that they were world powers, and could also show a substantial record of discovery and exploration.

Third group: This was a nebulous group to which South Africa could belong. The difficulty was where to draw the line, as there might well be claims by other interested countries such as Belgium, Japan, and India.

The British were concerned that U.S.-Commonwealth agreement should be reached before any other interested parties got to hear of what was toward. Mr. Macmillan's slip in New Zealand (during his visit) when he had referred obliquely to the possibility of internationalization, had already attracted enquiries from the Norwegians, which had had to be side-stepped. (The Americans had also emphasized to our Ambassador in Washington that they wished to avoid giving, at all costs, the impression that a "group" had been formed.)

they were nevertheless not convinced that they were of sufficient force to warrant the Union's inclusion in the discussions. The State Department spokesman also made a remark to the Ambassador which the latter had construed as indicating that one or more Commonwealth countries had not shown themselves enthusiastic about the Union's participation. The State Department also conveyed the impression that the proposed Commonwealth-U.S. meeting was being held at the instance of the Commonwealth countries concerned, and that it was therefore up to them to decide whether the Union should participate.

Our High Commissioner in London, in commenting on this, confirmed that no one was aware of any reluctance on the part of Commonwealth countries to invite South Africa, and pointed out that in fact the United States Government had proposed that discussions should be held in Washington in October, 1957.

XIV. FRESH AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

The British informed us - at the end of January, 1958 - that in December, 1957, i.e. after the previous inconclusive October talks in Washington, the Americans had without warning invited the British, Australian and New Zealand representatives in Washington for a further series of talks, in which the Americans put forward tentative proposals for negotiating an agreement. The proposals were:

- (a) An international authority over Antarctica should be established by countries with real interests, i.e. the seven present claimants and the United States. Russia should be excluded unless this were found to be impossible.
- (b) The possibilities of economic exploitation should be explored, and there should be universal access to economic resources.
- (c) The authority might consist of a Board of Governors, and in a lower tier there might also be an Advisory Council of other countries, including South Africa.

/...

- (b) Indien die Russe na die einde van die IGJ in die Suidpool aanbly, bestaan daar geen manier waarop hulle uitgesit kan word teen hulle wil nie. Die vasteland kan slegs behoorlik gedemilitariseer word as die Russe saamstem om in hierdie opsig met die ander lande saam te werk en demilitarisasie is die enigste waarborg teen die oprigting van Russiese basisse op groot skaal in die Suidpoolstreke - wat 'n moontlike gevaar nie alleen vir Suid-Afrika, Australië en Nieu-Seeland is nie maar vir die hele vrye wêreld;
- (c) Al sou die Russe hulle basisse na die IGJ ontruim, is daar geen rede waarom hulle, indien hulle nie uitgenooi word om lid van die owerheid te word nie, in praktyk nie na die Gebied kan terugkeer sonder enige verpligting om toesig oor hulle bedrywighede in verband met demilitarisasie te aanvaar nie;
- (d) Aangesien die Amerikaners nie beoog om die V.V. in kennis te stel nie, bestaan die moontlikheid dat die lande met eise in die Gebied aangekla kan word van pogings tot „kollektiewe imperialisme” agter die rug van die Organisasie;
- (e) Die plan maak geen voorsiening vir die toetrede tot enige toekomstige beheerliggaam van ander moondhede, veral Suid-Afrika, nie. Solank die Russe uitgeskakel word, sal dit moeilik wees om die plan te wysig sodat ander lande toegelaat kan word;
- (f) Die gevaar bestaan ook dat as die Amerikaners die eerste fase van hulle plan (samesmelting van hulle gebied met dié van Australië en Nieu-Seeland) uitgevoer en sodoende hulle posisie bevredigend gereël het, hulle mag sloer oor die verdere stappe - tot nadeel van die ander belanghebbende lande."

XIII. AMERICAN DOUBTS AS TO UNION'S RIGHTS TO PARTICIPATION.

In October, 1957, our Ambassador in Washington reported on the result of his conversations at the State Department, and indicated that, in effect, though the Americans were "sympathetic" and understood our arguments,

gefinansier sal word. Andersyds, mag 'n poging aangewend word om vir die Algemene Vergadering die bevoegdheid te verkry om die bedrywighede van die owerheid te ondersoek en voorstelle daarvoor te maak. Volgens die dokument is dit duidelik dat enige plan wat deur die V.V. aanvaar word die Organisasie soveel mag sal gee om hom met die owerheid te bemoei dat die plan onuitvoerbaar sal word. Daar kan natuurlik nie verhoed word dat die V.V. die saak bespreek indien so'n voorstel deur sommige lande ingedien word nie.

Die Verenigde Koninkryk is van mening dat dit die beste sou wees om die plan na die V.V. te verwys nadat volle ooreenkoms daarvoor deur die belanghebbende lande bereik is.

D. Die Amerikaanse plan.

Volgens gegewens tans beskikbaar is die Amerikaanse beleid ten aansien van die Suidpoolgebied om

- (1) die gebied in die Suidpool wat nog nie opgeëis is nie nou te eis;
- (2) die Australiese en Nieu-Seelandse regerings uit te nooi om hulle sektors met die Amerikaanse saam te smelt in 'n codominium met 'n gesamentlike administrasie op die patroon van 'n raad van direkteure;
- (3) anderlande met „Suidpoolbesittings" later uit te nooi om by die condominium aan te sluit;
- (4) Rusland daarbuite te hou en
- (5) die saak nie aan die V.V. voor te lê vir goedkeuring nie.

Die dokument gee die volgende nadele wat aan die Amerikaanse plan verbonde is:-

- (a) Aangesien dit die Russe uitsluit, mag Rusland die stigting van 'n aanvaarbare internasionale owerheid dwarsboom deur 'n meerderheid van stemme daarteen in die V.N. te organiseer of mag Rusland sy posisie in die Suidpool versterk ten einde die Amerikaners daar teen te werk;

/...

hand dat oorweging daaraan geskenk word om die Permanente Weermag van die V.V., indien dit tot stand kom, vir inspeksie in die Gebied te gebruik ten einde te verseker dat die Suidpoolstreke behoorlik gedemilitariseer word.

Die newensgaande dokument meld dat die organisasie uit ten minste die sewe lande met eise in die Suidpoolgebied en die V.S.A. behoort te bestaan, dog die vraag ontstaan of lidmaatskap ook oop behoort te wees vir lande met geen gebiedsbelange in die Suidpool nie. Paragraaf 31 van die stuk maak vervolgens melding van Suid-Afrika se versoek om, weens sy ligging en strategiese belang in die Suidpool, toegelaat te word tot enige wêreldooreen-
vir die Suidpoolgebied. Dit meld ook dat, as die Unie uitgesluit word, ons die enigste land wat naby die Gebied lê sal wees wat nie seggenskap in die toekomstige reëlings vir die Suidpoolstreke sal hê nie.

As die Unie tot lidmaatskap toegelaat word, mag dit die uitwerking hê dat sekere lande met minder belange ~~toetred~~ mag eis, soos bv. Indië, Uruguay, Ecuador, België en moontlik Japan. Die moontlikheid bestaan ook dat Sowjet-Rusland in die lig van ons toetredende lidmaatskap vir sommige van die Kommunistiese satellietstate mag eis.

C. Oor die probleem of die V.V. ingelig behoort te word oor die planne insake die voorgestelde owerheid opper die dokument die volgende argumente teen die voorlegging van die plan aan die V.V.:-

- (1) Aangesien meeste lede van die V.V. geen gegronde redes het om hulle met die Suidpoolstreke te bemoei nie, behoort die bewyslas op hulle te rus waarom die voorgestelde owerheid deur die V.N. bespreek moet word.
- (2) As die saak in die V.V. geopper word deur 'n land wat nie lid van die voorgenome Suidpoolowerheid is nie, dan is daar teoreties geen rede waarom lidlande van die owerheid nie kan weier om die V.V. se jurisdiksie in die saak te aanvaar nie.

Indien die voorgestelde owerheid na die V.V. terug word, bestaan die moontlikheid dat 'n voorstel ingedien word om die beoogde owerheid met 'n beheerliggaam van die V.N. te vervang wat uit die Organisasie se begroting

(iii) Australië -

In die Australiese sektor, waaroor Australië soewereiniteit het, by 'n order in rade van 7 Februarie 1933, het die Amerikaners een en die Russe drie basisse vir die I.G.J. Die aanwesigheid van die Russe en die Amerikaners in die Suidpool maak die Australiese eise onseker. Aangesien die V.S.A. geen Suidpooleise erken nie, bestaan die moontlikheid dat die Amerikaners 'n deel van die Australiese sektor mag eis.

(iv) Nieu-Seeland -

In die Nieu-Seelandse sektor, waaroor Nieu-Seeland soewereiniteit het by 'n order in rade van 1923, het die Amerikaners drie onafhanklike basisse vir die I.G.J. Daar is aanduidings dat as die Amerikaners, in opvolging van hulle beleid dat die V.S.A. nie die eise van ander state in die Suidpool erken nie, moontlik 'n eis in die Gebied stel, dit in die Nieu-Seeland se sektor sal wees.

B. Die dokument opgestel deur die werkgroep in Londen vir die aanstaande besprekings in Washington gee na 'n bespreking van verskeie administrasievorms (bv. 'n soewereine internasionale owerheid, 'n internasionale owerheid sonder nominale soewereiniteit en 'n condominium) as die mees praktiese vorm van administrasie 'n internasionale owerheid sonder nominale soewereiniteit. Hierdie tipe sal soortgelyk wees aan dié van die Panama-kanaal, waar Panama al die regte en hoedanighede van Soewereiniteit oor die kanaalgebied aan die V.S.A. oorgedra het, dog nominale soewereiniteit daarvoor behou het. Sodanige owerheid hou die moontlikheid in dat sodra dit ontbind word, teruggekeer word na die status quo ten opsigte van gebiedseise in die Suidpool.

Ten einde te verseker dat belanghebbende lande nie hulle huidige „regte“ in die Suidpool benadeel nie, word aan die hand gedoen dat die partye tot 'n internasionale ooreenkoms formeel die huidige toestand voorbehou as voorwaarde vir deelname in onderhandelings wat gehou moet word.

Daar word in die vooruitsig gestel dat die voorgenoemde internasionale owerheid in 'n posisie behoort te wees om met sekere gespesialiseerde liggame van die V.V., soos die Wêreld Meteorologiese Organisasie en die IBLO, saam te werk. Die opstellers van die dokument doen ook aan die

such as South Africa, which had a legitimate interest in the area, should be brought to the attention of the Americans during the forthcoming discussions in Washington).

XII. SUMMARY OF WORKING PAPER PRODUCED AFTER LONDON TALKS.

The following is a summary of the above paper produced at the time in the Department. It is quoted in full as the reasoning behind it is cogent.

"A. Die dokument opgestel na die besprekings in Londen tussen verteenwoordigers van die Verenigde Koninkryk, Australië, Nieu-Seeland, Suid-Afrika en Kanada (waarnemers) op 12 en 13 September 1957 gee die volgende argumente ten gunste van een of ander vorm van internasionale beheer in verband met die belanghebbende lande:-

(i) die Verenigde Koninkryk:-

In die Britse sektor vind die Verenigde Koninkryk as gevolg van die opposisie-eise van Argentinië en Chili dat hulle bedrywighede aldaar om hulle eise teen bogenoemde twee lande in stand te hou so duur is dat die alternatiewe vir Brittanje is om (a) hulle heeltemal van die Suidpool te onttrek of (b) om lid te word van 'n internasionale liggaam waarin dit nie nodig sal wees vir die Britte, die Argentyne en die Chilene om geld te verspil in verband met mededingende eise nie.

(ii) Noorweë en Frankryk -

Die Noorweegse sektor, waar daar min ontdekkingswerk gedoen is, is deel van Noorweë volgens daardie land se grondwet en oor die Franse sektor, waar baie ontdekkingswerk gedoen is, het Frankryk onbestrede soewereiniteit. Ofskoon /nóg die Russe /nóg die Amerikaners basisse vir die I.G.J. in die Noorweegse of Franse sektors het, kan die Russe ongemerk hierdie sektors binnegaan. As waardevolle ontdekkings deur ander lande in hierdie twee state sesektors gemaak word, bestaan die moontlikheid dat Noorweë en Frankryk nie ekonomiese voordeel daaruit sal trek nie - vandaar die beweegrede tot lidmaatskap van 'n internasionale beheerliggaam.

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- (g) The United Kingdom representative made the point that in "desk-level" conversations, it appeared that the Americans were still clinging to their 1948 proposals, and that their main idea was to evolve some plan which would exclude the Russians.

XIII. QUESTION OF UNION'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION.

Our High Commissioner in London was requested on the 7th September 1957 to strongly press the Union's claims to participation on the United Kingdom. The High Commissioner replied that the United Kingdom "were fully aware of our essential interest and appear willing at this stage to consider our inclusion in their proposed authority". The Union should indicate as soon as possible whether it supported the United Kingdom plan, bearing in mind the financial and manpower commitments it entailed.

The British and Australians welcomed the Union's statement of its case, and agreed that the disadvantages of excluding the Union should be brought to the attention of the Americans.

The High Commissioner also reported an appreciable shift in the New Zealand and Australian positions in favour of the British proposals.

It was pointed in a ministerial memo that the Union might well advise the United Kingdom of its support of the plan provided the United Kingdom formally recognised our right to membership in any control authority. The American plan, based on the amalgamation of their own and other claims, would lead to the exclusion of the Union.

On the 20th September, 1957, our Ambassador in Washington was requested to formally apprise the State Department of our interest in the future of Antarctica.

In his reply of 27th September the Ambassador advised us that the United States was proposing a meeting of Australia, United Kingdom and New Zealand. The Americans were first intending to propose a merger of a possible American claim with the Australian and New Zealand zones. The Australians and New Zealanders were reluctant to press for the Union's presence at this stage, but all three Commonwealth countries were prepared to affirm our interest at the next stage of the talks when the Commonwealth background paper was due to be discussed.

(In this paper it was subsequently recorded that "it was agreed that the disadvantages of excluding countries

meteorological and strategic importance of the area to the Union was not disputed, but it was felt that to admit the Union would be to open the door to other countries which had not attempted to establish interests in Antarctica.

(iv) The Departments of Defence and Transport concurred that it was of the utmost importance that the Union be associated with any future control and administration of Antarctica.

(v) Discussion of the British proposal.

Meetings of representatives of "old Commonwealth members" took place in London on August 15 and 28, 1957. The C.R.O. produced a working paper and discussion of this paper and allied subjects, brought the following points to light:

- (a) It was generally agreed that the Russians were in fact established in Antarctica and would be unlikely to leave after the end of IGY, or to accept an authority from which they were excluded. (Although the files do not actually record the fact, it appears that in the interim between these two meetings, the inclusion of Russia as a member of the proposed international authority was accepted.)
- (b) The Russians were unlikely to consent to being in a minority of one in the authority.
- (c) New Zealand had a very beneficial working arrangement with the United States in the New Zealand sector and would be loth to see this disturbed. The New Zealanders would prefer to have things as they were at least until after IGY.
- (d) Militarily speaking all were agreed that neutralization of the area was imperative, provided it was possible to ensure this technically.
- (e) The Union's representatives suggested that the Working Party being set up to hammer out the plan should work on the assumption that the Union might wish to be associated with the authority.
- (f) Australia would still prefer to eschew internationalization and to see the Americans claiming all the yet-unclaimed area of Antarctica to thus exclude the Russians. In this way the Americans would be committed to a recognition of the sector principle.

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(a) Union's policy: The Union felt that the question of possible claims in Antarctica by the United States should not be considered in isolation. If the Union should at a later date decide to acquire territorial rights in the area this would probably become more difficult if in the meantime large areas had been acquired by the Americans. They themselves might be less likely to recognise the aspirations of others once their own wants had been satisfied. It would be in the Union's interest to press for a consideration of the wider problem of the future of Antarctica. All the Departments concerned agreed with this view.

X. BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY.

(i) On the 25th July, 1957, our High Commissioner in London advised us that the British had informally broached the idea of establishing some form of international authority over Antarctica "which would give reasonable satisfaction to the actual and potential claims of the interested parties". The British idea, in general, was that the

following steps should be taken:

- (a) Co-ordination of the views of the "old" Commonwealth;
 - (b) American support should be sought;
 - (c) thereafter other countries with established interests should be approached;
 - (d) and finally, an international agreement outside (but registered with) the United Nations should be negotiated.
- (ii) Form of proposed authority:
- (a) the authority would consist of the United Kingdom, United States of America, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, Norway and France;
 - (b) there would be a central budget;
 - (c) Present territorial claims would be abandoned;
 - (d) Any country would have access to any part of Antarctic territory, subject to licences issued by the central authority;
 - (e) the establishment of military bases would be prohibited.
- (iii) The United Kingdom spokesman said that while Canada and the Union were not envisaged as members of the international authority, their views were felt to be of great importance. The clear

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The British considered that three stages were necessary

- (i) Priority of discovery, followed within a reasonably short period by
- (ii) Announcement of claim, which in turn should be followed closely by
- (iii) Effective administration.

(c) Possible United States claims: The British felt that, should they claim, the United States would undoubtedly lay claim to a far greater area than an impartial arbitration would award to them, and would thus overlap some or all of the present claims.

Unfortunately the areas in which the United States was felt to have the strongest claims - which included the present unclaimed area - was, according to present thinking, the least valuable. This probably explained why the Americans were in no way committing themselves - besides not wanting to encourage the Russians, by example, to lodge claims, they were waiting to evaluate the results of their IGY investigations before taking any concrete steps. These results would indicate which regions were most worthy of attention, economically speaking.

(d) On the 17th May, 1957, our Ambassador in Washington reported that the State Department had decided to recommend to the National Security Council that the President announce a United States claim in Antarctica, and at the same time recognise the existing claims of other friendly countries where these did not overlap one another. The Ambassador felt that this decision could be ascribed to a change in personnel in the State Department, and also as a result of Australian pressure.

The United States Department of Defence had expressed grave doubts as to the wisdom of this course, and adduced the following arguments;

- (i) a claim by the United States would encourage the Russians to do the same;
- (ii) the Russians would immediately cease to exchange geophysical information, which was of considerable value;
- (iii) the United States should await a proper evaluation of IGY data, which would indicate where the greatest deposits of valuable raw materials were situated. The United States would make a costly mistake in claiming now the wrong territory.

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VIII. INDIAN INSCRIPTION OF ANTARCTIC QUESTION ON PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF 11TH SESSION OF UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

This Indian move caught all concerned by surprise, It was felt that Krishna Menon and possibly Nehru, had possibly thought up the idea to further their favourite pose of "peace-makers" between West and East. All Commonwealth countries expressed resentment and concern at the move. A spokesman of the United States State Department, in conversation with a member of our Washington Embassy, said that he did not see how the Indians could believe that they were being helpful. Latin-American countries were expected to oppose inscription. (In the event, the Indians withdrew the item).

IX. FURTHER EFFORTS TO DRAW OUT AMERICANS.

(a) It will be recalled (vide VII (e)(5) above) that the American reaction to the joint approach was disappointing. The British consequently started considering what steps should be taken in the event of the United States deciding not to co-operate. One suggestion was that Commonwealth Governments might encourage the United States to claim the "vacant" sector of Antarctica lying between 80°W and 150°W.

The United Kingdom ideas regarding a possible claim to territory by the Union were that until the Americans could be persuaded to make a claim - and thereby indicate on what premises they felt claims should be based - the Union's chances of success were not bright, unless she could acquire something by means of bilateral arrangement with one of the "haves". The Union expressed concern as to whether it would be wise at that stage to recognise United States sovereignty over a considerable unspecified area of Antarctica, as such recognition might well weaken its bargaining position.

(b) Differing attitudes of United States and United Kingdom as to basis for acquisition of sovereignty.

The Americans seemed to think that undefined "rights" were acquired by discovery alone, and that these rights remained valid until the Government relying on them saw fit to endorse them with an official claim. This reasoning was in line with their repeatedly expressed reservation of all rights which might accrue to the United States or its citizens in the Antarctic.

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territorial rights".

(e) In the event, the joint approach was made on the 9th February, 1956.

Our Ambassador's report brought the following new factors to light:

- (1) Mr. Dulles mentioned that some kind of condominium in Antarctica might be found acceptable (he did add that he was theorising) and this led our Ambassador to the assumption that the Americans were still baffled by the problem;
- (2) The Secretary of State said that the United States had an important potential claim but no immediate intention of staking it out.
- (3) He also felt that the countries represented at the meeting should find it possible to find a common position against Soviet penetration without quarrelling amongst themselves.
- (4) The Ambassador was of the opinion that our association with the joint approach had been of great advantage to us, as it confirmed our interest, particularly as the United Kingdom had explicitly, and the other two Commonwealth countries implicitly, recognised it.
- (5) In a second report submitted shortly afterwards, our Ambassador expressed the belief that the Americans were apparently not completely wedded to the idea of continuous and regular multi-lateral consultation, and seemed to be leaning more to bi-lateral consultation, as and when necessary. The British were not sanguine about American enthusiasm.

(f) Soviet approach to the Australians for facilities:

In late 1955 the Soviet Government approached the Australian Government and in the context of their planned IGY activities, asked that certain facilities be granted for an air-link between Moscow and the Soviet Mirny base in Antarctica via Djakarta and Perth. The Australians replied, welcoming Russian interest in research in the Australian Sector of Antarctica, and referred specifically to the fact of Australian sovereignty. Co-operation in regard inter alia to the air-link was promised, subject to certain safeguards e.g. Australian navigators and interpreters on Russian aircraft overflying Australian territory. The Russians replied merely expressing satisfaction.

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- (1) the importance of closer co-operation between "the four of us", in view of Russian activity, should be stressed;
- (2) cards should be placed on the table;
- (3) henceforth there should be a regular exchange of information between "the Four";
- (4) on the United Kingdom side the opportunity would be seized to bring home to the Americans the facts of the Anglo-Argentine-Chilean quarrel.

Our representatives at the meeting took some exception to the apparent decision to exclude the Union, in view of previous statements of our interest. The United Kingdom representatives indicated that if the Union was interested in being associated with the approach to the Americans, there would be no objection on their part.

On Christmas Eve, 1955, the Union's decision to be associated with the joint approach to the United States, and subsequent consultation, was telegraphed to London and Washington, along with a statement of the Union's future policy which we intended to hand to the Americans.

(c) Union's future policy: This statement briefly contained the following:

- (1) a reminder of the Union's approach to the United States in 1948;
- (2) a reiteration of our interest in Antarctica, as set out in III (e) above, with the statement that the Union Government would be anxious to be associated with any consultative machinery;
- (3) an intimation that the Union might wish to acquire certain territorial rights in Antarctica, the manner of acquisition to be the subject of further consultation with the countries with specific interests in Antarctica.

(d) British reaction: The United Kingdom Government welcomed the Union's interest in the control and administration of Antarctica, and recognised the desirability of South African association with any international consultations on the subject. The interest shown by the Union in IGY activities was felt to point up the Union's case.

The United Kingdom would also be ready to enter into consultation with the Union Government and other governments concerned regarding the acquisition by the Union of "certain

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VII. RUSSIAN IGY ACTIVITIES IN ANTARCTICA CAUSE CONCERN.

(a) American approach: On the 22nd November, 1955, the United States Embassy addressed a note to the Department, in which it was stated that as Soviet interest in Antarctica during IGY might have other strategic significance, the United States would hope that a co-ordinated policy be adopted by those countries most likely to be approached (i.e. by the Soviet) with a formal request for use of air base facilities in the Southern Hemisphere. The United States believed that extension of assistance in this sense to the Soviet would be contrary to the interests of all concerned, unless there was an assurance Soviet interest was in fact confined to IGY activities, and thus limited in duration. A common policy was advocated. Similar notes were also addressed to other countries concerned with Antarctica.

The Union's reply was that it agreed that the countries most closely concerned should keep each other informed of developments.

(b) British initiative: On the 9th December, 1955, our High Commissioner in London reported on a meeting at the C.R.O. of representatives of the High Commissioners for Australia, New Zealand and the Union.

It appeared that the British had been reviewing Antarctic policy (partly, no doubt, under the spur of the American approach referred to in (a) immediately above). British thinking was following these lines:

- (i) IGY activities had brought the United States of America and the Soviet into Antarctica in a large way and for an unspecified period, and all Antarctic problems had to be considered in the light of this development.
- (ii) the United Kingdom was compelled now to accept the fact of Argentine and Chilean presence in Antarctica; the idea of expulsion by force had been finally discarded; maintenance of the present position was the best to be hoped for, with expansion of bases where practicable.
- (iii) the time had arrived for some frank talking with the Americans, and the suggestion was that the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand in Washington should make an early approach to the State Department on the following lines:

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2. the Union consider ways and means of acquiring a sector for herself, on which to eventually erect a weather station. The necessity for the erection of a considerable number of such stations throughout the region was generally recognised.

(b) Studies undertaken in the Department indicated that neither Norway nor Australia, whose sectors lay closest to the Union, would be likely to favour surrendering any portion to the Union in view of their determined stand in the past against any surrender of sovereignty. It was felt however, that while these two countries might well not be prepared to surrender any sovereignty to an international body, they may not be so intransigent towards the Union.

(c) Commonwealth Transantarctic Expedition.

The Minister announced in Parliament on the 5th May, 1955, inter alia, that Cabinet approval had been obtained for South African participation in the proposed Commonwealth Transantarctic Expedition (United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and the Union), and added "Ek dink dat dit sal help om ons aansprake te steun wanneer die tyd aanbreek, soos dit ongetwyfeld moet aanbreek, dat die een of ander besluit moet geneem word oor die Suidpoolstreke waarin ons 'n wesenlike belang het". A month later the scale of the Union's participation was announced - £10,000 towards the general cost of the expedition, £8,000 for radio-sound equipment, and the services of the meteorologists.

This statement led to an enquiry from the British High Commissioner as to whether it indicated merely that the Union was reiterating her interests in Antarctica as she had done in 1948, or whether it meant that the Union was contemplating making a new or different form of claim.

The Minister replied that "at (that) stage" he had not intended to indicate more than interest.

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(c) The Soviet Union must insist that there could be no regime in Antarctica without its participation, and that any decision taken in this regard, without such participation, would not be accepted as legal.

(d) As the Soviet Union felt that a regime "corresponding with the legal interests of all interested states" deserved consideration, the comments of the seven addressees were requested

There is no record that the Soviet initiative spurred any country to positive action.

V. EVIDENCE OF CHANGE IN EMPHASIS IN REQUIREMENTS FOR PROOF OF SOVEREIGNTY.

In a note dated the 29th August, 1953, the British Government informed us that in view of the impracticability of maintaining its title in the face of opposing claims of Argentina and Chile, who were better placed geographically, it had been decided to proceed to the orderly reduction of their political and naval commitments in the Antarctic area to a scale which they were in a position to meet permanently, and that they would therefore no longer attempt to maintain their claim to title over the whole of their sector of Antarctica.

VI. IMMINENCE OF IGY SPURS INTEREST.

(a) In January, 1955, Dr. Schumann, in a minute to his departmental head, who passed it on to this department with the suggestion that Dr. Schumann be authorised to discuss the points raised by him with other Commonwealth countries during the mid-1955 Commonwealth Meteorological Conference - drew attention to the extraordinary interest being shown in Antarctica as a result of preparations for I.G.Y. and suggested that:

1. the Union moot the possibility of a conference to consider the division of Antarctica into spheres of influence. He had in mind a conference of the seven countries already claiming territory there, with the addition of the U.S.A., Germany, the Union and one or two other countries who had contributed to our knowledge of the South Polar region.

(h) Broadening of scope of Union's canvassing.

In November, 1955, it was decided to go ahead and approach the other interested governments among "the Eight". This was done by direct diplomatic approach and by means of conversations between Minister Louw and representatives of the countries concerned at the United Nations General Assembly being held in Paris, According to a telegram dated 11th December, 1948, from Safdel, Paris, the reactions of Australia, New Zealand, Argentine, Chile and Norway were favourable and the Union's claim to recognition of our interests generally accepted. The French intimated informally that they could see no reason why the Union should be excluded, but were not prepared to make a firm statement until such time as the matter of the "regime" was carried further. In essence the attitude of all could well be summed up as being sympathetic but non-committal.

(i) Antarctica in "cold storage".

In spite of a United Kingdom intimation to the Americans that the Commonwealth countries, at least, were prepared to treat their proposals for an international regime as a basis for discussion, the Americans appeared to have lost interest. U.S.-Argentine relations were strained, the other non-Commonwealth countries among "the Eight" were in no way inclined to accept the proposal and the Americans were obviously assigning a much lower priority to the Antarctic problem than had hitherto been the case.

IV. THE SOVIET UNION ENTERS THE LISTS.

In June, 1950, the Soviet Union addressed apparently identical notes to the governments of the U.S., United Kingdom, France, Norway, Australia, Argentina and New Zealand (Note: Russo-Chilean diplomatic relations had been broken three years previously by the Chilean Government), whose tenor was briefly as follows:

(a) It was "generally recognised" that the Russian navigators Ballinghansen and Laylorer had been the first to reach and circumnavigate the Antarctic in the early 19th century:

(b) These early explorations entitled the Soviet Union to just as much say in the region as those carried out later by countries who were now engaged in determining a new regime for Antarctica.

Australia and Argentina: Not in favour.

New Zealand: As something had to be done sooner or later the countries concerned must agree on some sort of international control organ.

(g) U.S. response to Union's representations.

Our Embassy reported on 5th October, 1948, as follows:

- (i) Americans looked on S.A. interest with good deal of sympathy, and our approach was not unexpected.
- (ii) The Americans had originally raised the question of a Trusteeship over Antarctica when the Russians were refusing to co-operate in the Trusteeship Council. Russia had since taken her seat on the Council and the Trusteeship proposal was accordingly dropped.
- (iii) The Agreement had to be restricted to the 8-powers to exclude claims of outside powers such as Russia but it was the American intention to have a clause inserted in the Constitution allowing for accession by other powers whom all the signatories felt had a definite interest in the Antarctic. This ought to take care of the Union's case.

It is perhaps instructive to examine in this context the U.S. reply returned to Belgian representations in October 1948, whose import was, by and large, the same as the Union's. The Belgians had pointed out that the first scientific expedition ever to winter in Antarctica (in 1897-1899) was Belgian. This illustrated the longstanding interest of Belgium in Antarctica, which, allied with the economic and strategic importance of the area to Belgium, entitled that country to direct participation in Antarctic affairs. The U.S. reply delivered in December, 1948, was patently unenthusiastic. The Belgian arguments were dismissed as being of "relatively slight importance". The Belgians were however assured that they would be "kept informed".

(e) Union's approach to U.S. re participation - September, 1948.

As a result of the rather unhelpful attitude of the United Kingdom, it was decided to instruct the Embassy in Washington to apprise the U.S. Government of the Union's interest. The following arguments were to be used:

- (i) As the U.S. proposal stood, the Union would be the only major power in the Southern hemisphere which would have no say in the future administration of the Antarctic, whose character and scope was of vital interest to us.
- (ii) our Whaling interests.
- (iii) the importance of met. stations.
- (iv) our geographic situation, which made the Union a natural base for operations, commercial and otherwise in Antarctica and
- (v) our strategic interests.

The Embassy was requested not to press for formal inclusion of the Union and merely to stress our interest in developments.

C.R.O. expressed complete agreement with our line of action, and intimated that they now felt free to request United Kingdom Ambassador in Washington to put in a word with the State Department about the Union's interests.

(f) Reactions of other countries to U.S. proposals.

Norway: Would welcome co-ordination of scientific research but set against any surrender of political sovereignty. Also pointed out that exclusion of some parts from operation of agreement (viz South Shetlands and Orkneys) would merely exacerbate the present quarrel i.e. between United Kingdom, Argentine and Chile.

France: Adopted an almost identical attitude.

Chile: Rejected the proposals and suggested in turn an 8-power agreement on scientific co-operation which would leave the status quo regarding sovereignty undisturbed. Chile also drew attention to the fact that neither the spirit nor the letter of the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of 1947, which outlined a zone of security for the American continent "in which the South American Antarctic is included, could be reconciled with the proposed system of internationalisation".

The United Kingdom's attitude to the new proposal was that some sort of settlement was imperative and that "provided (the joint 8-power administration) did not, repeat not, take the form of trusteeship, or involve placing territory in any way under the authority of the U.N.", it provided a basis for negotiation.

The United Kingdom was also exercised with the idea of maintaining her sovereignty over a limited area of the South Shetlands. She would however be prepared to let everything south of 60°S go into the common pool, if everyone else did also.

(c) Union's attitude.

In the Minister's absence, the Department (of External Affairs), expressed general agreement with the British attitude, but raised strong arguments against the Union's exclusion from the proposed authority. We enquired whether the United Kingdom might be prepared to support a South African claim to participation in international discussions on the subject.

(d) United Kingdom reaction to Union's arguments for inclusion.

In August, 1948, our High Commissioner in London reported that the United Kingdom Government, while willing in principle to support the Union's claim to a say in the special régime proposed by the U.S. and while "fully recognising" the Union's interest in Antarctic matters, nevertheless felt that they could not support the Union's arguments, for the following reasons:

- (i) The proposals were purely American, and were not the result of prior consultation.
- (ii) The Americans expressly limited the powers concerned to those with actual claims in Antarctica.
- (iii) Without having first had an opportunity to study the proposals in detail they felt it would be inopportune to raise the question of the Union's participation.
- (iv) The U.S. proposals were expressly framed to exclude the possibility of certain other powers, notably Russia, from claiming association with the "special régime" through the Security Council.

III. FIRST AMERICAN MOVES TOWARDS INTERNATIONALISATION.

(a) Trusteeship. In July, 1948, the United Kingdom advised us that the Americans had informed them of a decision to put forward officially to the countries interested in Antarctica (i.e. Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, France, Norway and United Kingdom) a plan for international trusteeship of Antarctica which would cover the continent itself and all islands south of 60° except the South Shetland and South Orkney groups (claimed by the United Kingdom).

The U.S. would join this group of countries in an administering authority of the trust territory. Each state in turn would act as spokesman in the Trusteeship Council. A commission would be created to co-operate with the U.N. specialised agencies etc.

The United Kingdom immediately referred the Americans to the grave dangers inherent in any trusteeship scheme for Antarctica i.e. the intrusion of many countries including Russia in the area, and put forward a counter-proposal (previously vaguely mooted) for an 8-power condominium.

The American proposal found no favour, with the result that the U.S. prepared a revised scheme for a "special régime", which in essence, amounted to an 8-power condominium.

(b) Condominium: The American plan was briefly:

- (i) The scope of the régime should include all Antarctica and islands south of 60° S, with the exception of the South Shetland and South Orkney groups. All present claims would be merged.
- (ii) An International Antarctic Commission would be established on which one representative of each participating state would serve.
- (iii) This Commission would co-operate with the U.N. Specialised Agencies and with scientific bodies.
- (iv) Costs to be borne in equal shares.

The Americans expressed the intention of announcing their own claims in the Antarctic at the same time.

The United Kingdom notification of this U.S. approach ended with the significant words: "In view of indirect interest in the above of the Union Government..." (request comments of the U.G.)"

to note that this has also been the French attitude in the past e.g. French comment on the annexation by the United Kingdom of Marion Island).

Argentina: Recognises no claims in Antarctica other than her own. Both Argentina and Chile have refused to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to which the United Kingdom has on several occasions offered to submit the quarrel.

United Kingdom: Apparently recognises all present claims, except those made by Argentina and Chile, which are coincident with hers, and also overlap each others.

New Zealand: Recognises all present claims except those of Argentina and Chile but has consistently maintained that the only hope of a peaceful settlement lay in some form of international control, even if this meant a surrender of sovereignty.

II. IMMEDIATE POST WAR PERIOD.

(a) Renewed international interest in Antarctica.

In December, 1946, the United Kingdom Government warned that Argentina might at any moment raise the question of her claims to the Falklands and probably those in Antarctica also, at the U.N. The British were concerned that Commonwealth claims to Antarctica rested on rather flimsy grounds, and suggested that Australia and New Zealand in particular should take immediate steps to strengthen their claims by all practicable means.

(b) Union's desire to state claim.

On 27th December, 1946, the Union specifically raised with the United Kingdom the question of the possibility of our staking a claim in that portion of Antarctica lying immediately south of the Cape. As it happened, this lay within the territory claimed by Norway, whose annexation had been tacitly agreed to by the Union in 1928-1929. There was no reaction to our query, and although the proposal was examined departmentally at irregular intervals (vide e.g. Minister Louw's office note of 27th February, 1955 - inspired apparently by Dr. Schumann - in which he mooted a Norwegian surrender of part of her sector to the Union) the matter has lain officially dormant to this day.

In welcoming Russian interest in research (IGY) in the Australian Sector the Australian Government drew attention very specifically to the fact of Australian Sovereignty.

United States: (10th February, 1956):

In a circular note to all missions in Washington, the U.S. Government drew attention to the "pretensions" of the Australian Government in applying the W.M.O. Convention to Antarctic territories and stated "My Government wishes to point out as it has on previous occasions, that it does not recognise any claims so far advanced in the Antarctic, and reserves all rights accruing to the United States out of the activities of nationals of the U.S. in the area".

In this context it is of interest to note that both the United Kingdom and Australia informed the Americans in the preparatory period of IGY that any U.S. expedition in the South Pole area which might move into their territory would be welcomed and every assistance offered to it. There is no record of the exact wording of the American reply.

U.S.S.R.: A British paper of August, 1956, summarised the Soviet attitude towards territorial claims in Antarctica as follows:

1. As the importance of Antarctica is international in scope, its status should be settled with the participation "of all concerned" i.e. all nations, presumably;
2. The Soviet Government had not pressed any claims, yet, but considered that it was the legal successor of the Tsarist régime and heir to rights accruing to Russia as a result of exploration etc. undertaken in the past by Russians in Antarctica;
3. The sector principle was unacceptable;
4. A condominium should be established "which will constitute not a renunciation of sovereignty but collaboration in exploitation and peaceful utilisation".
5. The three principles in international law on which sovereignty was normally based i.e. discovery, notification and effective occupation, were only applicable to Africa, on the basis of the decisions reached at the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. (It is interesting

(iii) In 1928 the Norwegian Government decided to send an expedition to the South Pole region to annex any new territory which it might discover. The United Kingdom Government pointed out to the Union that the expedition was planning to visit the area immediately to the south of the Union. The Union Government's answer was that they would raise no objection to the annexation by Norway of any new territory between 20° ~~E~~ and 40° E. This decision was conveyed informally to the Norwegian Government by the British Minister in Oslo. In the event, the Norwegians annexed the territory (formally in 1939).

(iv) A proposal for a South African expedition to this area was put forward in 1930 by a Captain Joyce. The British Polar Committee got to hear of it, and pointed out that relations with Norway would be disturbed should the idea be carried out, in view of the assurances given by the Union in (iii) immediately above. The Union Government therefore decided not to support the proposal.

(c) Recognition of Claims.

Union: Per circular telegram of 9th March, 1948, the Union explicitly stated that "the continent itself is unoccupied ~~res nullius~~ and as such can be made the subject of special ad hoc international arrangements which could be altered from time to time ... British claims should be distinguished from this continental aspect".

Again in similar notes dated 5th November, 1948, to Australians, Norwegians, French, Argentines and Chileans we stated: "As you are aware, the Union has never advanced any claim to Antarctic territory, most of which, in default of effective occupation can only be regarded as terra ~~nullius~~".

Australia: (February, 1956): The Australian Government supports the sector principle, and does not favour any form of international control. They recognise the Antarctic claims of the United Kingdom, New Zealand, France and the Norwegian claim to the sector between 20° W and 45° E. They do not recognise either the Chilean or Norwegian claims in the sector 80° W - 150° W.

THE UNION AND ANTARCTICA.

I. BACKGROUND.

(a) The Antarctic Continent is normally considered to be that region lying to the South of 60° S.

(b) Existing claims.

(i) Basis.

In the course of this century, various countries have laid claim to "sectors" of the area, their claims being based as a general rule on discovery and notification of annexation. The third requisite, normally demanded in international law to support claims of sovereignty i.e. effective occupation, is, by virtue of the relatively uninhabitable nature of the region, absent. Title resting only on discovery and annexation is generally considered to give rights of inchoate nature and limited duration, unless perfected by effective occupation.

The boundaries of the sectors claimed run along lines of longitude, and therefore have their apex at the Pole itself.

(ii) Countries claiming.

United Kingdom:	90° W - 20° W
Norway :	20° W - 45° E
Australia :	
	(a) 45° E - 136° E
	(b) 142° E - 160° E
France :	136° E - 142° E
New Zealand :	16° E - 150° E
Chile :	90° W - 53° W
Argentina :	74° W - 25° W

Unclaimed:

90° W - 150° W - i.e. the Southern Pacific with exception of Peter I Island, claimed by Norway.

UITERS GEHEIM
TOP SECRET

455

SECRET



DEPARTEMENT VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

PRACTICA.

Mons. Kitzoff,

Dept. van Handel en Nywerheid

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the South of 60° S.

Met die komplimente van die
Sekretaris van Buitelandse sake.

With the Compliments of the
Secretary for External Affairs.

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Unclaimed:

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claimed by Norway.

/..

cooperative relationships with Specialized Agencies of the United Nations.

- c. Provide for such joint administrative arrangements as might be necessary and desirable to accomplish the agreed objectives.
- d. Ensure that no political rivalries in Antarctica endanger the constructive program contemplated. This could be accomplished by freezing the legal status quo in Antarctica at the beginning of the treaty and for its duration. Under this procedure no State would be required to renounce any claim of sovereignty which it might have asserted; no State would be obliged to recognize any claims asserted by other countries; and no new rights would be acquired or claims asserted by any country after the treaty has come into effect and for its duration. If at any time the treaty should be terminated, the legal situation in Antarctica would revert to the status quo ante.

3. ANTARCTIC CONFERENCE:

If it should be agreed that a treaty should be concluded to accomplish the foregoing objectives, then presumably a conference would have to be convened for that purpose. The question arises of when such a conference might take place and where it should convene. If a program along the foregoing lines is to progress, it would be useful to exchange views at an early date on the time and place of such a conference.

4. PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES:

If an Antarctic conference should be convened to conclude a treaty for the purposes set forth above, it is assumed that the countries which have conducted scientific research in the Antarctic region during the current International Geophysical Year would wish to participate.

The Government of the United States has not yet formulated in any fixed or final form its policy in regard to the matters of substance and procedure outlined in the four preceding paragraphs. Without prejudice to the rights which it has consistently asserted in Antarctica, it would prefer to consult with the Governments of other interested countries before reaching any final conclusions; and it believes that a flexible approach to these problems on the part of all concerned would be conducive to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. For this purpose the Government of the United States invites an expression of the views of the other interested Governments in regard to the questions raised above, in the hope that mutual agreement can be reached on a long range solution of the Antarctic problem.

The Governments of the other countries which have participated in Antarctic program of the International Geophysical Year are likewise being consulted by means of identical Aide Memoire.

It is suggested that this preliminary consultation be considered confidential until such time as public proposals can be made with some assurance of a satisfactory outcome.
Ends.

TELEGRAM

FROM: U.A. Embassy, WASHINGTON D.C.
TO: Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA

25th March, 1958 (4.37 p.m.)

GEHEIM
SECRET

No. 66

SECRET (SIMP)

Repeated Savings to London No. 2.

My immediately preceding telegram.

AIDE MEMOIRE.

Begins:

In view of the desirability of continuing in the future the fruitful scientific cooperation in Antarctica now being carried on so successfully during the International Geophysical Year on the basis of agreement among the interested countries, the Government of the United States wishes to ascertain the views of the Government of the Union of South Africa in regard to the following possible approach to the problem:

1. GENERAL POLICY OBJECTIVES:

Before undertaking to work out the details of any program for Antarctica it would seem desirable that there be broad agreement among the interested countries in regard to the basic objectives to be sought in a common Antarctic policy. It has been suggested that among the principal objectives to be sought there should be included the following:

- a. Freedom of scientific investigation throughout Antarctica by citizens, organisations, and Governments of all countries; and a continuation of the international scientific cooperation which is being carried out so successfully during the current International Geophysical Year.
- How* b. International agreement to ensure that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only.

2. ANTARCTIC TREATY:

It has been suggested that the major objectives to be sought in a common international Antarctic policy could best be achieved by means of a multilateral treaty among the countries having a direct interest in Antarctica. If this procedure should be adopted, such a treaty might contain provisions which would:

- a. Give legal effect to the general policy objectives and major principles set forth above by embodying them in treaty form.
- b. Provide for reports to the United Nations and

2/- cooperative

Received G.P.O. : 26/3/58. (7.01 a.m.)
" Office : 26/3/58. (8.30 a.m.)

COPY NO. 15

GEHEIM
SECRET

TELEGRAM.

FROM : S. A. Embassy, WASHINGTON.

TO : Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA.

25th March, 1958. (4.34 p.m.)

No. 65. SECRET (SIMP)

Repeated Savings to London No. 1.

My immediately following telegram contains text of State Department Aide Memoire handed to us today.

State Department made following points orally:

1. The Governments to which identical Aides Memoire have been given are United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Chile, France, Norway, Soviet Union, Japan, Belgium, which with South Africa and United States are the twelve countries which have co-operated in the Antarctic programme of the I.G.Y.
2. Timing of any future joint action is important and it is hoped that Governments will submit considered views on United States proposals at early date "preferably in a matter of weeks".
3. Premature leakage outside the "twelve" might give rise to unwelcome initiatives from other sources. Therefore, strict secrecy important at least until such time as views of all twelve are known and consideration can be given to next steps.

/AN.

A.

102/2/7.

GEHEIM.

455

COPY NO. 15



DEPARTEMENT VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Mrs. Kobzenberg, 29 MAR 1958
Dept. van Handel en Nywerheid,
Pretoria.

Met die komplimente van die
Sekretaris van Buitelandse sake.

With the Compliments of the
Secretary for External Affairs.

Afskrifte nos. 15 van telegramme
65 en 66 van ons Ambassade,
Washington, word hierby aangeleg.

Die telegramme het betrekking
op die hets - departementelle
vergadering wat vir 3 n.m. op
1 April (in nms. G.A. poste en
kantors) gereël is.

J.H. Killeen -
29/3.

B.

rs, PRETORIA.
(4.34 p.m.)

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/AR.

B.

COPY NO. 12...

102/2
102/2/7

TELEGRAM

FROM: Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA
TO: S.A. Embassy, WASHINGTON D.C.

2nd April, 1958

SECRET

No. 64 SECRET (SIMP) of the

Your telegrams Nos. 65 and 66 re Antarctica.

Suggest you informally advise State Department that Union is vitally interested in any developments affecting the future of Antarctica, as we have frequently emphasised in the past.

In so far as present proposals are concerned, you may say that in view of general election it is quite impossible at the moment to obtain Ministerial direction. You may however assure Americans that proposal is being carefully studied, and Union's reaction will be cabled as soon as possible.

Reference your despatch 14th March we are sending you details of Union's participation in I.C.Y. activities in Antarctica.

AGB/ab

COPY NO. 11..

102/2
102/2/7

TELEGRAM

FROM: Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA
TO: S.A. Embassy, WASHINGTON D.C.

2nd April, 1958

GEHEIM
SECRET

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Reference your despatch 14th March we are sending you details of Union's participation in I.G.Y. activities in Antarctica.

AGD/ab

102/2/7.

**GEHEIM
SECRET**IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM.

FROM : Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA.

TO : B.A. High Commissioner, LONDON.

31st March, 1958.

No. 75. SECRET (SIMP)

Reference telegrams Savings Nos. 1 and 2 from Washington to you re Antarctica.

Grateful if you would ascertain urgently preliminary reaction of British authorities to American proposal, and if known in London that of New Zealand also. This information required before noon tomorrow April 1st.

Must emphasize that only reaction to principle required at this juncture. Would appreciate full air-mail report on British attitude and on relevant developments which might come to your notice, as soon as possible.

Canberra has also been approached for reactions of Australian authorities.

GEHEIM
SECRET

COPY NO. 102/1/...

102/2/7.

IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM.

FROM ; Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA.

TO : S.A. High Commissioner, LONDON.

31st March, 1953.

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Canberra has also been approached for reactions of Australian authorities.

AED/ME.

SECRETIMMEDIATE CYPHER OTF TELEGRAM.

FROM : Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA.

TO : S.A. High Commissioner, CANBERRA.

31st March, 1958.

No. 13. X SECRET X

Reference U.S. demarche last week on Antarctica which was addressed amongst others to Australia and Union.

Matter being considered here at departmental level, and it would assist considerably in deliberations if preliminary reactions at least of Commonwealth authorities were known. Please endeavour ascertain urgently the provisional view of Australians, and if known in Canberra that of New Zealand authorities also, towards the American proposal and cable reply to reach me before noon tomorrow April 1st. Must emphasise that only preliminary reaction however tentative required at this juncture. Full airmail report on thinking of the Australian Government, and on relevant developments from time to time which might come to your notice, should be despatched as soon as practicable.

Americans have stressed need for strict secrecy to avoid unwelcome initiatives from other sources.

AGD/AN.

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

IMMEDIATE CYPHER OTP TELEGRAM.

FROM : Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA.

TO : S.A. High Commissioner, CANBERRA.

31st March, 1958.

No. 13. X SECRET X

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Americans have stressed need for strict secrecy to avoid unwelcome initiatives from other sources.

AGD/AN.

Received G.P.O. : 1/4/58. (4.18 p.m.)

COPY NO. 14
....

" Office : 2/4/58. (8.45 a.m.)

GEHEIM

SECRET

EMERGENCY TELEGRAM.

FROM : B.A. High Commissioner, LONDON.

TO : Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA.

1st April, 1958. (12.08 p.m.)

No. 59. SECRET (SIMP)

Your No. 75 received mutilated last night.

British and New Zealand was not obtainable until 10 a.m. this morning which is noon South African time.

American proposal acceptable in broad principle to United Kingdom and New Zealand. They and Australia received copies of Aide Memoire for information only since they had already discussed matter at official level in Washington.

British will therefore not reply to Aide Memoire now. They are putting whole question to their Ministers this week before expressing firm views to non-Commonwealth countries. They will inform us in meantime of Ministers conclusions which they expect may differ from American proposals on some points of detail.

Above information probably not available for week or two but will be reported airmail earliest.

Received G.P.O. : 1/4/58. (4.18 p.m.)

COPY NO. 13

Office : 2/4/58. (8.45 a.m.)

GEHEIM
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Above information probably not available for week or two but will be reported airmail earliest.

IMMEDIATE CYPHER O.T.P. TELEGRAM

FROM: S.A. High Commissioner, CANBERRA
TO: Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA

1st April, 1958 (4.33 p.m.)

No.10 X SECRET X

ANTARCTICA.

Your telegram No.13 received this morning.

2. I had taken advantage of calling on Mr. Casey 31st March after his return from Manila to sound him about Australia's views on United States proposal.

3. I mentioned on basis of report from Ambassador Washington of 13th March, that United States had informed Union Government main line of American thinking. Casey said he had been asked (presumably by Americans) whether he had any objection to our being consulted and had replied at once that of course he fully agreed. He realized very well our interest in Antarctica.

4. Australian Government seemed to be in general support of the United States proposal as outlined Washington despatch. They accept it would be impracticable to try to exclude Russians from any general arrangements. Russians were in Antarctica and in Australian sector and everyone knew how hard it was to get them to move out once they had foot-hold.

5. In circumstances Australia agreed that:

- a. emphasis should continue to be placed on advancement scientific work after I.G.Y. had ended;
- b. there should be complete freedom of movement between scientists in continent;
- c. non-militarization should be ensured. Latter requirement Casey said was of most vital importance since missile bases if established there, would be within 2,500 miles from Australia's southern cities. He could well understand that South Africa while further from Antarctica had no land masses in between and would have similar fears.

6. Casey said that conference would clearly be necessary to get these principles established. He gave impression that attempt might be made to have it held very shortly. He appeared to agree in general with list given in Washington despatch but when I mentioned(?) Japan seemed dubious.

7. He said he had asked Mr. Nash in Manila why he had put forward idea of international control which was so embarrassing to Australia. Mr. Nash replied that he had thought of it four years ago while in opposition. In latest statements he has placed less emphasis on United Nations(?) as possible administering body and now refers to International administration "under United Nations auspices".

/ab

Recd: G.P.O. 1/4/58 (3.45 p.m.)
Office " (9.00 a.m.)

13
COPY NO...12
102/2
102/2/7

IMMEDIATE OTHER G.P.O. TELEGRAM

FROM: S.A. High Commissioner, CANBERRA
TO: Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA

1st April, 1958 (4.33 p.m.)

No.10 X SECRET X

ANTARCTICA.

Your telegram No.13 received this morning.

2. I had taken advantage of calling on Mr. Casey 11th March after his return from Manila to sound him about Australian's views on United States proposal.

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102/2/7

102/2

102/1

GEHEIM.

PRETORIA.

BRINGEND.

10 APR 1958

WS
10/4/58

DIE SEKRETARIS VAN VERVOER.
 → DIE SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.
 (Vir aandag mnr. Kitshoff).
 DIE SEKRETARIS VAN DIE BESTE MINISTER.
 (Vir aandag mnr. Van Eyssen) Ter inligting.
 DIE PRESIDENT : WETENSKAPLIKE EN NYWERHEIDSAVORSINGSRAAD.
 DIE SEKRETARIS VAN VERDEDIGING. (Aandag mnr. Rowan).

Die Suidpoolgebied.

Na aanleiding van die besluit gesem gedurende die inter-departementele samesprekings oor die Unie se belange in Antarktika wat op 1 April 1958 plaasgevind het, ontvang ek nou graag so gou doenlik u amptelike kommentaar oor die jongste Amerikaanse voorstelle in verband met 'n moontlike internasionale beheer oor Antarktika. Afskrifte van die twee telegramme gedateer 25 Maart vanuit Washington wat 'n samevatting van die voorlopige voorstelle gee, en van 'n memorandum bevattende agtergrondsinligting, is reeds in u besit. 'n Ekstra stel word aangeheg ingeval u gebruik daarvan wil maak. Afskrifte van die telegramwisseling tussen hierdie Departement en ons missies in Londen en Canberra word ook ter inligting aangeheg.

Ek wil u terselfdertyd daaraan herinner dat die verteenwoordigers by die vergadering dit eens was dat Departemente, wanneer hulle hul kommentaar oor die nuwe voorstelle oordra, ook hulle beskouing van die Unie se belange in die Suidpoolstreek aandui, en die wenslikheid al dan nie om daar gebied te bekom. Onthou sal word dat hierdie kommentaar die grondslag sal vorm van enige toekomstige voorlegging aan die Regering.

2. ~~SEKRETARIS VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE.~~

GEHEIM.

Recd: G.P.O. 11/4/58 (10.05 a.m.)
Office " (10.35 a.m.)

COPY NO.....¹²

102/2
102/2/7

IMMEDIATE GYMER O.T.P. TELEGRAM

FROM: S.I. High Commissioner, GAMBERRA

TO: Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA

11th April, 1958 (3.37 p.m.)

SECRET

No.11 XX SECRET XX

Reference my telegram No.10.

ANTARCTICA.

1. Australians are concerned over A.P. message yesterday from Buenos Aires not yet published in Press here, which gives fairly comprehensive picture of United States proposal.
2. Department of External Affairs is preparing reply to the United States Aide Memoire. Australian Government will agree to freezing of position on everything on condition that:
 - (a) this does not prejudice their claim in any way and
 - (b) there is no commercial exploitation as distinct from scientific activity.
3. They envisage working party of officials in Washington but will press for conference to be held in Australia. They wish to play down(?) any suggestion of an "international authority" but are talking in terms of "machinery" to further scientific cooperation and to ensure non-militarization. This could be in two separate parts.
4. They are prepared to accept participation of all eleven recipients of United States Aide Memoire.

/ab

Recd: O.F.O. 11/4/58 (10.05 a.m.)
Office " (10.35 a.m.)

COPY NO...4...

102/2
102/2/7

IMMEDIATE CYBER O.F.O. TELEGRAM

FROM: S.A. High Commissioner, CANBERRA

TO: Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA

GEHEIM

11th April, 1958 (3.37 p.m.)

SECRET

No.11 XX SECRET XX

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/ab

455

LUCROSOX
AIR MAIL



102/2/7.
102/1
102/2

UNIE VAN SUID-AFRIKA
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

DEPARTEMENT VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE,
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,

PRETORIA.

GEHEIM.

DRINGEND.

14 APR 1958



W.S.
14/4/58 →

- DIE SEKRETARIS VAN VERDEDIGING.
- DIE SEKRETARIS VAN DIE EERSTE MINISTER. Ter inligting.
- DIE SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.
- DIE SEKRETARIS VAN VERVOER.
- DIE PRESIDENT: WETENSKAPLIKE EN NYWERHEIDNAVORSINGSRAAD.
- DIE SEKRETARIS: S.A.N.K.I.G.J.

Antarktika.

Na aanleiding van my diensbrief van 10 April 1958, heg ek hierby ter aanvulling aan afskrifte van telegram nr. 11 van 11 April, ontvang van ons Hoë Kommissaris te Canberra.

Soos gesien sal word, nader die Australiërs blykbaar reeds die stadium wanneer hulle hulle amptelike standpunt sal kan verkondig. Dit word derhalwe al hoe meer noodsaaklik dat die kommentaar van departemente, wat in my bovermelde diensbrief aangevra is, so gou moontlik ontvang word. Soos u u sal herinner, het hierdie Departement onderneem om die nodige kabinets-voorlegging, wat op u antwoorde gebaseer sal wees, op te stel. Dit word vertrou dat die voorlegging voor die einde van aanstaande week voltooi sal kan wees.

Moshaba
SEKRETARIS VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE.

GEHEIM.

A.:

GEHEIM.

18 APR 1958

DIE SEKRETARIS VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE : PRETORIA.

ANTARKTIKA.

1. Ek verwys na u diensbriewe 102/2/7 oor 102/1 oor 102/2 van 10 en 14 April.
2. Wat die hede betref is daar, vir sover dit die Unie se ekonomiese en handelsbelange betref, na die mening van hierdie Departement geen sterk saak uit te maak vir die Unie om gebied in Antarktika te bekom nie. Aan die anderkant kan die snelle ontwikkeling op die gebied van die wetenskap nie verontagsaam word nie en dit is denkbaar dat omstandighede binne afsienbare tyd dermate kan verander dat dit beslis in die Unie se ekonomiese belang kan wees om grondgebied in Antarktika te besit, of 'n aanspraak op sodanige grondgebied te hê. Mits die koste verbonde aan die verkryging en uitoefening van besitsreg dus nie onredelik hoog is nie, dink ek dat dit wys sou wees om pogings aan te wend om sodanige besitsreg te verkry.
3. Ek is dit eens met die Australiese mening dat dit onrealisties sou wees om Rusland by enige voorgestelde algemene reëlings rakende Antarktika te probeer uithou. Die beste waarvoor die betrokke Westerse lande hulle kan beywer skyn te wees om, by sodanige algemene reëlings, die bevordering van die wetenskap voorop te stel en te probeer verseker dat militêre oogmerke nie nagestreef word nie. Selfs al word hierdie doelstellings in 'n ooreenkoms tussen die belanghebbende partye vasgelê, wil dit natuurlik nog gladnie sê dat dit in die praktyk wel uitgeleef sal word nie.
4. Te oordeel na die ondervinding van die verlede met die V.V.O. sou dit gerade wees om daardie organisasie sover as moentlik op die agtergrond te probeer skuif by enige internasionale masjinerie wat geskep mag word om aangeleenthede in verband met Antarktika te behartig.

Ekstra
 B. DE WAAL MEYER

SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.

JS/

GEHEIM.

1 6 APR 1958

DIE SEKRETARIS VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE : PRETORIA.

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ekstra
D. DE WAAL MEYER

SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.

JS/

GEHEIM.

16 APR 1958

DIE SEKRETARIS VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE : PRETORIA.

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D. DE WAAL MEYER

SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.

JS/ *M*

Received G.P.O : 25/6/58 (8.56 am)
Office: 25/6/58 (8.30 am)

457.

TELEGRAM.

FROM : S.A. Embassy, WASHINGTON.
TO : Secretary for External Affairs, PRETORIA.

24th June, 1958. (3.05 pm)

GEHEIM
SECRET

No. 105 RECG-T. (EAS)

Antarctica...
today's meeting about which report follows by airmail
agreed to accept as basis for exchange of views the
Australian headings referred to in my minute 43/44 of
June 13th.

At next meeting July 1st there will be general discussion on all these headings with particular consideration of "Definition of Antarctica" and "Position in regard to non-signatories."
If you have views other than those already communicated to us on any of these points we would appreciate receiving them before July 1st.

Let Antelander sake geso, dit help me
one of 3 Julie Gus Komagubian te
via oor sake wat of 1 Julie needs
besprek sou word me.

EAS

455

102/2/7.

LEGACY
MAIL



UNIE VAN SUID-AFRIKA.
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

DEPARTEMENT VAN BUITELANDSE SAKKE
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET.

PRETORIA.

URGENT.

3 - JUL 1958



→ THE SECRETARY FOR TRANSPORT.
THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE.
THE SECRETARY FOR COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES.
THE PRESIDENT: COUNCIL FOR SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH.

Antarctica.

I attach, for consideration and comment, a copy of telegram No. 105 received from our Embassy in Washington, requesting guidance on the attitude to be adopted by the Embassy representatives attending the current preliminary discussions on the proposed Treaty on Antarctica. In this regard see also my minute of ~~the~~ today's date. X

X
It will be noted that particular attention is to be paid at the next meeting of these representatives inter alia to the question of a definition of Antarctica. In view of possible restrictions on military and commercial operation in the region falling within the purview of the Treaty, which might well be written into it, the implications need no emphasis.

Your urgent comments would be appreciated.

Alida
SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

SECRET.

Let Buitelandse Sake gesê, dit help me om op 3 Julie ons kommissie te vra oor sake wat op 1 Julie reeds bespreek sou word nie.

EGAS

Handwritten notes:
X
dit het my...
mit...
Registrasie
waarskynlik?
EGAS
3/7

B.
EGAS

to questions, that each of the twelve governments should be represented equally on whatever body should be set up. He thought also that it would not be advisable to adopt the principle of unanimity which would give one State a veto power. A two-thirds majority system, he thought, would be satisfactory; but he recognised that this might not be acceptable to the Russians.

(g) Duration of Treaty: Mr. Daniels thought that the duration of the Treaty should be for an indefinite period. He did not favour provision for withdrawal, but realised that this might be necessary if all the details of administration and control were not decided on before the conclusion of the Treaty.

5. Apparently the United States would be prepared to go ahead with the Conference and Treaty even should the Soviet Union react unfavourably, or fail to react, to their proposals. This is something we have suspected; and when I put the question to Mr. Daniels directly during our talk, he more or less confirmed it by saying that there would seem to be no point in abandoning a constructive mutual enterprise merely because one of the twelve - be it the Soviet Union, South Africa or any other Government, was hesitant. He was obviously concerned, however, about the Australian attitude should the Russians not agree to co-operate. He professed to appreciate the Australian position (my report 43/44 of 14th May, 1958) but remarked rather cryptically that whereas a month or two ago Australia wanted nothing to do with the Russians, they now wanted to do nothing without them.

I asked Mr. Daniels whether he was still thinking along the lines that the Treaty should be open to accession by countries other than the "Twelve" who had co-operated in the I.G.Y. programme in Antarctica. The line of his reply was that it might not be politic to exclude the possibility of accessions, given the principle of freedom of access for scientific co-operation. Looking at the question practically, however, he doubted whether any other countries would be able to show sufficient real and direct interest to qualify for accession. He seemed to be hopeful that the Indians would accept the position (he implied also that it had not been without difficulty or argument that the State Department had arrived at their proposals which would exclude India). From his remarks I gained the impression that the United States position, at least on available data, is that India has no part to play in Antarctica.

(sgd.) J.G. Stewart
COUNSELLOR.

WASHINGTON D.C.,
2nd June, 1958.

and that the Australians were now hesitant about Canberra because of practical difficulties should the Conference overlap with the opening of Parliament in September (confirmed to us by the Australian Embassy).

3. As soon as all Governments have agreed in principle to the United States proposals, formal preparatory work could begin in Washington. In the meantime this preparatory work should be carried forward on the basis of informal exchanges of views. The only Government whose reactions are still awaited is the Soviet Union. There had been one encouraging sign from the Soviet Union. The American Ambassador had discussed the proposals with Mr. Zarubin (former Ambassador to the United States and now in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and the latter had commented favourably on them.
4. The preparatory work would be to agree on the broad lines of a Treaty to be confirmed at the Conference. This treaty should be short and to the point, setting out the principles of co-operation. The essential articles would be:
 - (a) A preamble setting out the "high objectives".
 - (b) A statement on peaceful use of Antarctica.
 - (c) A statement on continued scientific co-operation.
 - (d) A statement on the freezing of claims to sovereignty.
 - (e) A statement on freedom of access to Antarctica for scientific purposes. Mr. Daniels thought that any country desiring access for scientific purposes would have to subscribe to the principles of the Treaty and accept the Administrative or control arrangements set up under the Treaty.
 - (f) An undertaking to designate representatives to meet to work out the continuing administrative arrangements. This may be the stickiest part of the negotiations for Mr. Daniels admitted that certain countries (Chile in particular) might require assurance on the methods and details of administration and control before committing themselves to a Treaty. He himself would prefer to leave these details to be worked out later, provided it were understood that they should conform with the principles of the Treaty. As a compromise it might be possible to agree on certain stated principles which should govern the details to be elaborated later. One of the things to avoid would be giving the impression of setting up any sort of supra-national authority. The terms "authority", "régime", etc., should be avoided as far as possible, with the emphasis rather on mutual co-operation. While he was not prepared to discuss details of the continuing machinery, he did express the view, in response

COPY/MC

CONFIDENTIAL.

AMBASSADOR.

Over the week-end I had the opportunity of a fairly lengthy talk with Ambassador Daniels of the State Department (Special Assistant on Antarctic Affairs). While the occasion was an informal one Mr. Daniels indicated that what he had to say could not be classified as informal or formal, but rather on the border-line between the two. This is the manner in which he has been handling the preparations for the Antarctica Conference over the last few weeks. As he puts it, he is stimulating exchanges of views on the social and informal level in order to clear the air for more practical discussions. I should explain that his procedure of operation over the last few weeks has been to establish close personal relations with responsible officials in the eleven Embassies concerned, to stimulate contact between them and to throw out to the various individuals or groups certain broadly conceived ideas - without any commitment - and await their reactions. My observations lead me to the conclusion that in this procedure of his he has been almost as frank with us as he has been with the three other Commonwealth Governments, and, I think, franker than with most of the other Governments. This has been the position ever since the series of meetings you had with him last Autumn, as a result of which he conceded the direct interest of the Union (I think we were the only Embassy, apart from the three other Commonwealth Embassies, with which he discussed in advance the ideas contained in the Aide Memoire of March 24th).

I mention the foregoing because Mr. Daniels has let me gain the impression that he thinks that the United States and the Union may think similarly on many of the principles at issue; and that he hopes we shall find ourselves in a position to support the United States viewpoint.

With that introduction I summarise below the points made by Mr. Daniels in our discussion. Some of these are not new to what we have already reported. Also it must be borne in mind that he claimed to be merely "thinking ahead":-

1. The Conference should be held before the next U.N. General Assembly.
2. Although Mr. Daniels was careful not to say so, he made it fairly clear that he wants the Conference to be held in the United States, and also that he hopes that Washington may be the seat of any "continuing machinery". He said that the Chilean venue was out of the question, that the Argentine venue was uncertain, that London probably would be unacceptable to the South Americans,

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COPY/MC

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA,
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.

2nd June, 1958.

AIRBAG.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Secretary for External Affairs,
PRETORIA.

Antarctica.

I enclose a memorandum by the Counsellor on a talk he has had with Ambassador Daniels, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Antarctica.

Mr. Daniels has spoken with me too over the last few days and given evidence of his desire to cooperate closely with this Embassy. It would certainly be useful to receive at an early date any views the Union authorities may have formed on the scope of the proposed Treaty and details of continuing machinery, etc. The present atmosphere of informal consultation which is being created is to our advantage in our relations with the State Department on this subject and should provide a useful opportunity for sounding out the reactions of other Governments.

(sgd.) W.D. du Plessis

AMBASSADOR

It is, however, not clear from the wording of the Soviet note whether they are making the participation of additional countries a condition for their participation in the proposed conference. From the way the note is worded it would appear that they are not doing so, and this is the way the State Department intends to read it until it appears to the contrary.

When asked for the United States views on the Russian proposal the official concerned intimated that the State Department "at present" opposed them. We do not know whether any significance should be attached to the use of the words "at present" in the reply given.

Another statement in the Soviet note which might possibly create complications is to the effect that the proposed Treaty should not include any clause dealing with the question of territorial claims in the Antarctic which might be considered as placing certain States in an unequal position with regard to others. It is not clear what the Soviets have in mind but it may be that they are suggesting that the Treaty should not recognize directly or indirectly that any States have made any territorial claims in Antarctica. Since it is conceivable that States who have made territorial claims in Antarctica would wish recognition to be given to this fact in, for example, the statement on the freezing of claims to sovereignty, the Soviet viewpoint if interpreted correctly could give rise to some difficulty.

We have not had an opportunity to discuss any of the above points with our colleagues, but as informal discussions are taking place early next week, we will then no doubt hear more of these matters. In addition we have been informed by an officer of the State Department that Ambassador Daniels hopes to arrange a meeting of the group of twelve for Friday morning 13th June, when it is hoped to make a start of regular discussions amongst the group. As the group will, therefore, possibly even next Friday settle down to substantive discussions I shall be glad if you will provide us as soon as possible with any views which the Union authorities may have on the scope and form of the Treaty, etc.

(sgd.) J.G. Stewart

CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES a.i.

COPY/MC

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA,

WASHINGTON 8, D.C.

6th June, 1958.

AIRBAG.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Secretary for External Affairs,
PRETORIA.

Antarctica.

I have to advise you that the Soviet Union, the only country whose reactions to President Eisenhower's proposals re Antarctica were still outstanding, has now transmitted its reply to the State Department.

Although we were not able to obtain a copy of the Soviet reply, nevertheless a copy was showed to a member of this Embassy on request. The Soviets have accepted President Eisenhower's proposals in principle but their note introduces a new element which is somewhat disturbing. The note suggests that the effectiveness of a conference and the proposed International Treaty would be considerably greater if all States who expressed a desire to do so were to participate. It argues that such an important question as the use of the Antarctic exclusively for peaceful purposes goes beyond the interests merely of those States already conducting scientific research in this area, and that account should also be taken of those States who may have some interests there in the future. The note states that in particular the well-known initiative taken by India in 1956 when it proposed discussing this question within the United Nations indicates the interests of other countries in the Antarctic being used exclusively for peaceful purposes and in the freedom of scientific research. The note, therefore, concludes that the participation of a sufficiently large number of States in the discussion of the question of the Antarctic might be ensured by calling a conference of all States that express a desire to take part in it.

The Soviet suggestion is perhaps not entirely unexpected because in a conference as at present envisaged they would stand alone whereas if they are able to expand its membership somewhat to include some of the Soviet bloc and neutralist countries who would follow their lead they would, if necessary, be in a more favourable bargaining position.

/...

account the practice already prevailing, are most expedient.

As regards the proposal contained in the U.S. State Department's letter of May 2 for convening an international conference, the Soviet Government states that it is ready to take part in that conference to discuss the use of the Antarctic for peaceful purposes exclusively and the freedom of scientific investigation in this area for all countries on an equal basis, and to take part in drafting a corresponding international treaty.

While agreeing to take part in the aforementioned conference, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to point out that the conference and the projected international treaty on the Antarctic would be much more effective if all states wishing to do so would take part in the discussion of this question. There is no doubt that such an important question as the use of the Antarctic for peaceful purposes exclusively transcends the interests of the states already carrying on scientific investigation in that area. The question of the freedom of scientific investigation in the Antarctic is of interest not only to those states already carrying on this work but also to those who would like to undertake corresponding scientific investigation in the future. Indicative of the interest of other countries in the use of the Antarctic for peaceful purposes exclusively and in the freedom of scientific investigation is, among other things, the well-known initiative taken by India in 1956 when it proposed that this question be discussed within the framework of the United Nations.

Participation by a sufficiently wide range of states in the discussion of the question regarding the Antarctic could, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, be ensured by convening a conference of all states expressing a desire to take part in it.

Bearing in mind that the State Department's letter of May 2 says that the question concerning the time and place of the conference on the Antarctic would be a matter for additional examination in order to adopt a mutually acceptable decision, the Soviet Government awaits proposals on this question and is prepared to take part in discussion of them.

PRAVDA, June 4, 1958.

1. The Antarctic should be used by all countries for peaceful purposes exclusively; this implies, among other things, that no military bases should be set up in the Antarctic, and no military, naval and air maneuvers - as well as the testing of any weapons - should be held there.

2. The governments, organizations and citizens of all countries should enjoy freedom of scientific investigation throughout the entire Antarctic on an equal basis.

The Soviet Union considers it useful that the above principles, which have developed in practice in the course of scientific co-operation during the International Geophysical Year, should be fixed in an international agreement ensuring the successful development of scientific investigations in the Antarctic for a long time to come.

The Soviet Government agrees that an important aim of the projected international agreement should be the prevention of any international misunderstanding that could hinder successful scientific investigation in this area.

With reference to the question of territorial claims in the Antarctic made by some countries, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to state again that it has not recognized and cannot recognize as lawful any separate settlement of the question regarding state ownership of the Antarctic. In this connection it is well to recall the outstanding services of Russian explorers in the discovery of the Antarctic and, among other things, the universally-known fact that it was precisely the Russian navigators Bellinshausen and Lazarev who early in the nineteenth century were the first to reach the shores of the Antarctic and circle that continent.

The Soviet Union reserves all rights based on the discoveries and explorations by Russian navigators and scientists, including the right to present appropriate territorial claims on the Antarctic.

At the same time the Soviet Government considers it possible and desirable in the interests of all mankind, and guided by the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter, to reach an international agreement ensuring the freedom of scientific investigation in the Antarctic and its exclusive use for peaceful purposes.

For achieving that aim it is important, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, to prevent at the very outset complications that may arise from attempts, direct or indirect, to settle or predetermine the question concerning the territorial claims of states in the Antarctic. In this light it would be well that the projected treaty not include any provisions affecting the question of territorial claims in the Antarctic, which could be regarded as placing some states in an unequal status with regard to other states.

The projected treaty could, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, envisage such forms of international scientific co-operation in the Antarctic which, taking into

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS,

PRESS DEPARTMENT,

1706 18th Street, N.W. WASHINGTON 9, D.C.

Translation from the Soviet Press.

No. 329.

June 5, 1958.

Exchange of Letters
between U.S. State Department and Soviet Embassy
in the U.S.A. on the Antarctic.

On May 2, 1958, the U.S. State Department sent a letter to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, proposing that a conference be convened on the question of the Antarctic. On June 2 the Soviet Embassy in Washington gave the State Department the following answer:

Letter of the Embassy of the USSR in the U.S.A. of June 2

In connection with the letter of the U.S. State Department of May 2, 1958, on the question of the Antarctic, the Embassy of the USSR, on instructions of the Soviet Government, has the honour to communicate the following:

The Government of the USSR, like the Government of the U.S.A., notes with satisfaction that representatives of scientific circles of a number of countries which are carrying on investigations in the Antarctic under the program of the International Geophysical Year are cooperating fruitfully.

The competent Soviet scientific circles which are cooperating with representatives of scientific organizations in the special Committee on Antarctic Investigations, set up by the International Council of Scientific Unions, approve the measures adopted by this committee in The Hague in February 1958 to continue international cooperation in the Antarctic after the end of the Geophysical Year. Soviet scientific organizations are also ready in the future to coordinate their efforts in the Antarctic with scientists of all other countries, considering that this would make it possible to develop the successes achieved in the scientific investigations during the International Geophysical Year.

The Soviet Government on its part is prepared to render all possible help for the development of international scientific cooperation in the Antarctic in the future as well. In the opinion of the Soviet Government this cooperation should be based, as hitherto, on the following principles:

COPY/MC

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA,
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.,

11th June, 1958.

AIRBAG.

The Secretary for External Affairs,
PRETORIA.

Antarctica.

I refer to my minute 43/44 of 6th June, 1958, regarding the Soviet reaction to President Eisenhower's proposals re Antarctica and attach for your information a Soviet Embassy press release which contains the text of the Russian reply.

You will note that the Soviet Union reserves all rights based on discoveries and explorations of Russian navigators and scientists including the right to present appropriate territorial claims in the Antarctic. In addition the note states that the Soviet Government "has not recognised and cannot recognise as lawful any separate settlement of the question regarding state ownership of Antarctic".

I am also enclosing copies of the French and Chilean replies to the United States invitation.

(sgd.) J.G. Stewart

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES.

CONFIDENTIAL.

- 4 -

preparatory talks may drive the Americans to propose proceeding without them. Should such a situation arise, we feel that the position should be further considered and you will, no doubt, consult us.

It may also be useful for you to have the attached record of a recent discussion between the Under-Secretary and the Japanese Consul-General on a number of points raised by the Japanese. A copy of the Japanese Aide Memoire is also enclosed.

(sgd.) W.C. Naudé

for SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

AIRMAIL.

The High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa,

LONDON.

CANBERRA.

For your information. Copies of Washington's minute of the 2nd June, and of the record of the discussions with the Japanese, are attached.

(sgd.) M.I. Botha

for SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL.

- 3 -

We should ascertain the views of our friends concerning the preference of Ambassador Daniels for a treaty of indefinite duration. We have no decided opinion as yet on this question and the question of withdrawal, but several thoughts occur to us. We appreciate that in wanting to exclude a provision for withdrawal, Ambassador Daniels has in mind preventing the Russians from pulling out of the contract, but we think that the Russians would not take the point into account if they really wanted to withdraw. Their previous record in W.H.O. bears this out - W.H.O. has no provision for withdrawal, but this did not prevent the Russians withdrawing when they wanted to. It should be pointed out, too, that the United States has argued in the past in favour of the right to withdraw on the grounds that a sovereign country must retain its right to freedom of action, and, in fact, in ratifying the W.H.O. constitution reserved its right to withdraw. Against this a fixed period treaty does in a way impose a greater obligation on member states to observe their undertakings for the duration of the treaty, and may thus perhaps discourage irresponsible withdrawals. Whatever is decided at the Conference about duration, a procedure for withdrawal could possibly be incorporated into the treaty to discourage irresponsible withdrawals - say a fairly lengthy period of notice, plus the approval of the controlling body.

Finally there is the question of the treaty being open to accession by countries other than the Twelve. We appreciate the argument that, given the principle of freedom of access for scientific co-operation, it might not be politic to exclude the possibility of accessions. But this is a difficult issue. It must be stated again that it is our primary concern that the control body should not be expanded beyond the twelve countries directly interested, and we are opposed to any increase in this number being invited to the conference. We realise, though, that in time other countries may establish an interest through their scientific activities, and it is conceivable that we might wish to agree to others acceding and subscribing to the principles of the treaty. Provision should perhaps be made for such an eventuality. But we must do our utmost to secure that any provision for accession in the treaty ensures that accession is on our terms viz. that acceding states do not become members of the control body. (As to the attitude of India, we have learned from the Australians that, according to their information from New Delhi, Krishna Menon is apparently unconcerned about the exclusion of India from the Twelve, and that it is chiefly their Permanent Representative at the United Nations who has been upset).

You raised in an earlier minute, of the 20th May, the question of our attitude should the Russians refuse the American invitation or not reply. The question, of course, now falls away in this form, but there is always the possibility that the Russian performance in the

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CONFIDENTIAL.

It is clear that the Americans want Washington as the venue in order to strengthen their case to have the "continuing machinery" centred there. Other participants may have other views on the headquarters question, and we should wait and see what suggestions emerge. Again, it is not in our view a fundamental issue.

As regards the content of the treaty, we agree with suggestions (a), (b) and (c) made by Ambassador Daniels (paragraph 4 of the Counsellor's memorandum). The suggestion ((d)) that the treaty should include a statement on the freezing of claims to sovereignty raises some difficulties, however. The Russians, according to your minute of 6th June, would appear to be opposed to the treaty's recognising territorial claims, either directly or indirectly. The Australians, on the other hand, have indicated that they have no intention of surrendering sovereignty over their sector, and they may therefore wish to see the treaty acknowledging territorial claims. Each view is likely to have its supporters. It is not yet clear to us how this divergence of opinion will be handled in the preliminary talks. If it should become necessary to take up a firm position you should consult us in good time indicating especially the viewpoint of Australia and the United Kingdom.

*Wait in
standpoint
we*

We are also in favour of the suggestion ((e)) that the treaty should contain a statement on freedom of access to Antarctica for scientific purposes. We think it is essential though, that any country desiring access for scientific purposes should have to subscribe to the principles of the treaty and accept the administrative and control arrangements established by the treaty. We feel most strongly that no such country should thereby be entitled to membership of the administrative or control group, which should be confined to the original twelve participants.

In regard to the "continuing machinery", we fully endorse Ambassador Daniels' view that each of the twelve governments should be represented equally on whatever body should be set up. It is indeed basic to our approach to the treaty and the arrangements made thereunder that we must guard against the Union being left out of the inner circle. We must exert ourselves to ensure that we are not left out.

As to the voting procedure, our preliminary thinking is that we would prefer the unanimity principle rather than the two-thirds majority. Failing agreement on unanimity, we would insist on a two-thirds majority at least. (It has occurred to us that a group of five Western countries could exercise a veto if necessary. We should be glad to receive your comments on this point). We realise the drawbacks of the unanimity principle in the context of the present treaty, and we should like to be kept informed of the other views.

course. Are you...
the possibility that the...

/...

SPECIAL AIRMAIL.

102/2/7

CONFIDENTIAL.

PRETORIA.

14th June, 1958.

URGENT.

The Chargé d'Affaires,
Embassy of the Union of South Africa,
WASHINGTON.

Antarctica.

The receipt of your minutes 43/44 of the 2nd and 6th June, 1958, is acknowledged with thanks.

To assist you in the preparatory discussions, I append hereunder the preliminary views of the Department on the points raised by Ambassador Daniels.

In the first place, we are not in favour of the preparatory talks taking matters so far that the conference will, in fact, be no more than a rubber stamp. We consider that issues are involved which may require the presence of officials from the home countries, and that since most of the participating countries would presumably not be able to arrange for such attendance at the preparatory talks, these countries will be at a decided disadvantage. Although the broad lines of a treaty are likely to emerge from the preparatory talks, the conference proper should be of such a nature as to allow exchanges of opinions by fully briefed delegates.

We are in complete agreement that the conference should be held and the treaty finalised before the next United Nations General Assembly.

As to the venue of the conference, we have no particular preferences, though it would be convenient for us if it were held in a place where we maintain a reasonably sized Mission. Certainly there is no cause for the question of a venue to become a major point of dissension. When the Australians approached us about Canberra, we gladly gave them our support, but, as you say, they are now doubtful whether they could, in fact, organise the conference because of practical difficulties. If the general feeling at the preparatory talks is in favour of Washington, we would have no objection.

/...

CONFIDENTIAL.

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA,
WASHINGTON.

19th June, 1958.

SECRET.

The Secretary for External Affairs,
PRETORIA.

Antarctica.

I spoke today with Mr. Booker, Counsellor of the Australian Embassy, about Australia's position in regard to an Antarctic Treaty, and he kindly gave me a written summary of their attitude, which is the basis on which they will approach the forthcoming preparatory talks. A copy of this summary is enclosed herewith. Mr. Booker made it quite clear that basic to the Australian attitude is a determination not to yield sovereignty over Australian territory. They would accept a freezing of the legal status quo but there could be no question of sovereignty being suspended during the duration of the Treaty or being delegated (except perhaps in certain minor administrative matters) to any international body.

Mr. Booker also gave me a memorandum embodying the tentative thinking of his Embassy on the articles of the proposed Treaty. I enclose a copy of the memorandum. In making it available Mr. Booker emphasised that it does not embody final Governmental views but rather the preliminary views of the Embassy which still have to be cleared with Canberra.

(sgd.) J.G. Stewart
CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES a.i.

SECRET.

LUGPOS.
AIR MAIL.



UNIE VAN SUID-AFRIKA.
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

102/2/7

Departement van Buitelandse Sake.
Department of External Affairs.

VERTROULIK.

PRETORIA.

3 JUL 1958

DIE SEKRETARIS VAN VERVOER.
DIE SEKRETARIS VAN VERDEDIGING.
→ DIE SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.
DIE PRESIDENT : WETENSKAPLIKE EN NYWERHEIDNAVORSINGSRAAD.

Antarktika.

Ek stuur u hiermee, ter inligting, die teks van die Russiese antwoord op die Amerikaanse uitnodiging om die konferensie van twaalf lande by te woon wat 'n aanneemlike beleid ten opsigte van Antarktika sal probeer vaslê.

Opgelet sal word dat die Russe in geen opsig bereid is om moontlike territoriale eise van hulle kant op te lê nie.

Soos reeds aan u bekend gemaak is, word voorlopige samesprekings oor 'n Antarktiese beleid tans in Washington deur die plaaslike verteenwoordigers van die betrokke lande gevoer. Om ons Ambassade aldaar in staat te stel om die Unie se saak te verdedig, moes hierdie Departement inderhaas voorlopige instruksies opstel en afstuur. 'n Afskrif van ons diensbrief, gedateer 14 Junie 1958, wat hierdie instruksies bevat, word aangeheg, tesame met die dokumente waarna daarin verwys word.

Ter aanvulling hiervan word afskrifte van die volgende stukke ook aangeheg:

- (1) Diensbrief 43/44 van 13 Junie 1958, ontvang van ons Ambassade in Washington, waarin verslag gedoen word oor die vordering wat in die voorlopige samesprekings gemaak is;
- (2) diensbrief 43/44 van 19 Junie 1958, ontvang van ons Ambassade in Washington, wat die tentatiewe sienswyse van die Australiese Ambassade in Washington bevat.

Graag ontvang ek enige kommentaar wat u mag goed-dink om te lewer.

Alidz
SEKRETARIS VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE.

VERTROULIK.

Article 9 - Settlement of Disputes between Parties.

- (4) For the initial stages at least, no formal record will be kept of the discussions.
- (5) Publicity will be kept to a minimum. Any press statements will be agreed by the Twelve.
- (6) Consideration of the time and place of the Antarctic Conference will be left over until some progress has been made in the discussions on the draft Treaty.
- (7) The Soviet representative took the opportunity of referring to the suggestion in the Soviet reply to the American invitation, that participation in the Conference should be open to all States which wished to participate. (Third last paragraph of the Soviet note sent to you with my minute 43/44 of June 11th.) He put forward a rather vague suggestion that the twelve countries should officially inform other countries (not specified) of the intention to hold the Conference and so afford them an opportunity of expressing a desire to participate. This was opposed in principle by the Chilean and Argentine representatives mainly on the grounds that the Conference was being convened primarily to carry forward the scientific co-operation of the I.G.Y., and that no other countries than the twelve had shown any interest in that co-operation. The feeling of the meeting, however, was that this was a question of substance rather than procedure and that it could be raised at the first normal meeting of the preparatory group.

(sgd.) J.G. Stewart

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES.

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA,
WASHINGTON 8, D.C.

13th June, 1958.

AIRBAG.

CONFIDENTIAL.

The Secretary for External Affairs,
PRETORIA.

Antarctica.

A meeting of officials of the twelve countries was held this morning to discuss the procedure for the preparatory work for the Conference on Antarctica. I attended it, accompanied by Mr. Franklin.

As the weekly bag is on the point of closing I set out very briefly the results of that meeting.

- (1) It was agreed that the first meeting should commence on June 24th. This would enable delegations to receive instructions from their Governments. Thereafter meetings would be held at regular intervals (probably every second day) as required.
- (2) Chairmanship would rotate among the delegations.
- (3) There would be no prescribed agenda as such; but it was agreed that the discussions would be over the outline of the proposed Treaty, with a view to agreeing on the main provisions thereof, and then working out tentative drafts of the individual articles. While no discussion of the content of the Treaty took place this morning, we have received informally from the Australians a list of the articles which they tentatively consider might be included. These are:-

Preamble.

- Article 1 - Peaceful Use of Antarctic.
- Article 2 - Scientific Research and Co-operation.
- Article 3 - Status Quo on Rights and Claims.
- Article 4 - Jurisdiction in regard to Civil Disputes and Criminal Matters.
- Article 5 - Position in regard to Non-Signatories.
- Article 6 - Duration, Ratification, etc.
- Article 7 - Definition of Antarctic.
- Article 8 - Administrative Arrangements.

out the basic draft of a Treaty. It was pointed out, for instance, that the preparatory discussions on a draft treaty would mean that the work of the conference could be cut down considerably and that without these discussions a conference would be an unduly long drawn out affair. Furthermore the practice of appointing a preparatory committee had already proved itself of distinct value in the drawing up of International Treaties and Agreements. We took the opportunity at this stage to endorse the desirability of having the preparatory talks include discussion of the broad lines of the draft of a Treaty, but at the same time made the point as instructed in your minute 102/2/7 of 14 June, that preparatory talks should not, however, take matters so far that the conference would in fact be a mere rubber stamp. It is not clear whether the Russians will again raise this particular question - they, however, raised no further objection when the Chairman of the day (Argentine) concluded that it was the consensus of opinion that the Australian list of topics (which had been circulated to the group during the course of the meeting) should form the basis for the discussion at the next meeting on 1 July.

The only other point which was raised during the course of the meeting relates to the time and place of the conference. The United Kingdom felt that it was premature to think of time and place until it was decided what the subject matter of the conference would be. We, however, expressed the view that there should be some preliminary target and with this the United Kingdom agreed. Australia felt that we should proceed to a conference as quickly as we could, while Norway expressed the view that in order to give Governments time to carefully consider the preparatory work which the group would carry out, the conference should only commence about three months after the group completed its work. Most delegations were not prepared, however, to express any firm views on this matter. It was eventually decided that the question of time and place for a conference would remain as first item on the agenda of each meeting of the group when any fresh views which might develop could be expressed.

articles. While no discussion of the articles of the Treaty took place this was done informally from the circulation of the articles which they had received included. These are -

(Sgd.) J.G. Stewart
 (Sgd.) J.G. Humart.

Articles

- Article 1 - Peaceful Use CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES ad.
- Article 2 - International Security and Co-operation
- Article 3 - States and the International Community
- Article 4 - Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
- Article 5 - Position to be taken by the International Community
- Article 6 - Disarmament, Reduction of Armaments, and Control of Armaments
- Article 7 - Definition of War
- Article 8 - International Law

COPY/CB

Ref. 43/44

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA,

WASHINGTON 8, D.C.,

24th June, 1958.

SPECIAL AIRMAIL.
CONFIDENTIAL.

THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: PRETORIA.

Antarctica.

At today's meeting of the working group it was agreed, as reported in my telegram No. 105, that the subjects listed by the Australian Embassy as possible articles for the proposed Treaty would serve as a suitable list of topics on which preliminary views could be exchanged at subsequent meetings. (The Australian list was incorporated in our minute 43/44 of June 13th and we enclose a copy for ease of reference.)

The next meeting is to be held on July 1st, and on that occasion there is expected to be a general exchange of views on all the subjects, with particular consideration being given to the "definition of Antarctica" and the "position in regard to non-Signatories".

The Russians again raised the question of participants and repeated their argument that all countries who wished to participate in a conference on Antarctica should be allowed to do so. The majority of speakers, including ourselves, the Australians, New Zealand and the Argentine, considered that the participants should be confined to the twelve countries who had participated in the IGY. Both New Zealand and Australia made the point that the twelve should decide on the form of the Treaty but that in the Articles of the Treaty provision could be made for the participation of other countries. The Delegate of Japan, whilst opposing an increase in the preparatory group beyond the twelve, nevertheless expressed the view when pressed by the Soviet Delegate, that once the preliminary work was done consideration could be given to inviting other countries, that is, to the conference. There was no further debate on this particular point and no decision was taken. This is, however, a question which is bound to be raised again by the Russians in the course of these informal meetings. At present, with the possible exception of Japan, there does not appear to be any support for the Russian proposal.

The Russian representative today also expressed opposition to discussing draft Articles for a Treaty at the informal talks. The talks, he said, should be confined to the time and place for conference, procedural questions and agreement on the general principles underlying the Treaty. There was no support for this point of view from the other members of the group who felt there was great advantage in having informal preparatory talks and working

HUGBOS.
AIR MAIL



UNIE VAN SUID-AFRIKA.
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

102/2/7

455

DEPARTEMENT VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

PRETORIA.

13 - JUL 1958

→ THE SECRETARY FOR TRANSPORT.
THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE.
THE SECRETARY FOR COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES.
THE PRESIDENT : COUNCIL FOR SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH.

Antarctica.

I attach, for association with previous correspondence on the abovementioned subject, a copy of a further minute 43/44 of the 24th June, 1958, received from our Embassy in Washington, giving a progress report on the preliminary discussions on the proposed Antarctic treaty.

Alton
SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

B.
C.R.
1-77

CONFIDENTIAL.

... this is, however, a question which is bound to be raised again by the Russians in the course of these informal meetings. At present, with the possible exception of Japan, there does not appear to be any support for the Russian proposal.

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11 JUL 1958

GEHEIM

DIE SEKRETARIS VAN BUITELANDSE SAKE: PRETORIA.

ANTARTIKA.

1. U diensbriewe 102/2/7 van 3 en 4 Julie 1958 met bylaes verwys.
2. Ek vind dit moeilik om enige kommentaar te lewer oor die inhoud van die stukke wat u aan my deurgestuur het aangesien daar blykbaar nog geen vaste gedagtes uit die Washingtonse besprekings te voorskyn getree het nie.
3. Volgens die Ambassade in Washington se diensbrief 43/44 van 24 Junie aan u sou die kwessie van 'n omskrywing van die woord "Antartika" op die vergadering van 1 Julie bespreek gewees het. Die Departement ag dit in die Unie se belang dat die gebied wat deur die voorgestelde verdrag gedek gaan word, tot die Antartiese landmassa en, indien nodig, 'n geringe strook seegebied aangrensend aan die landmassa beperk sal wees. Ek weet nie van enige grondige redes waarom die verdrag op enige aanmerkbare deel van die seegebied benoerde die Antartiese landmassa van toepassing behoort gemaak te word nie.
4. Ek stel voor dat, indien u nognie iets van die Ambassade in Washington in verband met die besprekings oor hierdie punt verneem het nie, u die Ambassade vra om te rapporteer oor wat op die vergadering van 1 Julie plaasgevind het. As hierdie punt nie toe bespreek was nie, moet die Ambassade asseblief informeel probeer vasstel wat die gedagtes van ander vriendskaplike lande oor 'n moontlike omskrywing van die woord "Antartika" is.

J. J. KITSHOFF

SEKRETARIS VAN HANDEL EN NYWERHEID.

B.
AR/GJFS-221.

3) Ensuring harmonious and mutually advantageous relations with the United Nations. The representatives may establish cooperative working relationships with specialized agencies of the United Nations having a technical interest in Antarctica and may submit, or cause to be submitted, informative reports from time to time to appropriate bodies of the United Nations.

[4), 5), etc. Other suitable measures, in implementation of purposes which may be agreed upon for inclusion in the proposed treaty, and limited strictly to the purposes of the treaty.

To execute and administer the measures which they may adopt, the representatives may employ the services of qualified persons. Contributions to meet the costs of implementing this agreement, pursuant to the present Article, shall be made in equal proportions by the High Contracting Parties.

DRAFT SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES.

Article

Representatives of the High Contracting Parties shall meet at the City of _____ within two months of the coming into force of this agreement and thereafter at suitable intervals, as determined by them, for the purpose of considering and adopting, by majority vote, each High Contracting Party having one vote, such administrative measures as are appropriate to ensure the successful accomplishment of the objectives of this agreement, including measures regarding:

1) Encouragement and facilitation of scientific research by nationals, organizations, and governments of all countries, for the successful and orderly exercise of the freedom of scientific research provided for in Article II of this agreement, the representatives of the High Contracting Parties may consider and adopt measures concerning:

a) Coordinated planning of support operations for international cooperative scientific programs in Antarctica, with a view to achieving maximum economy and efficiency in support of such programs;

b) Exchange of information regarding private or governmental expeditions to Antarctica for scientific purposes;

c) Arrangements for the exchange of scientific personnel and observers.

2) Ensuring the use of Antarctica for purely peaceful purposes. The representatives may consider and adopt measures for the stationing of observers at specific locations and such other inspection measures as may be deemed appropriate.

Neither this Article nor any other Article of this agreement shall be interpreted as prohibiting the use of military personnel and equipment, including naval vessels and military aircraft, for scientific research or to provide support therefor.

Article

Any question or dispute arising among any of the High Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the present agreement, which is not settled by negotiation, shall be referred to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement.

defined by the Conference, detailed consideration of administrative matters is not possible. However, Governments will wish to give advance thought to the size and nature of the administrative machinery which they might eventually have to establish after agreeing upon the principles for a treaty - it could range from a large organisation with many functions to the opposite extreme of almost no organisation at all. It could be generally agreed that administrative functions should be strictly limited to implementation of the specific principles of the treaty. Some of these functions would need consideration by the Conference. Others might be settled by subsequent arrangements under the auspices of the treaty participants. A tentative list might include:

Coordination of scientific programmes.

Notification of national plans.

Relations with scientific organisations such as SCAR and with other specialised international organisations such as WMO.

Distribution of scientific information.

Observer exchanges and other visitors.

Jurisdiction over nationals.

Submission of information to the United Nations on implementation of treaty.

(Sharing of administrative costs).

(Voting by two-thirds majority).

DRAFT WORKING PAPER.

SUBMITTED BY NEW ZEALAND.

PRINCIPLE: SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND COOPERATION.

The Governments, organisations and nationals of all countries should enjoy freedom to carry out scientific research in the Antarctic. They should make cooperative arrangements to ensure that the results of such research are fully shared for the benefit of mankind.

Note:

- (i) Freedom to carry out scientific research in the Antarctic would necessarily involve consideration by the Conference of the manner in which this principle should be implemented. Provision might be made, for example, for notification and coordination of scientific programmes and plans of individual expeditions in selected locations to ensure that overlapping of scientific operations would not occur.
- (ii) Similarly, logistic considerations, including the limited availability of accommodation and transport, would require that arrangements for observers and other visitors to scientific stations should also be notified and coordinated.
- (iii) The Conference might wish to examine the question of the definition of "scientific research".
- (iv) The concept of "freedom" set out in the above principle would be intended to be of general application, subject only to the observance of rules established by or under the proposed international treaty. In other words, participants enjoying the proposed freedom would be expected to accept the mutually-agreed obligations and responsibilities.
- (v) Until the content of the proposed treaty is more clearly

C

DRAFT WORKING PAPER
SUBMITTED BY NEW ZEALAND.

PRINCIPLE: PEACEFUL USE OF ANTARCTICA.

Antarctica should be used for peaceful purposes only.

Note:

(i) It would be understood, under this principle, that a distinction should be drawn between military operations proper (such as the establishment of military bases, fortifications, weapons, conduct of military manoeuvres, etc.) and the use of elements of the armed forces for logistic support of scientific expeditions. In the past such elements have provided valuable support in supplying scientific expeditions from several countries. The term "peaceful purposes" should not be interpreted as excluding similar activity in the future.

(ii) It would be necessary to ensure that the provision for "peaceful uses" was fully observed both by treaty signatories and by any others who might wish to send expeditions to Antarctica. This might be accomplished by exchanges of observers. It would be for the Conference to consider whether arrangements to this end needed to be elaborated in the context of the principle of "peaceful use" itself, or whether they might best form part of "administrative" arrangements made under the treaty.

CONFIDENTIAL

Suggested Amendment of United Kingdom Draft
as agreed upon at informal meeting
on 10th July, 1958.

DEFINITION OF ANTARCTICA

Antarctica shall, for the purposes of the present Convention, comprise all the land and waters situated in the whole area between latitude 60 degrees South and the South Pole, excluding the high seas.

CONFIDENTIAL

A

CONFIDENTIAL

Original United Kingdom Draft.

DEFINITION OF ANTARCTICA.

The Territory of Antarctica shall, for the purposes of the present Convention, comprise all the land, and appurtenant territorial waters and continental shelf, situated in the whole area between latitude 60 degrees South and the South Pole, but shall not extend to any waters in the said area consisting of high seas beyond the limits of territorial waters.

CONFIDENTIAL

deposited with -

ARTICLE X:

This agreement shall be open for accession by states members of the United Nations or of any of the specialised agencies, being states that undertake scientific research in Antarctica. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with -

ARTICLE XI:

This agreement shall continue in force for a period of

(and such other final clauses as may be necessary).

9th July, 1958.

S E C R E T

of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly, unless the parties have within a reasonable period agreed upon some other form of settlement, be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute.

ARTICLE VI:

Within of the coming into force of this agreement and thereafter as may from time to time be necessary, representatives of the states referred to in the preamble to the agreement and of such other states as have acceded to the agreement shall meet for the purpose of adopting, by majority vote, appropriate arrangements in relation to Antarctica for ensuring its use for peaceful purposes, for encouraging and co-ordinating scientific research, for co-ordinating support operations, for the exchange of information and observers, for establishing working relationships with specialised agencies of the United Nations, and for such other purposes as may be necessary for giving effect to the agreement.

ARTICLE VII:

For the purposes of this agreement, Antarctica comprises the area between the 60th degree south latitude and the South Pole, including Continental Antarctica, the adjacent islands, waters and submarine areas, and the superincumbent airspace.

ARTICLE VIII:

This agreement is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with -

ARTICLE IX:

This agreement shall come into force thirty days after the date when the instruments of ratification of all of the governments referred to in the preamble to the agreement shall have been

4/...

In particular -

(a) No state shall be required to renounce, or shall, by reason of becoming a party to this agreement, be taken as having renounced, any territorial right or claim in Antarctica

(b) No state shall, by reason of becoming a party to this agreement, be taken as having recognized any territorial right or claim in Antarctica of any other state,

(c) The activities during the currency of this agreement of any of the parties or of their nationals or organisations shall not, as between the parties to the agreement, either while the agreement is in force, or at any time after the termination of the agreement, constitute a basis for furthering existing territorial rights or claims, or for advancing new territorial claims, in Antarctica, but the legal status quo in respect of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall, while the agreement is in force, be entirely preserved.

ARTICLE IV:

Each state party to this agreement shall have the exclusive right, in relation to its own nationals and organisations, to exercise jurisdiction for the punishment of offences against its laws committed by its nationals or organisations in Antarctica. Pending the making of such other arrangements as the parties may subsequently agree upon, matters involving claims by nationals or organisations of one party arising out of acts or omissions in Antarctica by nationals or organisations of another party shall be determined in such manner as may be agreed upon by the parties concerned.

ARTICLE V:

Disputes between any of the parties to this agreement arising out of the interpretation or application of any article of the agreement shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction

SECRET

International Agreement relating to
Antarctica.

The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Recognising that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes,

Recognising the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from international co-operation in scientific research in Antarctica in the International Geophysical Year,

Considering that it is desirable to make provision for the continuance of scientific research in Antarctica on the basis of international co-operation,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I:

Antarctica shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall be and remain entirely demilitarised.

ARTICLE II:

The States parties to this agreement, their nationals and organisations shall enjoy freedom of scientific research in Antarctica and shall co-operate with each other in the co-ordination of, and in the exchange of information resulting from, such research.

ARTICLE III:


This agreement shall be entirely without prejudice to the position of any of the States parties to the agreement in regard to questions of territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.

would appear to be no grounds for failing to open the gates to all comers.

Incidentally, in regard to the question of additional participants, Ambassador Daniels told us that they had received an approach from the Italians requesting to be included in a Conference on Antarctica on the grounds that an Italian scientist had accompanied a recent New Zealand expedition to Antarctica. This approach serves to indicate that there are probably other States who are in a like position and would request admission to a Conference if a country like India were allowed to participate.

I am also enclosing a paper on the settling of disputes (annexure E) and a paper on administrative measures (annexure F) which were circulated by Ambassador Daniels but which were not discussed at the meeting.

Copies to London and Canberra.


CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES s.i.

In accordance with the decision of the group of Twelve at the last meeting, the New Zealand representative has prepared two drafts (Annexures C and D) along the lines indicated in my minute 43/44 of 10th July, 1958, in relation to the principles of Peaceful Use of Antarctica and Scientific Research and Co-operation. There was general agreement that these drafts would form a useful basis for discussion at the next meeting of the group. The draft on Scientific Research and Co-operation in particular contains suggestions which will permit discussions to range over a fairly wide field. As far as the draft on Peaceful Uses is concerned, the Australians expressed a preference for the text in their draft Treaty, while the United States, United Kingdom and New Zealand felt that it was perhaps unnecessary to mention demilitarisation. It was pointed out that the wording presupposed that there had been some militarisation which was not the case. We, with the Australians, were not entirely satisfied that it would be unnecessary to refer to non-militarisation or some such wording and we would of course be glad for your guidance on this in due course. As far as the draft on Scientific Research and Co-operation is concerned it was decided that the American draft on freedom of access for scientific research which was forwarded to you under cover of our minute 43/44 of 30th June, 1958, should replace the first sentence of the New Zealand draft of the principle. The second sentence of the New Zealand draft is also being reworded and will be discussed at our meeting on Monday. As already indicated the Australians in their draft (Article II) would restrict freedom of scientific co-operation to the parties to the Agreement.

Passing reference at the meeting was made to the question of voting. All were of the opinion that it would not be possible to insert a provision which would require voting to be unanimous. The New Zealanders and ourselves favoured a vote by two-thirds majority. This was also originally the Australian position but you will note from Article VI of their draft that they have taken the view that decisions should be by majority vote. The United States and the United Kingdom seemed undecided on this point.

One other point raised at the meeting which it is worth mentioning here relates to the decision of India to request that the question of Antarctica be placed on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. Ambassador Daniels stated that he remained opposed to this and that he hoped to be able to hold that line in the State Department. On the other hand Ambassador Daniels recognised that the United States had in the past adopted the attitude that it would not oppose inscription of any item. Ambassador Daniels wondered whether it was possible for any of the countries present to exert influence on the Indians to get them to withdraw their proposal. The United Kingdom representative then indicated that his Government had already indicated to the Indians that their initiative was not helpful. The representative of New Zealand thought it possible that the New Zealand Prime Minister might be prepared to raise the issue with Nehru. The Australians wondered whether it might not in the end prove necessary to let the Indians in to the Conference as a quid pro quo for their withdrawal of the item and indeed it was disturbing to note how ready some of the other parties were to even giving consideration to this possibility. For once a country which cannot claim any direct interest in Antarctica is admitted, there

not be possible to keep acceding countries off the administrative body), but that there should be freedom of access for scientific co-operation subject to the acceptance of the principles of the Treaty and the administrative and control arrangements established by the Treaty (participation in the administrative body would, however, be confined to the group of twelve). This has seemed to be the position of the New Zealanders too, but they now appear hesitant. The British have not been very communicative on this point, but our impression is that they would not take a stand against freedom of accession to the Treaty. According to the Australians the Chileans, Argentines, Norwegians and Japanese, for reasons which have not been clearly specified, are likely to favour an accession clause.

The Australian position is understandable. If the Russians stake claims, these claims are likely to be in the Australian sector. It is essential to Australia, therefore, that Russia should be party to a Treaty, and subject to its terms and conditions. To ensure this, therefore, they seem to be prepared to agree to an extension of participation under certain conditions.

We cannot avoid the possibility that if it comes to a show-down it may only be the Americans, ourselves and possibly the New Zealanders who would oppose the Australian viewpoint. Bearing in mind the Russian position and the overriding consideration for Australia that a Treaty without Russia would serve little purpose, we fear that the Americans may be persuaded to modify their position.

Bearing in mind your instructions it will be our intention to support the American viewpoint. We feel, however, that the tide may be running in favour of the Australian view. If the Americans do make concessions, I think you will agree that we would have no option but to go along with them. Our efforts in that case, we think, should be directed to endeavouring to ensure that the right of accession to the Treaty is subject to evidence of real interest in Antarctic co-operation.

The Australians are anxious to communicate their draft Treaty to the other members of the group including the Russians. They have agreed to await the outcome of the meeting next Tuesday (July 15th) at which the exchange of views on the documents prepared in terms of the discussions of the meeting of July 8th will take place. This exchange of views might clarify the position of the various delegations and may bring matters to a head. If, therefore, you have views which do not accord with those expressed in this report, it would be appreciated if you could ensure that they reach us as early as possible during the course of next week, and in any case before the following meeting of the group which will no doubt take place on July 22nd.

The meeting also discussed the draft definition of Antarctica which the United Kingdom is to present at the next meeting of the group on Tuesday. The original draft submitted to us by the United Kingdom (Annexure A) appeared to unnecessarily complicate matters by, for example, raising such questions as the continental shelf, and eventually a much simpler wording was agreed upon (Annexure B, which the United Kingdom has agreed to endeavour to clear with the United Kingdom authorities before our next informal meeting, which will take place on Monday morning, i.e. prior to the meeting of the group of twelve on Tuesday.

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
 AMBASSADE VAN DIE UNIE VAN SUID AFRIKA
 WASHINGTON 8. D. C.

11th July, 1958

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS REP. VAN DIE SUIDAFRIKAanse REGERING MINISTRE/REKTRASIE
16 JUL 1958
REGISTERED NO. 1001/1958
FILED ON FILE CLASS. NO. 1001/1958

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THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
PRETORIA.

ANTARCTICA

I have to advise you that, the informal meeting referred to in my minute 43/44 of 11th July, 1958, between the United States and Commonwealth members of the group took place as scheduled on 10 July.

At the meeting the Australian representative presented to us a complete draft of a Treaty which he had received from Canberra. The meeting did not get down to a detailed consideration of the Australian draft (Annexure A 1) but it is apparent that there is a fundamental difference of approach to the Treaty between the Australians on the one hand and the United States, and also ourselves and possibly New Zealand on the other. This difference of approach relates to the question whether the Treaty should be confined to the twelve or whether other countries should be allowed to accede. It will be seen that the Australian draft Treaty makes no provision at all for scientific access to Antarctica without accession to the Treaty. The whole draft Treaty is framed on the basis that every State participating in scientific investigation in Antarctica will be doing so as a signatory of, or an accessory to, the Treaty, and will have the obligations imposed by the Treaty.

The Australians argue that in this form the Treaty will be restrictive. They doubt whether it would be possible to control the activities of other States if they are not full participants. In their minds the main purpose of a Treaty is to be able to control Russian activity in Antarctica. To this end they consider it of first importance that the Russians should be participants in the Treaty organisation and they apparently feel that the Russians would not participate if participation were to be confined to the Twelve. They concede that it might be possible for the Russians to bring in their satellites as full participants, but they seem to think it preferable that the satellites be bound by the terms of the Treaty and the obligations thereof.

The American position is exactly the same as our own, as we understand it from your minute 102/2/7 of 14 June, 1958. That is, that there should be no provision for accession in the Treaty (if there were provision for accession it would

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Article III

Nothing contained in this agreement shall be interpreted as:

1) A renunciation by any High Contracting Party of any claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have asserted;

2) A renunciation or diminution by any High Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica;

3) Recognition by any High Contracting Party of all or any part of any other country's claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.

The legal status quo existing at the time this agreement enters into force, with respect to matters of sovereignty in Antarctica, shall not be affected by this agreement and shall be maintained throughout its duration. No acts or activities taking place while this agreement is in force shall have any effect on such status quo or constitute a basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.

ARTICLE

The administrative measures which may be adopted pursuant to Article IV of this agreement, and all rules and regulations pertaining thereto, shall apply equally to all countries and shall be administered in a uniform and non-discriminatory manner, with equal treatment being accorded to countries party to this agreement and to countries not party thereto and to their respective nationals, so long as such countries and nationals observe the provisions of Articles I, II, and III hereof and the administrative measures which may be adopted pursuant to Article IV hereof.

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ARTICLE II

The nationals, organizations and governments of all countries shall enjoy freedom of scientific research in Antarctica, subject to the observance of rules established by or under the present agreement.

(he seemed more impressed with the strategic than the scientific interest); and that I could quote him to you as being satisfied that the Union should have "equal rights with the United States" on the administrative organ. He saw no need for participation in the administrative organ being extended beyond the Twelve. This would be apparent from the draft article on administrative arrangements which he had given us and from the fact that the United States would prefer that the Treaty make no provision for accessions.

I also sounded Mr. Daniels about the earlier suggestion that had been put forward that there might be some sort of "two-tier" administration. He discounted this, however, as being in conflict with the ideas he had already expressed.

We should be grateful to receive any comments you may wish to offer on the draft articles enclosed herewith, and also on the Australian observations which we sent to you with our minute 43/44 dated 19th June, 1958.

Copies to London and Canberra.

J. P. A. ...

CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES a.i.

Ambassador Daniels gave us drafts of three articles relating to freedom of access, freezing of the status quo, and administrative arrangements. Copies of these are attached.

There was no opportunity of entering into detailed discussion of these three drafts. As far as the draft article on administrative measures is concerned, however, we asked Mr. Daniels whether, as the wording suggested, the countries not party to the Treaty would not participate in the administrative organ. He confirmed this.

During our discussion it was suggested to Mr. Daniels that it might be difficult to consider the position of non-signatories without taking a stand on the question of accession to the Treaty. His response was satisfactory to our point of view. He thought that if the Treaty made suitable provision for peaceful access for scientific purposes there would be no need to make provision for accession to the Treaty.

You will have gathered that the preparatory talks are in a very uncertain stage, and we are somewhat hesitant about taking too strong a line in the preparatory meetings. From the instructions we have received, our main impression is that the primary concern of the Union is to ensure that the Union has a full and equal voice in any administrative organ that may be decided on, and that participation in that organ should not be extended beyond the "twelve". As you will have gathered from our earlier reports there seemed to be reason to believe that this position was acceptable to the Americans. We have never been entirely happy that this was the case, however, and I took the occasion on Saturday to talk with Mr. Daniels about this. We spent the day together in the country and the circumstances were conducive to an informal but frank exchange of views. I told him, as the Ambassador had told him before, that while the Union might not have the same record of exploration and discovery as some other countries, we had a direct and vital interest. Apart from our scientific and technical interest, we were vitally concerned in the strategic position. Because of our geographic position it was of prime concern to us to ensure that the Antarctic should not be able to be used for purposes hostile to the Union or to the West. Accordingly we considered it essential that we should be fully represented on the administrative organ and that that organ should be confined to those countries with a real and direct interest. I told him that I believed the Union was, in general, sympathetic with the United States attitude and would wish to give such support as might be possible to the Americans. I realized that the preparatory talks were at a critical stage and that it was desirable to play along as far as possible with the Russians. Bearing in mind Russian emphasis on universality, however, we might be obliged to take a firm attitude in our own interests. If we were satisfied about our position on the control organ it would be easier for us not to take action in the preparatory talks which might be embarrassing to our friends.

Mr. Daniels' reaction to this was very satisfactory. He said that he had been convinced of the Union's interest

conflict of principle, e.g. the definition of Antarctica.

(d) There could be no certainty that the Russians would continue to talk even on this basis. It was desirable, therefore, that the other eleven countries should in the meantime endeavour to reach some sort of agreement on the proposed Treaty and on procedure so that they could develop a common approach to Russian intransigence and in the event of a break would be able to take timely and effective action. With this end in view and because, for obvious reasons, it was not advisable to have meetings of the eleven without the Russians, it was considered desirable to adopt the alternative of pursuing informal exchanges on the lines of the present meeting. For the American and Commonwealth representatives to consult together and at the same time to encourage individually exchanges of views with the others.

It was recognised that in following this procedure we should, *inter alia*, devote our energies to the following:-

(i) The Japanese position might prove to be embarrassing. It was a bit too "international". If pursued, it might encourage the Russians. Other representatives should try to make the Japanese aware of the realities of the case.

(ii) The position of the Argentines and Chileans on the contrary might be too "hard". The Chileans, in particular, seemed to be desirous of making the preparatory talks too formal by insisting on agreement on details before going forward to a Conference. The position had been complicated by the fact that the Chilean Government had sent a senior member of their Foreign Service (Ambassador Gajardo) to lead their delegation to the preparatory talks. They seemed to wish to make the preparatory talks more formal than might be desirable in the circumstances.

Ambassador Daniels told us that he had been under some pressure from the Chileans and Argentines to produce "working documents" for the preparatory talks. These two countries were particularly anxious to have firm agreement in advance on the administrative arrangements. They were also very sensitive on the question of sovereignty, and by over-insistence on these issues during the preparatory talks might cause difficulties in other directions.

We skirted the question of whether the eleven should proceed on their own to concluding a Treaty, should there be a break with the Russians. The Australian position did not allow of discussion of this.

To give effect to the suggestion in paragraph (d) above about informal consultation on the details of the Treaty,



EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
 AMBASSADE VAN DIE UNIE VAN SUID-AFRIKA
 WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

30th June, 1958

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DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS DEPT. VAN BUITENLANDSE SAKE DISTRICT OFFICE
9 JUL 1958
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THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
PRETORIA.

ANTARCTICA

In the light of the Russian attitude as it appeared to be emerging from the first preparatory meeting, Ambassador Daniels of the State Department suggested that there would be advantage in an informal exchange of views between him and the four Commonwealth representatives before the second meeting; and after consultation a meeting for this purpose was held at this Embassy on Friday, June 27th. The consensus of opinion which emerged was:

(a) It was uncertain whether the Russians would continue to participate in preparatory talks if these talks embraced matters of substance regarding the proposed Treaty. From the statements of the Russian representative at the first meeting it seemed that they wished the talks to be confined to consideration of the time and place of a Conference, the procedure for such a Conference and the bare principles of a Treaty. They also wished the Conference to be open to participation by any country which might so desire.

(b) While the Russian conditions were unacceptable, it was nevertheless desirable that they should be participants in an Antarctic Treaty; and we should try to avoid a "break" unless this should prove unavoidable. We should attempt, therefore, to keep the preparatory talks going on a basis which would allow of some progress on substance without giving the Russians cause to walk out.

(c) This might be accomplished by concentrating the talks in the initial stages on those matters on which it seemed that the Soviet representative had authority to negotiate. The agreement reached at the first meeting that the time and place of a Conference should be a continuing item on the agenda of the meetings would give some reason to the Russians to continue participating in the meetings. To meet their interest in the question of extending participation in the Conference, we could talk about the position of non-signatories and the principle of freedom of access to Antarctica for peaceful purposes. In discussion of this principle it might be possible to cover quite a number of matters of detail in regard to the Treaty. We could also in the initial stages concentrate on such matters as seemed least likely to give rise to

The time element may be particularly important now in view of the news, which we received confidentially from the British Embassy, that the Indian Government has sent instructions to its United Nations representative to seek to have the question of Antarctica placed on the agenda of the next session of the General Assembly. We understand from the British Embassy that you have been informed about this through the C.R.O.

Copies to London and Canberra, to whom we are also forwarding copies of the following documents:-

1. The United States Aide-Memoire.
2. The text of the United States invitation.
3. The Russian reply to the United States invitation.
4. The Embassy's reports Ref. 43/44 of 13th and 24th June, 1958.

The next meeting of the preparatory group will take place on July 8th.

R. P. ...

CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES a.i.

(ii) Freezing of the status quo.

There was some discussion of this and in spite of his stand on not discussing substance, the Soviet representative was drawn into it. In the circumstances one wonders if the procedure to follow in order to get the talks going is simply to ignore the Russian objections to discussing particular articles and to proceed to talk about these matters in the hopes that without precipitating a walk-out, the Russians would be drawn willy-nilly into the discussions.

The United States felt that the question of freezing the legal status quo was important and should be further clarified before the Conference. The Australians supported the freezing of all rights' claims for the duration of the Treaty, but felt that the Article would require careful drafting. Support for this also came from the representative of Chile.

The Soviet representative at this stage entered the discussions and drew attention to the paragraph of their note accepting the United States invitation to a Conference, which reads as follows:-

"For achieving that aim it is important, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, to prevent at the very outset complications that may arise from attempts, direct or indirect, to settle or predetermine the question concerning the territorial claims of states in the Antarctic. In this light it would be well that the projected treaty not include any provisions affecting the question of territorial claims in the Antarctic, which could be regarded as placing some states in an unequal status with regard to other states."

He did not elaborate on this and therefore we remain as much in the dark as before as to what the Russians have in mind in this connection.

It is our impression that the chances of making much progress with the Russians along the present lines are remote, and that after a few more meetings consideration may have to be given as to whether there is any advantage in continuing. In the meantime we understand that some delegations are hoping that it will be possible to speed up informal consultation among the eleven on the terms of a draft Treaty. The Australian representative is expecting to receive soon the text of a draft Treaty from Canberra and he has expressed the hope that as a first step the four Commonwealth representatives and the Americans could get together and endeavour to work out some mutually acceptable tentative draft on the basis of such document. He expects that the draft will be communicated to you by Canberra.

This approach obviously remains unsatisfactory to the other members of the group. The representative of Chile, for instance, felt that it was necessary to exchange views on the nature of the proposed Treaty in the preparatory talks and that in addition to the date and place of the Conference, the group should discuss the agenda, regulations to govern the conference and technical details. A similar view was expressed by the Argentine representative. The point was again made that a preliminary exchange of views on the proposed articles of a Treaty would considerably cut down the length of a Conference and contribute to its success. The Norwegian representative said his Government's approach to the preparatory talks was governed by special practical problems. The Norwegian Government, for financial and staff reasons, would like the Conference to be as short as possible and therefore they would like the group to be able to present to governments an outline of the problems the Conference would face so that adequate consideration could be given to them beforehand. He thought it would be useful to hear the views of representatives on the various matters which would form the substance of the Treaty, and he enquired whether the Soviet representative had any objections to hearing the informal views of representatives on these matters. To this the Soviet representative replied that it would be a waste of time but that he was listening. We added our say at this stage by pointing out that all apparently felt that there should be agreement on principles; nevertheless it was not possible to agree on principles unless we were certain what would be involved in giving effect to those principles. Therefore it seemed to us that it was necessary to have an exchange of views on the various principles involved. The United States also voiced its support for an exchange of ideas on various points - he stressed (for the benefit of the Soviet representative no doubt) that such an exchange was merely an informal information process and not binding on anyone.

(C) Specific Points Discussed.

(1) Definition of Antarctica.

In spite of the objections by the Soviet representative and at the suggestion of the French representative, various members of the group expressed their views on the definition of Antarctica. The following representatives felt that 60°S latitude should be agreed upon as a basis for a definition:- France, Argentine, Australia, Norway, Chile. The United States also expressed agreement for the adoption of 60°S latitude as a point of departure for discussions without, however, including the high seas. The United Kingdom expressed their agreement with this suggestion. (The exclusion of the high seas would possibly mean that whaling operations would not be affected by any agreement on Antarctica.)

hoped the Conference would be able to take place by the end of summer. We stated that we had no particular preference as far as the venue was concerned, but would hope that it would be in a country where we had a reasonably sized diplomatic mission. We had assumed that the Conference would be held in one of the twelve countries attending the preparatory talks. There were no further exchanges of view on this question.

Other matters discussed during the meeting were:-

(A) Participants.

The Soviet representative again raised this question. He saw no reason for limiting the number of participants to the twelve countries and it should be made possible for other countries also to participate. When asked by the Australians whether he was referring to additional participants at the Conference only or also at the preparatory talks, he replied that he was actually referring to the Conference but that he would also have no objection to additional participants during the preparatory talks.

Opposition to the Soviet point of view was expressed by Chile, New Zealand, Australia, the Argentine and France. The representative of Japan thought that the best way to proceed would be to reserve the question of participation till a later stage and in the meantime to get on with such matters as a definition of Antarctica and territorial claims. The representative of New Zealand suggested to the Soviet Representative that consideration of the question of participation could not be dissociated from consideration of certain principles of the proposed Treaty, in particular that relating to the position of non-signatories, and that a way out of the difficulty might be to have a look at the principles on the basis of which the position of non-signatories would be determined. He stated that New Zealand considered that the Treaty should provide for the position of other countries who wished to do some scientific research provided they accepted the same obligations as the Twelve. This provision could be made by means of an accession clause or by stating the intention of the Twelve to provide fair treatment for all, provided they agree to abide by the rules. He wondered whether agreement on this principle would not meet the Soviet position on additional participants. The New Zealand suggestion was of course aimed at getting the Russians started on discussing something which might indirectly lead to some progress on substantive questions. (See also sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of my minute 43/44 of 30 June). His suggestion, however, drew no response from the Russians.

(B) The Purpose of the Preparatory Talks.

The Soviet representative again insisted that the talks should not be concerned with questions of substance. The group should confine itself to discussing the time and place of the Conference, procedural questions, the question of participants, and some general agreement that such principles as scientific co-operation in research work and peaceful uses, would be included in the Treaty. He considered that agreement on these matters was all the preliminary work which would be necessary in order to provide for a successful conference.

1st July, 1958

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THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,

PRETORIA

ANTARCTICA

As reported in my minute 43/44 of 24 June 1958, the first item to be taken up at each meeting of the group of Twelve would relate to the Time and Place of a Conference on Antarctica. Consequently a number of representatives expressed views on these particular points this morning.

The United States representative stated that he had an open mind on the question of place but hoped that the Conference would be able to convene by the end of the summer. Both Australia and Japan expressed a preference for holding the Conference in Washington, the former making the point that it would be convenient if the Conference were held in September at a time when many Foreign Ministers would be coming to the United States in any case to attend the United Nations General Assembly. The representative of Japan felt that Washington would be the most suitable venue, in particular as the preparatory talks are being held here and most Embassies are well equipped in the way of staff to attend such a Conference.

The Soviet representative, while professing that he had no instructions, nevertheless advocated Geneva as a suitable site for the Conference. His argument was that the venue of the Conference should be such as would be most suitable for the success of the Conference and he thought that Geneva would fill the bill admirably. All the facilities for holding Conferences were there, including a large United Nations staff. The Soviet proposal of course immediately raises the question of the desirability of associating the Conference with the United Nations even to the extent of only making use of United Nations facilities. It would seem desirable to keep the association of the Conference with the United Nations as tenuous as possible and therefore to oppose any effort to hold the Conference in Geneva. In any event, as pointed out to the Soviet representative by the representative of New Zealand, Geneva might already have a full schedule of Conferences for this year and the Conference could not count on the availability of United Nations staff. In this connection it is recalled that the Second Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy will be taking place in Geneva during the first half of September and a United Nations Sugar Conference during the latter half, so it appears that the possibility of holding the Conference in Geneva in September would in any event be ruled out. We took the opportunity at this stage to state that we

In so far as item 1 - definition of Antarctica - is concerned, the Department of Commerce and Industries has suggested that for purposes of the treaty, Antarctica be limited to the land-mass itself, and, if necessary, to the narrow fringe of ocean surrounding it also. In this connection it might also be mentioned that for the purposes of SCAR (Special Committee on Antarctic Research), Antarctica is understood to consist of that area lying to the south of the Antarctic convergence, which is in turn understood to follow, approximately, the 50°S line of latitude. As the national membership of SCAR is identical with that of the "Twelve" at present engaged in Washington in these discussions, relations between the two bodies will presumably be close, and an approximation, if nothing more, of definitions of objects of common interest might be considered advisable.

Departmental thinking has not, however, crystallised to any degree, and the above remarks are merely intended to be representative of certain factors which might be taken into account. Your urgent comments would therefore be appreciated.

W. D. Drake
SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.



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UNIE VAN SUID-AFRIKA.
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

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Departement van Buitelandse Sake,
Department of External Affairs.

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PRETORIA.

17 JUL 1958

THE SECRETARY FOR TRANSPORT.
THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE.
→ THE SECRETARY FOR COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES.
THE PRESIDENT: COUNCIL FOR SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH.

AAA

Antarctica: Preliminary discussion of
draft Treaty.

*B. -
L.S.
19/7*

Our Embassy in Washington has advised the Department that it has been agreed that the following matters will be discussed at the next meeting on 22nd July, 1958, of the representatives of the twelve countries at present engaged in Washington in preliminary discussion of a draft treaty for Antarctica:

1. United Kingdom draft definition of Antarctica.
2. New Zealand working papers on the peaceful use of Antarctica, and scientific research and co-operation in that region.
3. Three draft articles submitted by the United States, which deal with non-discrimination, freedom of research, and rights and claims, in Antarctica.

All these papers are attached, together with the following minutes from the Embassy in Washington, which give useful background information regarding the progress, if any, achieved in the talks, and the difficulties being, and likely to be encountered:

- (a) Minute 43/44 of 30th June, 1958.
- (b) Minute 43/44 of 1st July, 1958.
- (c) Minute 43/44 of 11th July, 1958.

The complete draft treaty submitted by the Australian representative, referred to in the second paragraph of the minute dated the 11th July, 1958, (see above) is also attached.

The Embassy has cabled to the effect that representatives at the discussions are expected to seek the instructions of their governments on the three items listed for discussion at the next meeting, and that our comments should reach them by the 21st July, 1958. The need for some haste can therefore be appreciated.

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9 JUL 1958

SECRET:

THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: PRETORIA.

ANTARTICA.

1. Your minute 102/2/7 of 17th July, 1958, and enclosures refer.
2. The United Kingdom's draft definition of Antartica refers to "all the land and waters situated in the whole area between latitude 60 degrees South and the South Pole, excluding the high seas". It is not clear to me what the United Kingdom has in mind in seeking the inclusion of "all waters" within the defined area but suggesting that "high seas" in the area be excluded. My impression is that the proposed definition is too vague to be accepted in its present form. An alternative would be to include in the definition all the land mass between latitude 60 degrees South and the South Pole plus the adjacent waters, say, for a distance of twelve miles from such land. There may, however, be practical difficulties in the way of applying such a definition.
3. It seems to me premature, however, to embark on a discussion of a definition of the term "Antartica" until such time as more is known about what the proposed Treaty will contain with regard to commercial exploitation of the area to be covered by the Treaty. It is conceivable that the rights of signatories to the International Whaling Agreement may be affected by whatever is written into the Treaty with respect of commercial exploitation of the resources of Antartica. The Department, accordingly, cannot express a firm view on the proposed definition until this issue has been clarified.
4. The Department does not wish to comment on the other two papers which are to be discussed at the meeting of 22nd July.

A. J. J. F. STEYN

SECRETARY FOR COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES.

ER/GJFS. 221.

The complete draft treaty submitted by the Australian representative, referred to in the second paragraph of the minute dated the 11th July, 1958, (see above) is also attached.

The Embassy has cabled to the effect that representatives at the discussions are expected to seek the instructions of their governments on the three items listed for discussion at the next meeting, and that our comments should reach them by the 21st July, 1958. The need for some haste can therefore be appreciated.

Since such an observer exchange program as suggested by the United States should be on a reciprocal basis in order to be of the most benefit to the countries concerned, the United States is making personnel available as observers to accompany the expeditions of other countries to the Antarctic. It is hoped that the Government of the Union of South Africa will, therefore, also be able to provide a space for a United States observer on whatever expedition the Government of the Union of South Africa may be planning for the coming summer season.

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The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Union of South Africa and refers to the high degree of cooperation in the scientific field among the countries participating in the Antarctica program of the International Geophysical Year. This cooperation among the scientists of these countries and the direct personal association they have had with one another has greatly enhanced the value of the International Geophysical Year program and has increased the knowledge which they are mutually obtaining from their activities and observations in Antarctica.

In the same spirit which motivated this cooperation among the scientists, and in addition to any program among the scientists for cooperation in the scientific activities at the various Antarctic stations, the United States wishes to invite official observers from each of the countries active in Antarctica to accompany the United States expedition on its relief and resupply mission to and from the Antarctic during the coming summer season there. To this end the United States Government has made a space available on its expedition for an observer from the Government of the Union of South Africa during the United States Operation Deepfreeze I. Details concerning the plans for transportation of observers will be available at a later date. Because of the need for careful advance planning, an early indication whether this invitation of the United States will be accepted would be appreciated.

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COPY/ES

Embassy of the Union of South Africa,
Washington 8, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL.

20th June, 1958.

THE SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS: PRETORIA.Antarctica.

I attach for your consideration a copy of a note which was handed to a member of the Embassy by an official of the State Department on 18th June.

You will see that the note refers to the high degree of co-operation in the scientific field among the countries participating in the Antarctic programme of the International Geophysical Year, and invites the Union Government to designate an observer to accompany the United States expedition on its relief and resupply mission to and from Antarctica during the forthcoming summer season there. Details of the transportation plans for observers will be supplied later.

The State Department note observers that an observer exchange programme should operate on a reciprocal basis and therefore expresses the hope that the Union Government will be able to provide a space for a United States observer on any expedition which the Union may be planning to the Antarctic.

Upon enquiry the State Department official indicated that the United States expedition would probably set out towards the beginning of December and would return sometime during February but these plans had not been finalised as yet. It is understood that the expedition will be visiting the Ross and Weddell seas but this is subject to confirmation.

Similar notes have been addressed to the other countries participating in the I.G.Y. in Antarctica.

The importance of giving serious consideration to this invitation seems clear in view of the Union's desire to foster United States recognition of its direct and active interest in Antarctica, particularly now during the formative stage of a possible international arrangement for the area.

You will note that an early reply to the United States invitation is requested. According to the State Department official this is to ensure that the plans for the expedition may be finalised well in advance.

(Sgd.) J.G. STEWART

CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES.

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URGENT.

PRETORIA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

17 JUL 1958

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THE SECRETARY FOR TRANSPORT.
THE PRESIDENT: COUNCIL FOR SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH.

Observer exchange programme suggested
by the United States of America.

4/10. Bore
of 2/10
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I attach, for your urgent consideration and comment, a copy of minute 43/44 of the 20th June, 1958, and annexure, received from our Embassy in Washington, in which the American Government offers to make space available on its next Antarctic expedition - Operation Deepfreeze IV - for a South African observer.

It will be noted that the United States Government will expect reciprocity in this regard, and that American personnel are being made available to accompany expeditions of other countries to the Antarctic.

Loie 4/10.

M. I. BOTHA

*Loie of 5 sal cekeer ook
belang stel. 4/10.*

SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

CONFIDENTIAL.

THE SECRETARY FOR DEFENCE.
THE SECRETARY FOR COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES.

For your information. Copies of the papers referred to are also attached.

Alw
SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.